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As president, Dwight Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons, both fission and
fusion, were permissible and desirable assets to help protect U.S. national security against
the threat of international communism.  He championed the beneficent role played by
nuclear weapons, including both civilian and military uses, and he lauded the
simultaneous and multi-pronged use of the atom for peace and for war.  Eisenhower’s
assessment of the role and value of nuclear technology was profound, sincere, and
pragmatic, but also simplistic, uneven, and perilous.  He desired to make nuclear weapons
as available, useful, and ordinary for purposes of national security as other revolutionary
military technology from the past, such as the tank or the airplane.  He also planned to
exploit nuclear technology for a variety of peaceful, civilian applications that he also
believed could contribute to national strength.  
However, Eisenhower did not possess a systematic view of national security in the
nuclear age as some scholars have argued.  Rather, Eisenhower approached the question
of how to defend national security through nuclear weapons with an array of disparate
ideas and programs which worked simultaneously toward sometimes divergent objectives
that were unified only by a simple conception of national strength.  In this effort,
Eisenhower occasionally pursued what might seem to be conflicting initiatives, but
nonetheless consistently advanced his view that strength through nuclear technology was
possible, necessary, and sustainable. Because he believed nuclear technology effectively
served his goal to defend national security through strength, Eisenhower sought to reverse
the perception that nuclear weapons were inherently dangerous by advocating steadily and
consistently for the proper and acceptable use of nuclear technology to contribute to the
safety of the republic. He conceived policies such as the New Look, massive retaliation,
Project Plowshare, and Atoms for Peace in part to convince the American public and the
international community of the U.S.’s genuine desire for peace as Eisenhower
simultaneously entrenched atomic and thermonuclear weapons into the American national
conscience.  Through his efforts, Eisenhower made nuclear weapons and nuclear
technology ordinary, abundant, and indispensable to U.S. national security in the
twentieth century.
ABOLISHING THE TABOO: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND 




B.A., Appalachian State University, 1997
M.A., University of North Carolina at Greensboro, 1999
A DISSERTATION
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Department of History






Dr. Jack M. Holl
Co-Major Professor
Dr. Donald J. Mrozek
Copyright
ABOLISHING THE TABOO: PRESIDENT EISENHOWER AND 





As president, Dwight Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons, both fission and
fusion, were permissible and desirable assets to help protect U.S. national security against
the threat of international communism.  He championed the beneficent role played by
nuclear weapons, including both civilian and military uses, and he lauded the
simultaneous and multi-pronged use of the atom for peace and for war.  Eisenhower’s
assessment of the role and value of nuclear technology was profound, sincere, and
pragmatic, but also simplistic, uneven, and perilous.  He desired to make nuclear weapons
as available, useful, and ordinary for purposes of national security as other revolutionary
military technology from the past, such as the tank or the airplane.  He also planned to
exploit nuclear technology for a variety of peaceful, civilian applications that he also
believed could contribute to national strength.  
However, Eisenhower did not possess a systematic view of national security in the
nuclear age as some scholars have argued.  Rather, Eisenhower approached the question
of how to defend national security through nuclear weapons with an array of disparate
ideas and programs which worked simultaneously toward sometimes divergent objectives
that were unified only by a simple conception of national strength.  In this effort,
Eisenhower occasionally pursued what might seem to be conflicting initiatives, but
nonetheless consistently advanced his view that strength through nuclear technology was
possible, necessary, and sustainable. Because he believed nuclear technology effectively
served his goal to defend national security through strength, Eisenhower sought to reverse
the perception that nuclear weapons were inherently dangerous by advocating steadily and
consistently for the proper and acceptable use of nuclear technology to contribute to the
safety of the republic. He conceived policies such as the New Look, massive retaliation,
Project Plowshare, and Atoms for Peace in part to convince the American public and the
international community of the U.S.’s genuine desire for peace as Eisenhower
simultaneously entrenched atomic and thermonuclear weapons into the American national
conscience.  Through his efforts, Eisenhower made nuclear weapons and nuclear




Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Dedication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
CHAPTER TWO: Historiography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
a.  Initial Impressions and Orthodox Scholarship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
b.  Revisionism and Post-Revisionism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
c.  The Intellectual Eisenhower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
d.  Eisenhower and Hiroshima . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
CHAPTER THREE: Restoring Economic Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
a.  Cold War Economics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
b.  The Fear of the Garrison State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
c.  A New Look at Financial Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
CHAPTER FOUR: Projecting Military Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
a.  Tactical Atomic War in Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
b.  The Threat of Massive Retaliation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
c.  Projecting Strength in Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
CHAPTER FIVE: Supporting Industrial Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
a. “A Wasting of Strength” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
b.  Civilian Nuclear Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
c.  The Promise of Nuclear Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
CHAPTER SIX: Bolstering Moral Strength . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
a.  Eisenhower’s Crusading Religion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
b.  Disarmament through Deterrence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
c.  Moratorium for Peace . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
d.  The Hope of Peace in the Nuclear Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 271
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
ix
Acknowledgments
Though this has been a selfish project, it has not been a solitary effort nor is the
achievement mine alone.  Many people have helped my pursuit of this goal as if it was
their own.  I feel the deepest gratitude for those who have given selflessly of their hearts
and minds, their thoughts and encouragement, their kindness and patience, their time and
money to support the completion of this dissertation.  My most immediate thanks go to
Jack Holl, who served enthusiastically as my major professor during my entire time at
Kansas State University and who guided me through this project from the beginning to
the bitter end.  I will forever be indebted to him and his wife, Jackie, for their generous
sacrifices of time, thought, and energy.  My thanks also go to Donald Mrozek, whose
commitment to academic rigor and speed helped me both to improve and finish this
manuscript.  I am grateful also to Sue Zschoche, David Graff, John McCulloh, Joseph
Unekis, Chad Litz, and Tracy Turner for their help in improving this project.  This
dissertation would not have possible without the help of Jim Leyerzapf, Herbert Pankratz,
and David Haight at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library and Patricia Hand
and Matthew Schaefer at the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library.  My thanks also go to
John Smail, George Warren, Daniel Butcher, and Deborah Quick for providing me
opportunities to teach while completing this manuscript.
To my friends, some of whom are also colleagues and all of whom have
shouldered this burden, I extend my thanks:  To Jason and Angela Buchanan, who were
there at the beginning; To Chris and Sonya Vancil for the many terrific dinners, comic
relief, and steadfast comradeship; To Lisa and Mike Mundey for their sincere friendship,
xsolid advice, and commitment to excellence; To Dan and Sally Friedman, for their
inspiring achievements, thoughtful encouragement, and vocal determination to see me
finish this project; To Micah and Michelle Booth, for their unconditional support,
unwavering enthusiasm, and necessary and memorable distractions from this dissertation. 
Finally, I am most grateful to my family.  My thanks go to Tim and Nancy Mages,
Tim and Andrea Mages, Becke and Tony Barlow, and my grandparents, Harry and
Shirley Wood, for their staunch support.  I am monumentally grateful to my sister,
Ashley, and her husband, Rick Gragg, for their genuine commitment to my academic
endeavors.  I have relied upon Ashley and Rick for strength and motivation more than
they know.  My deepest thanks go to my parents, James and Susan Jones, who have done
so much for me that I can not hope to express it all in these short sentences.  Their
willingness to trust me with their money but my decisions has given me the freedom to
succeed.  Moreover, their nearly infinite patience and dedication to my welfare has
allowed me to stay in school far beyond what we all thought was possible.  
Finally, I can only begin here to express my gratitude to Shannon, my wife and my
best friend.  She has been an equal partner in this project from the beginning, and she
dutifully read every page of this dissertation.  Shannon carried the weight of this project 
on her shoulders just as I did, but never once did she question the soundness of my
choices, complain about the sacrifices we made, or waver in her support of me.  Even
when things were at their worst and the end seemed too far away, she had no doubts.  The
successful completion of this dissertation is as much a result of her dedication, her effort,
her patience, and her wisdom as mine. 
xi
Dedication
For Dad, Mom, Ashley, and Shannon
For Harry and Shirley Wood
For Cleve and Sarah Jones
 “Memorandum to Lewis Strauss from Robert Cutler,” October 21, 1953, Papers1
of Lewis S. Strauss, Atomic Energy Commission Series, Box 8, Atoms for Peace, 1949-
1954, Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, West Branch, Iowa, hereinafter Hoover
Library, 1.
1
CHAPTER ONE – Introduction
On October 21, 1953, President Dwight Eisenhower suggested to his Special
Assistant for National Security Affairs Robert Cutler “that the taboo on the use of atomic
weapons be abolished.”  The president indicated that the time had come for a serious
revision to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 “in order that atomic weapons be treated like
other weapons.”  After all, Eisenhower continued, “if there is to be peaceful usage of
nuclear material, its handling and production needs to be considerably unshackled from
restrictions which were originally appropriate.”   That October morning Eisenhower1
expressed to Cutler a desire to take advantage both of those peaceful usages and of the
tremendous military value of nuclear weapons.  In addition to changes to legislation, he
also expressed a need to convince the American people that nuclear weapons were
virtually the same as other weapons and that they could and should be used to maximum
potential for the purposes of national security.
As president, Eisenhower believed that nuclear weapons, both fission and fusion,
were acceptable and desirable assets to help protect U.S. national security against the
threat of international communism.  He championed the beneficent role played by nuclear
weapons, including both civilian and military uses, and he lauded the simultaneous and
multi-pronged use of the atom for peace and for war.  Eisenhower’s assessment of the
role and value of nuclear technology was profound, sincere, and pragmatic, but also
 Joseph Carroll, House of War: The Pentagon and the Disastrous Rise of2
American Power (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), 209.  Carroll borrowed this phrase
from Neil Rosendorf, “John Foster Dulles’ Nuclear Schizophrenia,” in John Lewis
Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds., Cold War
Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 63.
  Dwight D. Eisenhower, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States:3
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953-1960, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1960), 820, 822.
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simplistic, uneven, and perilous.  He desired to make nuclear weapons as available,
useful, and ordinary for purposes of national security as other revolutionary military
technology from the past, such as the tank or the airplane.  The president also planned to
exploit nuclear technology for a variety of peaceful, civilian applications that he also
believed could contribute to national strength.  Through this effort, Eisenhower
occasionally pursued conflicting initiatives, but nonetheless consistently advanced his
view that strength through nuclear technology was a possible, necessary, and sustainable
means to protect U.S. national security.  
After considering the variety of initiatives in the realm of nuclear policy that
Eisenhower pursued, some scholars have characterized the president’s policies as
discrepant.  This perceived contrast led at least one observer to suggest the president
suffered from “nuclear schizophrenia.”   The evidence to support this view is striking.  In2
his Atoms for Peace speech of December 1953, less than a year into his first term, the
president pledged the full effort of the United States “to help solve the fearful atomic
dilemma--to devote its entire heart and mind to find the way by which the miraculous
inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death, but consecrated to his life.”  3
Still, during Eisenhower’s terms in office, his administration conducted as central to
 Prentice C. Dean, Energy History Chronology from World War II to the Present4
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Energy, 1982).
3
national security over 160 tests of nuclear weapons.  At the same time, the administration
oversaw the construction and operation of only a handful of civilian nuclear power
reactors.   Eisenhower worried about the spread of nuclear weapons to irresponsible4
states, but successfully negotiated over three dozen bilateral treaties, agreeing to ship
fissile material and nuclear reactor technology abroad if nations renounced future pursuit
of nuclear weapons.  He feared for the fate of Americans in the event of nuclear
exchange, but dismissed a 1957 recommendation to spend five billion dollars a year for
five years to build fallout shelters which might save tens of millions of Americans in the
event of nuclear war.  The documentary recorded reveals the great danger and fear of
nuclear war fostered by Eisenhower’s strategic nuclear initiatives as well as steps taken
by the president to mitigate or end the threat of nuclear war such as Atoms for Peace and
the implementation of a testing moratorium.  For Eisenhower, the use of atom for a
variety of objectives reflected his conviction that the use of nuclear technology in service
of the republic involved both cost and value, danger and safety, fear and hope, evil and
good. 
Because he believed nuclear technology effectively served his goal to defend
national security through strength, Eisenhower sought to reverse the perception that
nuclear weapons were inherently dangerous and immoral.  He advocated steadily and
consistently for the proper and acceptable use of nuclear technology to contribute to the
safety of the republic.  Eisenhower’s early commitment to nuclear weapons, his
 “Estimated U.S. and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-1994,"  Bulletin of5
Atomic Scientists (November/December 1994): 58-59.
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implementation of various nuclear policies aimed at both peace and security, and his
continued insistence that nuclear weapons constituted simply one more weapon in the
nation’s arsenal all sought to lessen the nation’s fear about their nuclear future.  Only
when Americans understood and accepted the boost to national strength provided by
nuclear weapons would they be comfortable enough with these weapons of mass
destruction to accept them fully into national life, the president concluded.  
Because Eisenhower remained committed throughout his presidency to the
building of strength to meet the communist threat, he also succeeded in making nuclear
weapons and nuclear technology ordinary, abundant, and indispensable.  When Dwight
Eisenhower was inaugurated president of the United States in January 1953, America
possessed 841 nuclear weapons, both fission and fusion, which could unleash nearly fifty
megatons of explosive power.  These weapons could be deployed in combat either by
Strategic Air Command bombers or by any one of the twenty 280-millimeter atomic
cannons stationed in parts of Europe and Asia.  At the end of Eisenhower’s second term
in office, America’s nuclear stockpile totaled 18,638 nuclear warheads with a massive
20,491 megatons of explosive power.   Eisenhower had increased the numbers of5
weapons twenty-two times and the total yield of those weapons four-hundred times. 
Military modernization efforts under Eisenhower also included the B-52 intercontinental
jet bomber, the Army’s Jupiter and Air Force’s Thor intermediate range ballistic missiles,
the liquid-fueled Atlas intercontinental ballistic missile, as well as the Navy’s Polaris
 “Minutes of Meeting,” June 23, 1954, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as6
President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, Box 5, 203  Meeting, Dwight D.rd
Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas, hereinafter DDE Library, 2.
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missile deployed by nuclear-powered submarines such as the U.S.S. George Washington. 
The advanced, solid-fueled missile, the Minuteman, was in development.  As a result of
Eisenhower’s efforts, America’s nuclear arsenal was mobile, deliverable, advanced, and
fearsome.  Beyond just the military, Eisenhower engendered other efforts such as Project
Plowshare and Atoms for Peace to demonstrate the peaceful applications of nuclear
technology.  Taken together, Eisenhower aimed in part to convince the American public
and the international community of his nation’s genuine desire for peace at the same time
that he helped to entrench atomic and thermonuclear weapons into the American national
experience.  
If he had had the opportunity, Eisenhower would have preferred to eliminate
nuclear weapons altogether.  He often complained that, “if he knew any way to abolish
atomic weapons which would ensure the certainty that they would be abolished, he would
be the very first to endorse it.”  In June 1954, Eisenhower remarked to his National
Security Council that “he thought it unfortunate that nuclear weapons even existed.” 
“But the clock could not be turned back and there was no way that any agreement could
be worked out that would assure with certainty that these weapons could be abolished,”
he continued.   Absent that agreement, which at the time seemed unlikely, Eisenhower6
embraced nuclear weapons as a means of defending national security.
Eisenhower’s understanding of the fission and fusion weapon was rudimentary
and practical.   His limited technical understanding came from the information provided
 Henry DeWolf Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes: The Official7
Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb under the Auspices of the United States
Government, 1940-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945); Bernard Brodie,
ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order (New York: Harcourt, Brace
and Company, 1946).
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to him in early scientific briefings, from reading the Smyth Report, and from the
collection of documents on the atomic age edited by Bernard Brodie The Absolute
Weapon.   Later, Eisenhower also gathered information from the Atomic Energy7
Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss along with presidential advisors James Killian and
George Kistiakowsky.  Still, the president expressed only minimal interest in how and
why the nuclear weapon worked.  He remained focused instead on the practical, the
attainable, the knowable, rather than the theoretical, of how fission and fusion served his
purposes. 
 Eisenhower approached the question of how to defend national security through
nuclear weapons with an array of disparate ideas and programs which worked
simultaneously toward sometimes divergent objectives and were unified only by a simple
conception national strength.  As both a military officer and a political figure, Eisenhower
believed national strength was the product of the sum total of America’s efforts.  Robert
Donovan explained that Eisenhower’s working philosophy of national strength was “to
take the many ingredients of national power – airplanes, ground forces, battleships,
industry, the economy, the spirit of the people – and blend them in such a way as to insure
essential security for the United States.”  According Donovan, he believed that “it is the
 Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: Harper, 1956),8
330-31.
 Richard H. Immerman, “Confessions of an Eisenhower Revisionist: An9
Agonizing Reappraisal,” Diplomatic History 14, no. 3 (1990): 325.
7
sum of American power that counts.”   Eisenhower did not possess what historian8
Richard Immerman described as the first  “systematically articulated body of thought on
war, peace, and security in the nuclear age.”   He believed instead that nuclear weapons9
when used in specific and ways which sometimes seem inconsistent nonetheless served to
build economic, military industrial, and moral strength.  His emphasis on building
cumulative national strength for national security and his conclusion that the nuclear
weapon contributed to that strength required him to compartmentalized intellectually
from one another those four sources of strength.  Rather than a systematic view that was
arrived at mechanistically and considered methodically, Eisenhower’s view was
improvised and segmented.
Eisenhower believed that American national strength grew from four sources, and
those sources were financial, military, industrial, and moral in nature.  Further, he
believed that nuclear technology supported and sustained each of these four sources of
strength.  First, Eisenhower thought that nuclear technology provided a great opportunity
to build the economic strength of the nation through fiscal discipline.  From his
experience as advisor to the Truman administration between 1945 and 1952, Eisenhower
came to understand how the Cold War strained the American economy.  He worried that
poor planning or fiscal irresponsibility over the long term might threaten America’s
national security as much as military weakness or internal subversion.  Eisenhower feared
8the rise of a garrison state in the United States when the demands of national security
created a state-run economy which stifled both free-market capitalism and liberal
democracy.   He came to emphasize the role of nuclear technology to provide a proper
defense structure at a cost the United States could afford. 
Second, Eisenhower believed in the value of the nuclear weapon to provide
strategic military strength.  Though he may have objected to the use of nuclear weapons
on Japan at the end of World War II, he did so because that an escalation of violence was
not necessary to defeat Japan, not because he believed those weapons would be
ineffective.  During his presidency, Eisenhower threatened the use of nuclear weapons to
help bring an end to the Korean stalemate.  Before 1954, Eisenhower considered tactical
nuclear war with atomic weapons possible and winnable.  After the advent of the
thermonuclear weapons, Eisenhower adopted a grand strategy often called massive
retaliation.  The tremendous explosive yield of and surprising radioactive fallout created
by early thermonuclear tests suggested to Eisenhower the great risk inherent in using
nuclear weapons for any tactical purpose.  Because he wanted to retain the fission weapon
as a military asset, he needed to integrate successfully fusion weapons into the U.S.
arsenal.  Eisenhower employed the doctrine of massive retaliation as a strategy to take
advantage of the awesome power of the new hydrogen bomb without sacrificing the
tactical value of the United States’ smaller-yield nuclear weapons.   An increasing
reliance on thermonuclear weapons and a strategy of massive retaliation allowed
Eisenhower the flexibility first to avoid war if possible and second to achieve victory if
necessary.
 Robert Griffith, ed., Ike’s Letters to a Friend, 1941-1958 (Lawrence, KS:10
University of Kansas Press, 1984), 36.
9
Third, Eisenhower pushed for the expansion of civilian nuclear power for
domestic and international reasons and supported the advancement of basic nuclear
science in hope of building American industry.  In the United States, Eisenhower wanted
the government to expand access to nuclear materials and nuclear technology for private
development.  At less cost to the government and with greater results, private companies
could build nuclear power plants and provide for the electrical needs of the national
industrial economy.  In addition, world demand for cheap electrical power grew every
year, particularly in Europe, which was struggling to rebuild its industrial capacity
following the devastation of World War II, and in the third world, where new nations
struggled to build satisfactory infrastructures and to balance national self-determination
with superpower demands to choose sides in the Cold War.  Energy-starved areas of the
world needed an expansion of sources of electrical power.  Eisenhower imagined that
nuclear technology could meet the demand and promote good will between the United
States and Europe as well as the desperate non-aligned nations of the world.  
Last, as the primary steward of American nuclear technology, Eisenhower
endeavored to showcase the virtue of nuclear technology and its proper moral use by the
United States.  The president had characterized the nuclear weapon, which was initially
and principally a weapon of massive destruction, as a “hellish contrivance.”   Despite his10
use of satanic rhetoric concerning the nuclear weapon, he also believed that humankind’s
proper management of the weapon could demonstrate the positive value of nuclear
 Campbell Craig, Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear11
War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), x.
10
technology in support of freedom and peace against the evils of international communism
and the Soviet Union.  Freedom was a spiritual right that must be defended with arms, but
the basic morality of the nation must not be sacrificed in defense of that freedom. 
Eisenhower carefully maneuvered through this dilemma as he employed the nuclear
weapon to advance general and nuclear disarmament as a necessary first step toward a
peaceful end to the Cold War.  As that effort sputtered, he attempted to negotiate a
nuclear test ban treaty and ultimately a moratorium, both of which demonstrated the
United States’ commitment to good will and peace.  Eisenhower also used nuclear
technology for programs such as Atoms for Peace which the president thought would ease
fear, provide hope, and contribute to peace in the world.
This argument challenges the thesis that Eisenhower fundamentally altered his
view of nuclear weapons and nuclear war in 1955-56 as a result of the imminent
deployment of the thermonuclear bomb.  Campbell Craig, for example, argued that
Eisenhower used the policy of massive retaliation to steer every crisis toward peace.  He
also argued that this application of massive retaliation was a result of Eisenhower’s
recognition in 1955 of the tremendous power and danger of thermonuclear war and his
conclusion that nuclear war was no longer winnable.  Eisenhower believed that war had
become immoral, Craig argued.   But Eisenhower had thought from the beginning of his11
presidency that war was immoral, thermonuclear or otherwise, and Craig’s
characterization of Eisenhower’s thinking on nuclear war missed the mark.  For
11
Eisenhower, the policy of massive retaliation and the intent to resolve crises short of war
were not aberrations from the basic strategic idea that the nuclear weapon supported
national strength.  Instead the president consistently built strength through nuclear
weapons from the beginning to the end of his presidency and the military application of
nuclear technology was only one element in an overall strategic goal.  Therefore,
regardless the distinction between kilotons and megatons of explosive power, Eisenhower
emphasized the tactical and strategic military value of nuclear weapons and did not need
to make any intellectual change to incorporate the hydrogen bomb into his national
security policy.  
Because nuclear weapons so clearly and effectively served the national interest,
Eisenhower concluded they were a force for good.  He argued that, like any other weapon
system, nuclear weapons could contribute to a variety of national political, strategic, and
economic goals. The president noted and appeared to understand that his plan for national
strength based on nuclear weapons involved great danger, but accepted that risk as
unavoidable, minimal, and ultimately tolerable.  His desire to capitalize on what he saw
as the many benefits of a fully developed and deployed nuclear arsenal led him to a grand
strategy which often blurred the distinction between atomic and thermonuclear devices
and effectively likened the explosive power of nuclear weapons with that of conventional
bombs used in previous global conflicts.  At the same time, his under appreciation for the
difference between conventional explosions, explosions yielding kilotons, and those
yielding megatons allowed him to move the world dangerously closer to global
annihilation through a massive buildup of weapons.  Although Eisenhower was deeply
12
concerned about waging war in the nuclear age, his trepidation about nuclear conflict did
not discourage him from pursuing and implementing nuclear policies which ultimately
and fully committed the United States to the use of nuclear weapons for national defense
over the long term.   He accepted that danger as long as he was also able to pursue
peaceful objections with the same nuclear technology.  For Eisenhower, the risk of
nuclear war did not outweigh the rewards that included the building of strength, the
containment of communism, and the pursuit of peace.
 Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower: Soldier and President (New York: Simon and1
Schuster, 1990), 573.
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CHAPTER TWO – Historiography
The historical literature on Dwight Eisenhower grew considerably beginning after
the opening of vast amounts of research materials at the Eisenhower Presidential Library
in the late 1970s.  In addition, both the resurgence of conservative political strength and
the increased attention on the office of the presidency made Americans more interested in
the life and times of Dwight Eisenhower.  “Eisenhower gave the nation eight years of
peace and prosperity.  No other President in the twentieth century could make that claim,”
Stephen Ambrose reflected.   Presidential historians and political scientists were1
fascinated by this legacy and the many contributions Eisenhower made to American
politics and society in the middle of the twentieth century.  
Eisenhower’s reputation also enjoyed a resurrection as the century progressed.  At
one time he was considered as “do nothing” a president as some of the least remembered
and least admired chief executives such as Warren Harding and James Buchanan.  In
1962, Arthur Schlesinger’s poll of scholars placed Eisenhower as twenty-second best of
thirty-five presidents.  By the time of David Porter’s poll in 1981, however, Eisenhower
had risen to twelfth, and Robert and Tim Blessing’s poll of 1982 bumped him to eleventh. 
By 1996, Eisenhower cracked the top ten among scholars when both a Chicago Tribune
poll and another poll by Schlesinger’s son, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., placed Eisenhower as
ninth best.  In the Schlesinger poll, Eisenhower came in just behind the great and near-
great presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, George Washington, Franklin Roosevelt,
 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., “Rating the Presidents: Washington to Clinton,”1
Political Science Quarterly 112, no. 2, (1997): 183.  See also William J. Ridings, Jr. and
Stuart B. McIver, Rating the Presidents: From the Great and Honorable to the Dishonest
and Incompetent (New York: Citadel Press, 1997).
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Thomas Jefferson, and Andrew Jackson.  Schlesinger explained that Eisenhower’s
meteoric rise was due in part to the failings of his successors.  “The more his successors
got into trouble,” he wrote, “the better Eisenhower looked.”  1
Schlesinger also noted that Eisenhower’s growing prestige had much to do with
the opening of his presidential papers.  A wealth of information became available, and
researchers increasingly found a great deal more to Eisenhower than earlier scholars had. 
Following the Watergate scandal, the federal government began waves of reviews of
classified material to determine which documents could and should be made available to
the public.  As a result, some valuable and revealing collections related to Eisenhower
became accessible, including the minutes of National Security Council meetings as well
as a large collection of presidential papers later known as the Ann C. Whitman file, after
Eisenhower’s personal secretary.  Still, historian Stephen Rabe remarked, scholars
“would never have joined the pilgrimage to Abilene unless they judged the Eisenhower
years worthy of study.”2
a.  Initial Impressions and Orthodox Scholarship
Eisenhower was the subject of many studies even before he became president. 
His role as Supreme Allied Commander in the European Theater of Operations propelled
 Pre-presidential biographies of Eisenhower include Francis Trevelyan Miller,3
Eisenhower, Man and Soldier (Philadelphia: The John C. Winston Company, 1944);
Alden Hatch, General Ike: A Biography of Dwight D. Eisenhower (Chicago:
Consolidated Book, 1944); Delos Wheeler Lovelace, General "Ike" Eisenhower (New
York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1944); Helen Nicolay, Born to Command: The
Story of General Eisenhower (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, Inc., 1945); 
Kenneth S. Davis, Soldier of Democracy: A Biography of Dwight Eisenhower (Garden
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him to a position of global prominence.  As early as 1944, even before the war ended,
popular biographies of Eisenhower by his acquaintances hit book shelves in the United
States and Europe.    The authors of these works explored Eisenhower’s childhood, his3
adolescence, his formative years at West Point and as a junior officer as well as his role in
formulating major war plans for the conflict against the Axis Powers.  These biographies
provided little in the way of scholarly analysis, offering instead entertaining, anecdotal
material to satisfy the public’s demand for more detail about a national hero. 
Francis Trevelyan Miller claimed to write the first full biography of the general in
Eisenhower, Man and Soldier.  In this and similar works, Eisenhower emerged as an
American folk hero.  Born in Texas but raised on the plains of Kansas, Eisenhower
applied all of his mind, body, and spirit to achieve his personal goals.  Whether on the
gridiron, the baseball diamond, at work in a creamery in Abilene, at West Point or as a
commissioned officer, Eisenhower realized his own American dream with hard work and
commitment.  “He is the typical American from the typical American home town,” Miller
explained, “who started at the bottom and has worked himself up on his own merits to
become one of the most powerful figures in the world today.”   Like Miller, these writers4
 Personal accounts from the war and post war period include Harry C. Butcher,5
My Three Years with Eisenhower: The Personal Diary of Captain Harry C. Butcher,
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generally agreed that Eisenhower was a great leader of men; he was patriotic, humble,
intelligent, and dedicated.  From local boy to national hero, Eisenhower exemplified
American values and exuded American greatness.
After the war, Eisenhower continued to attract the public’s attention for two
reasons.  First, filled with exuberance after the great victory of World War II, Americans
wanted to know as much as possible about wartime leaders.  To meet this demand,
associates of Eisenhower began publishing first-hand narratives about their own personal
relationship or experience with him.   Second, according to at least one scholar, “Every5
war in American history has produced a national hero in its victorious military leader,
and, usually, has sought to honor him with the presidency.”   No sooner had the general6
returned from the war than talk of “Eisenhower for President” swirled in some political
circles.  
Journalist Allan Taylor published a small volume just before the 1952 presidential
election entitled What Eisenhower Thinks.  Because of Eisenhower’s popularity, Taylor
wrote, he seemed quite capable of winning the presidency and therefore what he thought
was “of tremendous importance to Americans.”  “His popularity is an extraordinary
 Allan Taylor, What Eisenhower Thinks (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell7
Company, 1952), i.
 Ibid., 180.8
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tribute,” Taylor wrote, “it reflects a spontaneous trust, amid confusion and peril, in the
strength, integrity, common sense and ability of a man who believes in the American
people and who has shown his capacity to deal with threats to his country’s heritage.”   In7
times of great danger and great promise, Taylor’s Eisenhower symbolized “the kind of
leadership that the Republic badly needs.”8
Kevin McCann, Eisenhower’s personal assistant from 1946 to 1951, agreed.  In
Man From Abilene, McCann wrote:  “Eisenhower has emerged in ten short years as one
of the great political catalysts of our time – a man whose mere presence seems to
overcome national boundaries and the force of whose personality can dissolve the
traditional conflicts that for centuries have held the European nations apart.”  By virtue of
his values, leadership, and personal charm, Eisenhower had risen to “stature almost
exactly in proportion as the United States itself has.”  He was the “typical representative
of greatness,” McCann believed.   Rather than writing traditional biographies, both9
Taylor and McCann collected, edited, and annotated statements by Eisenhower with only
limited analytical commentary between selections. 
Although Eisenhower insisted that he had no interest in running for political
office, his steadily growing popularity spawned more biographies which considered
 See W. G. Clugston, Eisenhower for President? or, Who Will Get Us Out of the10
Messes We Are In? (New York, Exposition Press, 1951).
 John Gunther, Eisenhower, The Man and The Symbol (New York, Harper,11
1952), 132.
 Merriman A. Smith, Meet Mister Eisenhower (New York, Harper, 1955).12
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 precisely that possibility.   Popular columnist and nonfiction writer John Gunther10
considered Eisenhower’s qualifications for the presidency in Eisenhower, The Man and
The Symbol.  Gunther outlined Eisenhower’s vast military and diplomatic experience at
Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE), his unassailable leadership
abilities, and his overall personal and professional capacity to serve as president of the
United States.  Gunther sketched Eisenhower’s political views as much as outsiders knew
of them and attempted to find Eisenhower’s place across the political spectrum in the
United States.  “To sum up, the General would be orderly, decent, and honorable in the
White House,” Gunther wrote.  “He wants unity and strength. He is wholesome; he has
great ability to listen; he would take good advice,” he continued, “He has a fine
inspirational quality.  He would be economical, and he believes in peace.”   The nation11
agreed with Gunther and McCann.  Eisenhower ultimately decided to run for the
presidency, and he defeated Democrat Adlai Stevenson solidly in the 1952 presidential
election.
At the height of Eisenhower’s popularity during his first term, favorable literature
poured forth from journalists, scholars, and partisans alike.   New York Herald Tribune12
journalist Robert J. Donovan sought to chronicle Eisenhower’s first three years in office
 Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower: The Inside Story (New York: Harper, 1956).13
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with first-hand accounts and personal observations.   Pulitzer Prize-winning biographer13
Merlo John Pusey argued that the Eisenhower years had been “a buoyant, forward-
moving, and fruitful period.”  Pusey heaped even more praise on Eisenhower.  “His major
concern with great problems, his simplicity of manner, his dedication, and his deep regard
for the welfare of his fellow citizens,” Pusey wrote, “are reminiscent of Lincoln.”  14
Eisenhower’s wartime mess sergeant and shameless booster Marty Snyder celebrated the
president’s first term in office and prepared for his second presidential campaign. 
“Dwight D. Eisenhower has been an excellent President; he has been an excellent friend,”
Snyder asserted, “I intend to go on working to have him remain both.”15
The first generation of professional Eisenhower scholars however took issue with
these uncritical accounts.  Orthodox scholars sought foremost to demystify, with
scholarly detachment, the heroic Eisenhower who had emerged from these early accounts
of the 1940s and 1950s.  According to Arthur Schlesinger Jr., this scholarship grew in
part from the general disdain for Eisenhower among intellectuals in the 1950s.   Some16
scholars, thinkers, and academicians of the period, including Schlesinger, resented
Eisenhower’s veiled contempt for intellectuals, his trouncing of Stevenson in 1952 and
1956, his rapid transformation from the friend of Soviet Marshal Georgi Zhukov into
 Ibid.17
 William V. Shannon, “Eisenhower as President: A Critical Appraisal of the18
Record,” Commentary 26 (November 1958): 390.
20
anti-communist and his transition from apolitical American patriot into vehement critic of
the New Deal.  They wanted to believe that Eisenhower had been coopted by more
conservative elements within the Republican Party who then turned his popularity into a
dam to hold back the tide of liberalism.
Accordingly, this generation of scholars saw the thirty-fourth president as an
unintelligent and uninvolved chief executive who allowed his powerful subordinates to
run the government while he fished, played bridge and golf, and collected contributions
on behalf of the Republican Party.  They fostered “the notion of a genial, indolent man of
pied syntax and platitudinous conviction, fleeing from public policy to bridge, golf, and
westerns.”   Orthodox scholars found little in Eisenhower to praise and much to criticize. 17
They argued that the president was aloof, unintelligent, and out of his league as chief
executive of the United States.  William V. Shannon described the Eisenhower era as a
“the time of great postponement.”   Solving America’s problems simply had to wait until18
someone more capable assumed the presidency, Shannon concluded.
More importantly, these scholars argued that Eisenhower’s political inexperience,
lack of intellectual power, and discomfort with the demands of the presidency contributed
greatly to the dangerous state of national malaise during which the Soviet Union grew
stronger and the United States grew weaker.  As the Soviets quickly caught up with
America in apparent military strength, Eisenhower became bored with the multitude of
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administrative tasks required of the president.  His boredom soon turned to frustration
after which he wavered, delegated, and then vacationed, some suggested.    In works by19
his political associates such as Emmet Hughes, Arthur Larson, and Sherman Adams,
“Eisenhower emerges as a man of force, dignity, and restraint who did not always
understand and control what was going on, was buffeted by events, and was capable of
misjudgement and error.”  20
b.  Revisionism and Post-Revisionism
Major revision of Eisenhower scholarship began in the 1970s for two reasons.  21
First, presidential struggles after Eisenhower made the tranquility of his administration
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Observer, December 14, 1974.
 Richard H. Rovere, “Eisenhower Revisited – A Political Genius? A Brilliant23
Man?”  New York Times Magazine, February 7, 1971, 14 quoted in de Santis,
“Eisenhower Revisionism,” 198.
 Revisionist accounts by journalists include Arthur Krock, “Impressions of the24
President – and the Man,” New York Times Magazine, June 23, 1957, 5, 34-39; Edwin A.
Roberts, Jr., “Thoughts on the Man from Abilene,” National Observer, December 14,
1974; Murray Kempton, “The Underestimation of Dwight D. Eisenhower,” Esquire,
September 1967, 108-109, 156; Richard Rhodes, “Ike: Artist in Iron,” Harper’s
22
look much better by comparison and more interesting for study.   The growth of the22
power of the presidency under Lyndon Johnson, the military quagmire in South Vietnam,
and the excesses of the Nixon administration, including the Watergate fiasco, forced
many to take another look at the Eisenhower years.  Within that social and political
context, Eisenhower simply did not look so bad anymore.  “Eight years of Eisenhower:
seven and a half of peace,” former Eisenhower critic Richard Rovere wrote in 1971, “ten
years of Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon: almost ten solid years of war.”   Scholars became23
more interested then in discovering just why Eisenhower seemed to succeed and by
extension why his successors seemed to fail.  Second, as the Eisenhower Presidential
Library and the National Archives and Records Administration began the systematic
review and opening of Eisenhower’s presidential papers, scholars got a better look at just
how the White House had operated under Eisenhower and how he had filled the role of
chief executive.  About half of the Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower, also known
as the Ann Whitman File, became available for research in 1975; the other half were
opened in 1983.  In sum, Eisenhower revisionists revealed a more active, engaged, and
influential president.   “The opening of his papers,” Schlesinger was compelled to write,24
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“showed that the mask of genial affability Ike wore in the White House concealed an
astute, crafty, confident, and purposeful leader.”   While they all did not agree on25
specifics, they did agree that Eisenhower was a far more successful leader whose style
was more subtle and sophisticated than previously thought.
One of the most influential of the early Eisenhower revisionists was Princeton
political scientist Fred Greenstein.  First in an article and later in a monograph,
Greenstein argued that Eisenhower guided his administration with a hidden hand,
skillfully and effectively working his subordinates, the press, and other government
leaders behind the scenes.   “Whatever the merit of Eisenhower’s policies and actions,”26
 Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, xiii.27
 Greenstein, “Eisenhower as an Activist President,” 577.28
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Greenstein wrote, “they were his policies and actions, not the result of drift or of aides
who worked their will on a passive president.”   Greenstein concluded that Eisenhower’s27
style of leadership was both activist and “low-profile” and thus not always evident to
every chronicler.   Eisenhower “deliberately cultivated the impression that he was not28
involved even in the most successful of the maneuvers in which he directly participated,”
he argued.  What orthodox scholars saw as Eisenhower’s presidential inaction intended to
protect his own personal popularity, Greenstein saw as a carefully calculated effort to
maintain that personal prestige in order to achieve his larger political goals.  “He
employed his skills to achieve his ends by inconspicuous means,” he continued, “and was
aware that a reputation as a tough political operator could be inconsistent with acquiring
and maintaining another source of presidential influence, namely public prestige.”29
As evidence, Greenstein offered a case study of Eisenhower’s handling of
Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy.  Through hidden-hand leadership and skillful use of
language, Greenstein found Eisenhower actively and purposefully working to challenge
McCarthy behind the scenes as the junior Senator from Wisconsin searched for
communists in Eisenhower’s government and in the Army.  Eisenhower’s strategy for
neutralizing McCarthy, Greenstein maintained, was to engage him indirectly, to deny him
direct executive attention, to refuse to dignify his accusations with a vigorous response,
and to respond obliquely when McCarthy attacked.  Eisenhower followed McCarthy’s
 Greenstein, The Hidden-Hand Presidency, 212, 227.30
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attack upon the Army, for example, not with an attack on the Senator but by heaping
praise upon that very same institution.  Greenstein credited Eisenhower with bringing
about McCarthy’s demise through a purposeful campaign of denying McCarthy executive
attention and an even larger presidential stage from which to perform.   He admitted that30
not all of Eisenhower’s efforts were successful in dealing with McCarthy, but he
emphasized that Eisenhower deserved more credit and less criticism for trying to
neutralize McCarthy.  Greenstein’s Hidden-Hand Presidency became the inspiration and
the baseline for many to revisit the Eisenhower presidency. 
The flood gates of revisionism soon opened and a torrent of scholarship on
Eisenhower poured forth.  With new documentary evidence becoming available,
historians and political scientists found more examples of Eisenhower’s leadership,
diplomatic skill, good intentions, and terrific successes.  Though they did not agree on
every single point of contention, biographers such as Herbert Parmet and Robert Divine
lauded Eisenhower’s execution of political leadership at home and abroad.   Biographer31
Herbert Parmet’s treatment of Eisenhower accentuated the president’s “remarkable
record,” noting that Eisenhower was careful and conservative.   He navigated a steady,32
middle-of-the-road course for the nation.  He was not a political genius, but he possessed
natural political instincts that allowed him to operate successfully within his party and his
 Ibid., 578.33
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government.  Eisenhower respected his office and the constitution; he was dignified,
intelligent, and quite popular.  “To label him a great or good or even a weak President
misses the point,” Parmet wrote, “[h]e was merely necessary.”  Necessary, Parmet
concluded, if the United States intended “to survive the passionate and frequently reckless
wiles of lesser men” who might not have been able to steer the United States away from
the dangers of the period including isolationism, extremism, and thermonuclear war.33
Robert Divine’s Eisenhower and the Cold War was a general commentary based
on the emerging revisionist literature.  Divine reiterated, amplified, and expanded
arguments made by other revisionists including Robert Donovan, Peter Lyon, and
Stephen Ambrose.  Divine offered as evidence Eisenhower’s published diary and
memoirs as well as the written works of presidential confidants.  Unlike orthodox
students of Eisenhower’s conduct of the Cold War, Divine concluded that Eisenhower,
not John Foster Dulles, was the main architect of the administration’s Cold War foreign
policy.  The president exercised great skill, patience, and caution in negotiating the
dangerous diplomatic world he inherited, Divine continued.  He argued that Eisenhower’s
great foreign policy successes were inherently negative: “He ended the Korean War, he
refused to intervene militarily in Indochina, he refrained from involving the United States
in the Suez crisis, he avoided war with China over Quemoy and Matsu.” While he
recognized that Eisenhower experienced failures in Cuba and Vietnam, where problems
lingered for later administrations, Divine praised the president as an advocate of peace
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and restraint amidst a throng of cold warriors.  34
Revisionists have also considered in detail Eisenhower’s nuclear policies.  They
paint him as an energetic, active president who occupied a central role in the formulation
of nuclear policy and who pursued, above all else, peace in a world threatened by
thermonuclear war.   Aided by a wealth of documents declassified by the Department of
Energy on a variety of nuclear issues, these authors conclude that, as he labored to
achieve peaceful uses for atomic science, “Eisenhower dominated the formulation of
nuclear policy in a way that no other President has before or since.”   In Atoms for Peace35
and War, historians Richard Hewlett and Jack Holl argued that Eisenhower presided over
the origins of the nuclear world known then.  The study chronicled in detail Eisenhower’s
intricate political negotiations between the executive and legislative branches and
between military and civilian leadership over control of atomic technology.  From the
beginning of his presidency, Hewlett and Holl concluded, Eisenhower labored to
formulate a nuclear policy aimed at preparing the world for nuclear peace, rather than
war.   
The authors of Atoms for Peace and War succeeded also in offering a revisionist
interpretation of Eisenhower as president.  Although he did not always appear as the
primary character in every policy discussion, the authors often described the pressure of
 Ibid., 565.36
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the president’s hidden hand, starting, shaping, and prodding the nuclear debate to a final
conclusion.  Hewlett and Holl argued that Eisenhower’s approach to nuclear policy was
consistently proactive, committed, and energetic.  They also chronicled his successes and
failures to split and fuse atoms for peace, not for war.  Though he failed to achieve all his
nuclear goals for the United States, Eisenhower negotiated and lobbied for an
international nuclear regulatory agency at the United Nations.  He also fostered the
development of EURATOM as an instrument of nuclear control and cooperation in
Europe.   Although he committed to a moratorium on nuclear testing on October 31,
1958, he failed to conclude a lasting nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. 
Despite the increase of the size and strength of the American nuclear arsenal and
comparable developments in nuclear weapons delivery capability Hewlett and Holl
concluded that Eisenhower’s efforts to spread the benefits of the peaceful atom through
Atoms for Peace proved his most important achievement.  The proposals contained in his
Atoms for Peace speech defined the debate about the use of nuclear energy for several
decades, while his steadfast commitment to minimizing the risk of and dangers inherent
in nuclear war demonstrated a desire for peace in a world too familiar with war.
“Probably no American leader at the time wrestled harder with that dilemma than did
Eisenhower,” Hewlett and Holl argued.  “It fired his determination to find a way out of
the nuclear nightmare by turning the genius of the world’s scientists to the arts of peace,”
they concluded.36
Like other revisionists, Hewlett and Holl emphasized that Eisenhower shaped and
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steered the nuclear debate to his own goals.  “Eisenhower’s words reflected the central
role he had played in defining the place of the peaceful and military atom in American
life,” they concluded.  To his credit, Eisenhower kept the nuclear debate centered on great
issues, of war and peace, of hope and fear, and of right and wrong.  “The development
and control of nuclear technology did involve moral issues of great consequence,”
Hewlett and Holl remarked, “and Eisenhower was consciously trying to keep that truth
before the eyes of the public.”   In this way, Eisenhower became the primary nuclear37
architect for the United States.  He brought the debate about nuclear weapons to the
forefront, and he labored endlessly and sometimes fruitlessly to steer America toward
peace in the atomic age.  The efforts of Hewlett, Holl, and other Eisenhower revisionists
led Richard Immerman to conclude that Eisenhower was indeed the first post-World War
II president to develop a “systematically articulated body of thought on war, peace, and
security in the nuclear age.”  38
More recently, revisionism has given some ground to a post-revisionist trend. 
Orthodox Eisenhower scholars viewed Eisenhower as an inept president with few
policies, and revisionists saw him as an exceptional president with successful policies. 
Post-revisionists evidenced a combination of the two.  Available documents and new
scholarship entrenched the revisionist impression of Eisenhower as a skilled leader and
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purposeful president, and post-revisionists generally concurred.  But the products of that
leadership, Eisenhower’s decisions and actions, post-revisionists argued, often produced
more mixed results.  Post-revisionists argued “that the Eisenhower presidency was more
complex and not as successful as many revisionists have maintained” but they also
accepted “the basic revisionist argument that Eisenhower was a thoughtful and skillful
leader.”   Revisionists had not been sufficiently critical of Eisenhower, according to39
these scholars, and the flaws in his character, his leadership, his vision, and his efforts
needed greater exploration, consideration, and analysis.   40
A comprehensive post-revisionist treatment of Eisenhower was The Presidency of
Dwight D. Eisenhower by Chester Pach and Elmo Richardson.  The revised, 1992 edition
however fit nicely into the emerging post-revisionist trend.  Eisenhower “used his power
resourcefully – and often successfully – in domestic and foreign policy to accomplish his
objectives,” Pach and Richardson commented, and “his greatest failures were not from
lethargy or ineptness but lack of vision.”  Even more, they continued, Eisenhower’s rigid
Cold War attitude failed to account for the growth of nationalism in the third world, and
his innate conservatism weakened any attempt he may have made to alleviate domestic
social ills, such as segregation and gender inequity.41
To explain the complexity to which Pach and Richardson referred, post-revisionist
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scholars focused on many aspects of the Eisenhower presidency and produced a wide
variety of monographs.  In foreign policy, post-revisionists argued that Eisenhower
chronically misunderstood developments in the third world.  According to Robert
MacMahon, Eisenhower mistook nationalism for communism and saw the Soviet Union
as the prime mover of all discontented social movements throughout the globe.  “This
failure of perception . . . constituted a major setback for American diplomacy,”
MacMahon wrote, and “in this critical area, then, the Eisenhower record appears one of
persistent failure.”42
Post-revisionists have also objected to the glowing assessments of Eisenhower’s
foreign policy in Cold War battlegrounds, such as Vietnam and Korea.  In South
Vietnam, for example, revisionists such as Robert Divine had relished Eisenhower’s
restraint.   David Anderson challenged the notion that Eisenhower’s restraint was an43
appropriate or successful policy.  His was “an example of flawed containment” which
was essentially “negative” and only “sought to hold off defeat and wait for a better day
with little regard for the internal dynamics of Vietnamese society.”  “The Eisenhower
administration simply postponed the day of reckoning in Vietnam,” Anderson
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concluded.   Post-revisionists have challenged revisionist exaggeration and evidenced44
Eisenhower recklessness elsewhere in Asia, .  
In South Korea, post-revisionists gave less credit to Eisenhower and Dulles for
bringing the Korean War to a conclusion in 1953.  Rosemary Foot believed that larger
diplomatic and political factors played a far greater role in bringing North Korea and
China to the negotiating table.  The overall impact of Eisenhower’s threats of nuclear
attack upon both adversaries have been exaggerated by revisionists, she argued.  45
Working from both American and Chinese sources, Gordon Chang contended that
Eisenhower’s failed leadership and ambiguous policies nearly brought America to war
with China over Taiwan in 1955.  Despite Eisenhower’s blundering and routine
misunderstanding of China’s conduct, the two nations avoided war, but only because
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai backed down before the moment of confrontation.  Indeed,
Chang continued, Eisenhower’s nuclear blustering encouraged Mao Zedong to begin
earnest pursuit of a Chinese nuclear weapon so as to be prepared for the next crisis over
Taiwan.   46
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H. W. Brands has indicted Eisenhower for his simplicity and inability to get his
foreign policy team to agree on an appropriate strategy.  Brands argued that the New
Look was in fact counterproductive because “the country wound up with the worst of
both worlds:  the high risks of strategic warfare and the high costs of limited conflict.”   47
The New Look failed largely because Eisenhower allowed debates between advocates and
opponents to persist throughout the two terms.  The result was bureaucratic and
administrative confusion.   Brands has also argued that Eisenhower to a certain degree48
manufactured the crisis over Taiwan in 1954-55 out of a desire to validate the credibility
of his nuclear deterrent.  Eisenhower was disinclined to look for a peaceful solution to the
crisis because he sought to prove that nuclear weapons were a usable part of America’s
military machine.  As the crisis unfolded, Eisenhower struggled to keep events under
control and his small pledge to defend Taiwan unnecessarily escalated into the possibility
of using nuclear weapons to defend two small, worthless island groups.   49
Post-revisionists also described Eisenhower’s mixed record in issues related to
nuclear war, nuclear testing, and disarmament.  Jeremi Suri, for example, challenged the
revisionist arguments of Divine and others that Eisenhower pursued disarmament with
great vigor in an attempt to curb the arms race.  Focusing on the so-called Surprise Attack
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Conference of 1958, Suri concluded that Eisenhower doomed disarmament negotiations
with the Soviets by stubbornly insisting on an agreement on inspection and verification of
any disarmament treaty before a political discussion might even take place, by failing to
secure agreement among key members of his cabinet regarding disarmament goals, and
by employing tactics that would have eroded the obsessive secrecy that the Soviets so
vigorously protected.  “The former general emerges from the history of the Surprise
Attack Conference more as an ambivalent, confused, and passive chief executive,” Suri
concluded.   The price of Eisenhower’s stubbornness and failed leadership was a lack of50
any real progress on arms control.   
Martha Smith-Norris argued that the failure of the Geneva Test Ban Talks of
1958-60 directly resulted from bureaucratic divisions within the Eisenhower
administration.  Like Suri, she concluded that Eisenhower experienced a failure of
leadership and was unable to bridge the gap between dissident elements within his own
government.  She argued that the other major parties including the British and the Soviets
modified their position in pursuit of a deal, but Eisenhower stubbornly refused to separate
test ban talks from the larger disarmament issue.  Smith-Norris maintained that
Eisenhower never wanted an agreement, but instead only desired to appear to want one.   51
On other issues related to nuclear policy, Eisenhower has also emerged from post-
 Benjamin P. Greene, “Eisenhower, Science and the Nuclear Test Ban Debate,52
1953-56,”  The Journal of Strategic Studies 26, no. 4 (2003): 157.  
35
revisionist literature as engaged, concerned, and committed to peace, but also as a failure
for reasons of his own doing.  Benjamin Greene has recently argued that Eisenhower
began earnest pursuit of a nuclear test ban treaty in his first term before Adlai Stevenson
raised the issue in the 1956 presidential campaign.  Greene maintained that Eisenhower’s
believed that Stevenson had ruined any chance the president had to negotiate a deal in
secret.  To Greene, Eisenhower emerged as a decisive leader committed to a test ban but
who used deceit and outright lies to conceal his own desire for a test ban.  “This episode
reveals that an administration initially dedicated to a policy of candor toward the
American people on nuclear matters,” Greene argued, “ended its first term with an
extensive campaign of deception.”  52
c.  The Intellectual Eisenhower
In the spirit of post-revisionism, some effort must be made to analyze Eisenhower
the intellectual, that is, one who thinks deeply and critically about issues, in this case,
nuclear issues.  One of the earliest considerations of Eisenhower’s intelligence was
journalist Allan Taylor’s 1952 campaign exposé What Eisenhower Thinks.  Taylor
intended to offer to voters a detailed view of the man whom many in America loved but
about whom they knew very little.  After Eisenhower declared himself a Republican and
announced his candidacy for the presidency, Eisenhower’s supporters, like Taylor, began
to offer their interpretation of why he was the best candidate.  “What Dwight Eisenhower
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thinks,” Taylor asserted, “is of tremendous importance to Americans in the critical year
1952.”  Even more, what Eisenhower thought was the only way to ascertain what he
might do as president.   Other contemporary writers took a different approach. 53
Eisenhower’s mind, Richard Rovere wrote in 1950, was “unschematic, distrustful of fine
distinctions, given to overstatement, impatient with theory, eager to make translations
into the realm of matter and things, concerned with the effect of ideas rather than their
validity.”   Unlike Taylor, Rovere wondered, “why on earth should anyone think54
Eisenhower would make a good president?”  If the presidency was as difficult a job as
most Americans believed it was, “then clearly Eisenhower has no qualifications worth
discussing and those who are so eager to have him for President are either contemptuous
of the office or themselves ridiculously ignorant.”55
Assessments of Eisenhower as an intellectual varied widely depending upon who
made the assessments.  Not surprisingly, Eisenhower’s political opponents thought very
little of Eisenhower’s perspicacity.  President Harry Truman, for example, was quite
dismissive.  After Truman claimed how he might have successfully handled Fidel Castro
and his revolution, the man from Missouri quipped that, “Of course, that son of a bitch
Eisenhower was too damn dumb to do anything like that.  When Castro decided to go in
the other direction for support, Eisenhower was probably still waiting for a goddamn staff
report on what to think.”  Biographer and oral historian Merle Miller noted that “‘staff
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report’ were the two dirtiest words” he had every heard Truman utter.   In the midst of56
the 1952 campaign, Eric Sevareid of CBS News noted that Eisenhower, unlike Adlai
Stevenson, had created a great reserve of trust among voters in America.  Although
Eisenhower seemed to know what he was doing, this was only an illusion built on public
relations because, Sevareid continued, Eisenhower himself was “empty of ideas.”   Even57
Eisenhower’s friends were not reassuring.  From the beginning of his political campaign
in 1952, Eisenhower recognized that his staff underestimated his intelligence.  “All they
talked about was how they would win on my popularity.  Nobody said I had a brain in my
head,” Eisenhower remembered.  58
Another contemporary of Eisenhower’s, John McCone, Chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission in the final years of Eisenhower’s presidency, carefully qualified his
impression of Eisenhower’s intelligence.  When asked about his intellectual capacity
compared with those of other presidents, McCone answered that Eisenhower stacked up
well.  According to McCone, the greatest intellectual capacity as a scholar belonged to
John Kennedy; as a negotiator, Lyndon Johnson; as a decision-maker, Harry Truman. 
“On the other hand, if you [sic] talking intellectual capacity in terms of person who could
see the breadth of his total responsibility and reach some decisions as to what is best for
the country, given the conditions in which he found himself,” McCone continued,
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“Eisenhower would be by far the best.”   McCone considered Eisenhower a “thoughtful59
man” who had an ability to select capable men and give them great responsibility.  60
Other of Eisenhower’s political appointees saw him as intelligent, but certainly not as an
intellectual.  Sherman Adams, for example, noted that “Eisenhower was not much of a
reader” and that the president was so “impatient with the endless paperwork of the
presidency” that he asked his staff to distill long documents down to one page.61
Overall, confidants and assistants characterized Eisenhower’s intelligence
similarly.  Above all, most praised his leadership as the best example of the man’s
intelligence.  Rather than offer a litany of examples to support their claims, most of the
memoirs by Eisenhower’s aides accepted that because of his previous and current
positions his ability to lead was unassailable.  Speech writer and presidential aide Emmet
John Hughes was so impressed by the greatness of Eisenhower’s leadership that he
attributed to it a mystical spiritual quality.  “So gray and distant and secret” was
Eisenhower’s ability to lead, Hughes wrote, that it has confused the politician, evaded the
historian, and baffled the philosopher.   Attorney General Herbert Brownell was more62
technical in his evaluation.  Brownell compared Eisenhower’s handling of his presidential
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staff to the ways in which he handled his military subordinates.  In leading, Eisenhower
allowed for “maximum autonomy” among those he trusted, and, in the executive branch,
his appointees were always those whom he could trust.  Brownell’s description of his
leadership read like a defense counsel’s argument, dismissing the outward appearance and
focusing instead on the true nature of Eisenhower’s leadership.  “His brand of political
leadership may have led others mistakenly to underrate him,” Brownell wrote, “but
Eisenhower’s own sense of equanimity and his past accomplishments did not force him
into a false posture of deliberately instrumental presidential activism.”  That is,
Eisenhower did not need to act as if he was in control because he was and he knew it. 
Like others in the president’s cabinet, the Attorney General was given autonomy and “the
opportunity to turn broad policy and theories of government into solutions.”  Because he
allowed his subordinates room to maneuver and because he accomplished the goals which
prompted his run for office in 1952, Eisenhower was a successful leader, according to
Brownell.63
By his associates in the military and in government, Eisenhower was also praised
for his deep understanding and respect for the traditions and procedures of the American
republic.  Arthur Larson described Eisenhower’s presidential style as a product of three
principles: “a profound–almost exaggerated– respect for the dignity of the office;” a need
for restraint on the tremendous power of the executive office within the context of the
separation of powers; and a conviction that the president must not exploit his powers for
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any purpose beyond the scope of his constitutional duties.   Sherman Adams noted that64
Eisenhower “knew more about the intricacies of high government than many professional
politicians” and that his “military experience had given him a considerable knowledge of
government.”   Brownell agreed and noted that Eisenhower had an “intense feeling for65
and a developed understanding of the structure of the American government.”  His
training at West Point and his commitment to separation of powers and the scope of
presidential responsibility made Eisenhower an ideal candidate for the presidency.  
Accordingly, Eisenhower refused to use his bully pulpit to tear down Joseph McCarthy
and generally avoided getting into day-to-day political battles which might otherwise
damage his popularity, his prestige, and the integrity of the office.  In this way, Brownell
contended, Eisenhower operated quite differently and more intelligently than later
presidents such as Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon.66
Eisenhower’s associates also defended his intelligence against undeserved attacks. 
The self-proclaimed Republican egghead and presidential speech writer Arthur Larson
discounted those who considered Eisenhower unintellectual.  He recalled one instance
when the man who supposedly never read anything but Western stories corrected a
comment by Larson on Greek history.  When Larson noted he felt a bit like Alcibiades the
Just, the fifth century Greek, Eisenhower interjected, “You mean Aristides the Just.”  67
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Larson described a man well versed in ancient history and who soon would be recognized
as the military history expert he was.  Moreover, Eisenhower knew American history
well, though the best example Larson offered was that Eisenhower could recite Lincoln’s
“house divided” speech.  
Larson also argued that Eisenhower’s unintellectual appearance was merely a
facade carefully cultivated by his aides and by the president himself.  Eisenhower did read
newspapers even though he had remarked that he did not; he did not read western novels,
except when his aides told the press he did.  Larson did not call Eisenhower an
intellectual, but noted that “the unintellectual, easygoing image” was not congruent with
the real Eisenhower Larson knew.   The architect of containment, George Kennan,68
agreed.  During some high-level talks about Cold War policy, Kennan remarked that
Eisenhower displayed his own “intellectual ascendancy” over every other man in the
room, Kennan included.69
Eisenhower possessed a unique sort of intelligence, according to some who knew
him well.  Attorney General Brownell wrote of the president’s “genius to understand” just
how to pursue political goals and to maintain simultaneously the trust of the populace in
his benevolent intentions.   James Killian described Eisenhower as a man always open to70
and supportive of innovative and creative endeavors in science and technology.  Killian
did not credit Eisenhower with conceiving new ideas on his own, but glowingly praised
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his active approach to the information presented to him by his team of scientific
advisors.   Sherman Adams wrote of his quiet respect for Eisenhower who in crucial71
meetings listened more than he spoke and asked questions of those who knew better the
issues under consideration.  Eisenhower’s participation “brought the whole discussion
into clearer focus.”  72
Scholars have considered with caution Eisenhower as an intellectual.  Michael
Beschloss noted the low grades Eisenhower had heretofore received from scholars on his
intellectual capacity.  “The cant of the age had it that Eisenhower was too tired or lazy or
dumb to take command of his job,” Beschloss wrote.   This refrain grew no doubt from73
comments like those of David Lilienthal who noted that Eisenhower was “one of the least
profound men” in such a high position.    Eisenhower biographer Piers Brendon74
questioned “whether Ike had the requisite intelligence to do the top job.”   Brendon also75
wrote that Eisenhower’s “‘statesmanlike’ equivocations smacked at best of intellectual
ineptitude and at worst of moral cowardice.”  He was simple and lacking in sophistication
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and his “garbled verbiage appeared now to betoken not so much sincerity as stupidity.”  76
The view of Eisenhower as something less than intelligent may have emerged
from the man’s own writings.  Vincent De Santis criticized Eisenhower’s memoirs as
they revealed only what he did and very rarely what he thought.   In his memoirs,77
Eisenhower rarely delved into the why of matters, but instead only reported on the who,
what, where, and when of his life experiences.  This was the product of his professional
education.  Military historian John Keegan compared Eisenhower’s intellectual training to
that of an Orthodox Jew who was drilled in a dead language and was expected to
memorize large chunks of important works.  For purposes of military exams at West
Point and the Command and General Staff College, this training sufficed, but it
stimulated little capacity for historical or analytical thought, Keegan argued.   Another78
historian commented that, at least at Fort Leavenworth, Eisenhower’s training had been
intended only to produce “disciplined staff officers.”  “Command school did not
encourage independent thinking or the analysis of political affairs,” Zachary Davis wrote. 
Students were given tactical battlefield problems and their answers were graded based on
how closely they matched the “time-honored answers.”   Soldiers, like Eisenhower, “are79
trained to defend the existing social order rather than to examine it critically,” another
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observer wrote.   The product of this training would be a mind certainly capable of80
extensive memorization and factual recall to impress many, but might not result in a
probing and inquisitive mind seeking precise  answers to complex problems.  
Historians and political scientists have been hesitant to characterize Eisenhower as
an intellectual in part because Eisenhower never described himself that way.  Though he
certainly considered himself intelligent, Eisenhower never referred to himself as an
intellectual and routinely expressed disdain for the large body of anonymous academics in
the United States and elsewhere.  Eisenhower valued “solid common sense” over
academic book learning and was inherently distrustful of those who pursued and
respected the latter.  Allen Dulles, for example, knew that he had won his case for CIA
intervention in Guatemala in 1954 when he saw his political opponent, who planned to
argue against intervention, appear in the Oval Office carrying three hefty legal tomes to
help make his case.   Commenting on Robert Oppenheimer and Harry Dexter White, two81
Ivy League graduates accused of being sympathetic to communism, Eisenhower opined
they “were two miserable offenders – misled by the fact that they were probably overly
educated for their own good and had a consequential feeling of arrogance.”    Overly82
educated people often lacked the basic common sense to assess problems and make
decisions for the betterment of the American republic, according to Eisenhower.  In 1958,
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Eisenhower requested a study of likely human endurance in the horrors of a possible
nuclear war, a problem he often pondered.  But the president informed his National
Security Council that he “did not want a lot of long-haired professors to undertake such a
study, but rather some down-to-earth knowledgeable people.”   83
Eisenhower reproached his friend and former advisor C. D. Jackson for an article
Jackson published on education in Life magazine on March 1958.  “I must confess
ignorance of even the existence of the pseudo-philosophical Frenchman who developed
the doctrine of existentialism,” Eisenhower remarked.  The president lampooned Jackson
for use of the word “lamaseries,” as Jackson likely only did so “to remind the average
reader that it would be wise to check his impressions against the dictionary.”  Of course,
Eisenhower already knew the word, but doubted that Abraham Lincoln, “a master of
expressive prose,” would ever have used it.   In this case, Jackson neatly fit84
Eisenhower’s borrowed definition of an intellectual: “one who uses more words than
necessary to tell more than he knows.”85
Even Eisenhower’s closest friends and advisors sometimes were confused by his
comments about his own intelligence.  Sherman Adams recounted an instance in the
midst of the Korean crisis when Eisenhower was trying to get South Korean President
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Syngman Rhee to follow America’s advice.   Eisenhower lamented that this was one of
those times when he needed the help of “someone more intelligent than I am.”   At one86
point in October 1957, after Sputnik, Eisenhower conceded to C.D. Jackson, “I often wish
that I had someone around, like yourself, who is willing to tackle a large problem, eager
to think it through, and to come up with a concrete suggestion for a coordinated plan of
attack (and not merely another speech by me!)”   On other occasions, Eisenhower87
seemed either to be feigning or purposefully modest.  In a letter to Swede Hazlett,
Eisenhower wrote of a letter to the president from Harold Whicker.  “Some of his
sentences are a little on the lengthy side for my simple mind, but even so he succeeds in
expressing himself clearly and forcefully,” Eisenhower wrote.   According to Sherman88
Adams, Eisenhower thought the biggest problem with being president of the United
States was that he had little time to think about the serious problems he faced.  89
Eisenhower has fared better recently even among the academics he ordinarily
disdained.  Scholar George Quester queried simply “Was Eisenhower a Genius?” and he
answered in the affirmative.  Arguing as would Werner Heisenberg, Quester postulated
that to be able to observe directly or to evidence Eisenhower’s genius would naturally
serve to disprove its existence.  Indeed, “genius in politics requires that one conceal one’s
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genius.”  Eisenhower understood that the best way to achieve results in politics was to
play dumb.  In short, the author maintained that Eisenhower was a genius because he got
what he wanted politically.  Quester went so far as to speculate that, because he was
unsure of his own vice president’s ability to lead, Eisenhower wanted Nixon to lose the
presidential election of 1960 and took steps to guarantee that outcome.  This unsupported
conjecture aside, Quester’s view of the nature of genius fit nicely into revisionist claims
that one need not like the ends to appreciate the genius of the means.   Or, as Richard90
Immerman noted, “the shortcomings of his strategy must not obscure the intellectual
acuity and perspicacity that gave rise to it.”   In response to Quester’s question, however,91
Immerman concluded that Eisenhower was not a genius, but rather capable, resourceful,
and intelligent.92
The best treatment of Eisenhower as a thinker was Robert Griffith’s examination
of the president’s economic world view.  Griffith examined Eisenhower’s conception of
what the author termed the corporate commonwealth which was a coherent and consistent
view of the America economy and the means needed to guarantee its successful and
prosperous operation.  According to Griffith, Eisenhower saw inherent contradictions
within modern capitalism which could be overcome by a citizenry that avoided class
conflicts, restrained greed, and discouraged wicked partisan debates.   Creating93
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Eisenhower’s congenial society and functioning economy involved avoidance of the class
conflict that characterized Marxist thought and that prompted the excessive investment of
economic power in the hands of the state.  Class conflict was anathema to Eisenhower; he
could not conceive that humans did not recognize just how their lives and livelihoods
were bound together and how class antagonism only served to tear apart the social fabric
so necessary for progress and prosperity.   Class warfare ultimately resulted in statism, 
which stifled the American entrepreneurial spirit under the false notion that the
government should guarantee and provide economic prosperity for all Americans
regardless of circumstance.  Through cooperation, self-restraint, discipline, and
disinterested public service, these pitfalls could be avoided.
Griffith was quite careful not to describe Eisenhower as an intellectual. 
“Eisenhower was not, of course, a profound or original thinker,” Griffith casually
remarked.  He was certainly not an intellectual, and though he attended West Point, his
performance was “indifferent.”  But Griffith did offer other insights into Eisenhower’s
thinking.  Through his career in the military, “Eisenhower absorbed the principal
elements of his education: a respect for the efficiencies of organization, a contempt for
politics and politicians, a distrust of popular democracy and of the masses whose ‘class
fears and prejudices are easily aroused,’ and, finally, a strong commitment to duty and to
the ideal of disinterested public service.”   Griffith’s study came closest among94
revisionists to defining a specific, but broad world view for Eisenhower.  This study of
Eisenhower’s conception of the corporate commonwealth integrated several elements of
 Davis, “Eisenhower’s Worldview and Nuclear Strategy,” i.95
 Ibid., 20.  Davis cited Edward Meade Earle, The Makers of Modern Strategy96
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), viii.
 Davis, “Eisenhower’s Worldview and Nuclear Strategy,” 22.97
49
his thinking about a variety of matters and emphasized consistency and purpose rather
than contradictory economic and political notions.  
But Eisenhower did not need to be an intellectual, as Griffith noted, to possess a
certain consistent view of things, particularly the value and function of nuclear weapons
in service of the American republic.  In his dissertation “Eisenhower’s Worldview and
Nuclear Strategy,” Zachary Davis explored “the evolution of Eisenhower’s worldview
over the course of his lifetime” and examined “how it influenced his strategic thought,
especially his nuclear strategy.”   Davis delved into Eisenhower’s education and95
experience, including World War II, where the general developed a more sophisticated
understanding of military strategy.  For Davis, world view is “a theory or framework for
ordering information.”  “In most cases it is a loosely integrated body of general
propositions which may suggest policy guidelines,” Davis cautioned, “but does not
provide specific policies or solutions.”  In the case of Eisenhower, Davis suggested,
world view was simply the most abstract level of grand strategy.  In turn, grand strategy
“expresses how a nation can use its national resources – military, economic, and human –
to pursue the national interest.”   According to Davis, Eisenhower’s world view helped96
him to organize and identify principal interests, separating those priorities from a myriad
of lesser interests.  97
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d.  Eisenhower and Hiroshima
A study of Eisenhower’s view on the role of nuclear weapons in America must be
premised on how he understood them.  In turn, Eisenhower’s understanding of the nuclear
weapon can not be fully explained without considering the circumstances in which he
learned of them and their first use.  Immediately after the bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki, the debate began on the question of whether the atomic bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki were necessary to end the war in the Pacific.  Scholars such as Alperovitz
and Barton Bernstein challenged the orthodox interpretation that President Harry Truman
had ordered the bombings exclusively to save American lives and to bring a quick end to
the Pacific War.  They argued that Truman had other motivations to use the bomb,
including to deter the Soviet Union from entering the Pacific war and to intimidate the
Soviets into resolving upcoming postwar disputes about Eastern Europe and the Pacific
along American terms.  These scholars further questioned Truman’s assertion that the
bombs saved millions of American lives and that Japan intended to fight on through the
fall of 1945.
Regarding Eisenhower, some scholars have debated whether the Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe sincerely objected to the use of atomic bombs against Japanese
cities to his immediate superiors including Secretary of War Henry Stimson and President
Truman.  Alperovitz concluded that Dwight Eisenhower was the only major American
commander who held his moral center and rightly opposed the atomic bombings of
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Japan.   In response, Barton Bernstein, who also agreed that the bombings were not98
necessary, rejected Alperovitz’s conclusion that Eisenhower opposed the use of nuclear
weapons.  99
The question regarding Eisenhower’s view of the first atomic bombings hinged on
only a few pieces of evidence.  In this case, the Alperovitz camp used certain evidence to
support their position, and the Bernstein camp dismissed that same evidence. 
Alperovitz’s argument relied mostly upon Eisenhower’s own claim that he opposed the
bombings, claims which came only after some passage of time.  In Crusade in Europe
published in 1948, Eisenhower wrote: 
I had a long talk with Secretary Stimson, who told me that very shortly there
would be a test in New Mexico of the atomic bomb, which American scientists
had finally succeeded in developing . . .  I expressed the hope that we would never
have to use such a thing against any enemy because I disliked seeing the United
State take the lead in introducing into war something as horrible and destructive
as this new weapon was described to me.  Moreover, I mistakenly had some faint
hope that if we never used the weapon in war other nations might remain ignorant
of the fact that the problem of nuclear fission had been solved . . .  My views were
merely personal and immediate reactions; they were not based on any analysis of
the subject.   100
Alperovitz buttressed this claim with evidence from an interview Eisenhower granted to
historian Herbert Feis in 1960 in which Eisenhower repeated his claim that at the time he
did not see any value in the use of the atomic bombs on Japan.  Further corroborating
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evidence came from Eisenhower’s 1963 memoir, Mandate for Change:
The incident took place in 1945 when Secretary of War Stimson visiting my
headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop
an atomic bomb on Japan.  I was one of those who felt that there were a number of
cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act . . .  But the Secretary, upon
giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan
for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent. 
During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of
depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my
belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely
unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid
shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I
thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives.  It was my
belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a
minimum loss of “face.”  101
In addition, Alperovitz cited similar evidence from a magazine article of 1963 and from
the recollections of Eisenhower’s son John S. D. Eisenhower and his brother Milton
Eisenhower, both of whom relied on Dwight Eisenhower’s recollection to sustain their
own.   102
Bernstein looked at Alperovitz’s evidence with great suspicion and concern.  He
argued that no reliable documentary evidence supported Eisenhower’s claim and thus the
claim can not be accepted at face value.   In Bernstein’s view, much can be inferred103
from the position of Chief of Staff General George Marshall, one of Eisenhower’s
mentors and a man for whom Eisenhower had great respect.  Bernstein argued that
“General Marshall was the dominant figure before the end of the war in thinking about
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tactical use” of nuclear weapons against Japan.   Marshall was hesitant about the104
strategic use of the atomic bomb against Japan, a sentiment he shared with Secretary of
War Stimson.  Though strategic bombing had been utilized so far in the war, some still
objected to the indiscriminate bombing of noncombatants.  According to Bernstein, the
fact that Marshall was thinking about using atomic weapons as support for the coming
Kyushu invasion suggests that Marshall did not believe Japan was near surrender. 
Further, if Marshall did not believe that Japan was finished, Bernstein concluded, why
would Eisenhower conclude that they were, especially considering Eisenhower knew less
of the Pacific Theater than did Marshall?  “The only one of the Joint Chiefs who actually
had raised serious pre-Hiroshima doubts about the use of the A-bomb had been General
Marshall,” Bernstein maintained.  “He had not objected to its use, but he had strongly
urged – presumably for ethical reasons and the protection of America’s moral reputation
– that the weapon should be used on a truly military target,” Bernstein argued.105
Alperovitz and Robert Messer countered that “Marshall simply was not ‘in the loop’
when it came to many of the political-diplomatic issues surrounding the bomb.”  106
Bernstein retorted that Marshall believed the invasion of Japan was still necessary,
regardless of the Soviet invasion and regardless of the bomb.  Bernstein believed that
 Leslie R. Groves, Now It Can Be Told: The Story of the Manhattan Project107
(New York: De Capo Press, 1975), 188.
 Ibid., 200-1.108
54
Eisenhower would more than likely have shared that belief.
Eisenhower became aware of the American atomic bomb project in 1942.  In late
1942, Major General Leslie Groves, military head of the Manhattan Project,  instructed
Major General G. V. Strong to brief General Eisenhower on the need to destroy the
nascent German atomic bomb project.  Army Air Corps General “Hap” Arnold and Major
General T. T. Handy authorized Strong’s mission to suggest a bombing or sabotage
mission against German heavy water plants in Norway.   Allied commando raids in107
October and November 1942 and again in February 1943 ultimately succeeded in
destroying the plants, but they were quickly rebuilt.
In May 1944, Eisenhower received Major A. V. Peterson who briefed him on the
possibility that radioactive materials might be used against allied troops during the
upcoming invasion of France in 1944.  No record of the briefing exists, but it very likely
followed the parameters of a War Department memorandum of March 22, 1944.  In that
communication, General Groves wrote that “radioactive materials are extremely effective
contaminating agents; are known to the Germans; can be produced by them and could be
employed as a military weapon.”   The briefing came and went, and on May 11,108
Eisenhower wrote to Chief of Staff General Marshall to confirm that Eisenhower had
indeed received the message.  Eisenhower made a “careful analysis” of the information
provided by Peterson and passed it along to a limited number of persons with the proper
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precautions and in strict secrecy.   Eisenhower recounted this briefing in his memoir on109
the war.  “I was told that American scientists were making progress in these two
important types [bacteriological and atomic],” Eisenhower wrote, “and that as a result of
their own experience they were to make shrewd guesses concerning some of the details of
similar German activity.”  In the briefing, Eisenhower received what he later called
“remarkably accurate estimates of the existence, characteristics, and capabilities of the
new German weapons.”  These estimates allowed American and British high command,
even higher than Eisenhower, to take action to impede or eliminate German scientific
progress in these areas.  “We sent intermittent raids against every spot in Europe,”
Eisenhower wrote, “where scientists believed that the Germans were attempting either to
manufacture new types of weapons or where they were building launching facilities along
the coast.”   110
Eisenhower also was instructed by General Groves and General Marshall to gather
more intelligence on Nazi operations.  “We had to learn as soon as we could what the
Germans might be able to do if they exerted every possible effort to produce an atomic
weapon,” Groves remembered.   The Alsos program sought this information and began111
as early as 1939.  The program found some successes even before the invasion of Europe
in 1944.  Early Alsos missions uncovered information on the heavy water plants in
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Norway, and intelligence operations in Italy sought similar discoveries in southern
Europe.  After the Normandy landings, Alsos expanded operations.  Small troop elements
infiltrated behind enemy lines and into Germany to collect data for the allies.   112
According to Groves, Eisenhower was provided a letter requesting that the Allied
commander give the Alsos commander “every facility and assistance at your disposal
which will be necessary and helpful in the successful operation of this mission.”   Near113
the very end of the war, U.S. high command expressed concern about German atomic
research falling into the hands of advancing French or Russian armies.  At the request of
General Marshall, Groves advised Eisenhower about the possibility of a small
redeployment of troops.  “According to this plan, American troops would have to get into
and hold the area long enough for us to capture the people we wanted, question them,
seize and remove their records, and obliterate all remaining facilities,” Groves
remembered.   Groves advised Eisenhower that this guidance was not a set of orders to114
be followed at all costs, but only requests to be fulfilled at Eisenhower’s best discretion. 
Eisenhower ultimately approved the operation.  Still, Eisenhower did not describe in any
detail any of the briefings he was given on the status of the American bomb project. It
was quite possible that Eisenhower knew more about the German atomic bomb than the
American atomic bomb.  In the end, Eisenhower did not need a detailed knowledge of the
bomb’s physics to object to the atomic bombings the way he did.  He needed to know
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only that the bomb was new and far more powerful than conventional ordnance. 
Beyond this debate between Alperovitz and Bernstein, why Eisenhower chose in
1948 to express his opposition to the atomic bombings of Japan is another historical
problem.  What possible reasons did Eisenhower have for getting on record as an
opponent of the use of the atomic bomb in combat so long after the fact?  Certainly
Eisenhower’s objections further differentiated him from Robert Taft and the
Congressional isolationists within his own party.  Eisenhower would soon become the
standard bearer for a group of Republican internationalists who believed in the great
value of the NATO, the United Nations, and greater cooperation with European allies on
political, military, and economic matters.  His objections to the use of atomic bombs in
combat in part reflected his general desire not to antagonize unnecessarily America’s
allies or international organizations which could serve to advance American goals in the
Cold War.   Eisenhower believed that U. S. nuclear policy at home and abroad could have
a significant impact on the nation’s ability to make and keep allies in the Cold War. 
Further, he did not believe that isolation or unilateral action by the United States served
the national interest.  Eisenhower also likely understood that his public opposition to the
atomic bombing of Japan in 1948 put him at odds politically with President Truman who
had ordered the bombings.   
Without dismissing Eisenhower’s 1948 objections, his arguments certainly proved
convenient politically as Eisenhower was able simultaneously to distance himself from
the increasingly unpopular Truman and yet endear himself to some Republicans. 
Eisenhower’s statement of opinion on the bombings carried little political risk for a man
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as popular as he.  American war veterans widely respected, admired, and loved Dwight
Eisenhower and they had no grounds to doubt his support of the American fighting man. 
At home, few Americans could question Eisenhower’s patriotism and the general turned
university president ran little risk of alienating himself from the mass of Americans.   His
opposition to the bombing in no way endangered his status as genuine American hero. 
His critique of the atomic bombings however did cement his status as a man of peace in a
time of war.  Also, Eisenhower’s objections to the atomic bombings interjected him into
the political debate and simultaneously raised him above the political bickering of the
time through a display of his compassion, intelligence, and common sense.   By the time
Eisenhower decided to run for president, he had successfully established himself as a
popular and capable leader who was quite knowledgeable about atomic affairs and
distinct from both Democrats and Republicans.  Facing a period of increasing dangers,
Americans chose Eisenhower to lead them through the next four years.
 In this dissertation, the term “atomic” refers to fission weapons fueled by1
uranium or plutonium which yield explosions in the kiloton range.  The term
“thermonuclear” refers to fusion weapons fueled by hydrogen which yield explosions in
the megaton range.  These weapons are also known as hydrogen bombs.  The term
“nuclear” shall refer to a combination of atomic and thermonuclear weapons.
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CHAPTER THREE – Restoring Economic Strength
As president, Dwight Eisenhower sought to use the atomic bomb to help restore
strength to the American economy for the ongoing struggle against international
communism.   Though this necessity was juxtaposed with a desire to augment American1
military power, the buildup of conventional armies and atomic weapons since 1945 had
already created military power unequaled in American history.  Eisenhower worried
nonetheless that the economic policies of the Truman administration had jeopardized
American fiscal solvency with a rapid jump in defense spending and the consequent
deficits.  Beginning in 1953, Eisenhower insisted that his administration address this
fiscal danger to national security before considering others.  
The new president concluded that a rapid and sizable increase in the number of
atomic weapons would afford him the ability to maintain proper military power at a
reduced monetary cost.  In this effort, Eisenhower intended to make atomic weapons
more abundant, more powerful, and more useful to the republic in ways beyond simply
their function in war.  This was a necessary first step toward fully integrating the atomic
bomb into national life and deriving maximum advantage of the bomb’s potential for
financial benefit as well as its explosive power.  For Eisenhower, the restoration of
economic strength to the nation through the atomic bomb would yield substantial positive
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results, most notably a cumulative increase in national strength and an augmented ability
to wage the Cold War. 
In 1953, Eisenhower did not fear atomic war as much as he feared that the United
States was rapidly becoming a garrison state.  Tactical atomic war in the days before the
Soviet hydrogen bomb proved less than terrifying to Eisenhower.  In his view, atomic war
seemed less likely and less destructive to the United States than a lack of fiscal discipline
and the inevitable economic downturn.  Eisenhower worried particularly about Truman’s
plan to meet Soviet military strength with American conventional and atomic forces. 
Eisenhower believed this type of military commitment required fiscal discipline to ensure
economic prosperity over the long term.  If government spending for national security
continued to rise and larger deficits persisted, the government might be required to take
direct action to reduce the risk of inflation, unemployment, recession, and depression. 
Any sort of reactionary governmental interference would unnaturally inhibit the free flow
of market forces and create an American economy founded not on free trade but on
government regulation.  In a resulting garrison state, the economy would operate under
the control of a powerful, centralized government which used taxation, wage and price
controls, and tariffs to steer the economy.  Under a garrison state, the free market upon
which the American economy depended and in which Eisenhower placed great faith
would suffer.  In a garrison state, state power would also threaten an erosion of traditional
American rights and liberties.  Eisenhower “believes that free enterprise is the
underpinning of all freedom,” journalist Richard Rovere wrote in 1950, “he thinks we
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worry too much about security and too little about liberty.”   For Eisenhower,2
deteriorating economic freedom threatened political freedom as well.  If both were
crushed under the weight of the garrison state, Americans would no longer need to defend
the United States against communism; the communists would have already won.
To alleviate this terrible risk, Eisenhower implemented a new national security
policy, dubbed the New Look, which was to build economic strength rather than simply
military strength.  In the midst of Cold War, the United States needed cumulative national
strength.  Military strength without comparable financial strength would leave the nation
vulnerable.  “The U.S. must wake up & prepare a position of strength from which it can
speak serenely and confidently,” Eisenhower wrote, and “we must hold our position of
strength without bankrupting ourselves.”   The president anticipated that if he committed3
to a buildup of nuclear weapons early and a steady reliance upon those weapons over the
long term he would not have to choose between fiscal restraint and discipline on one hand
and military strength on the other.  
a.  Cold War Economics
Between the end of World War II and 1953, Eisenhower became familiar with the
requirements of the Cold War economy.  Eisenhower viewed the economy as did many
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contemporary American conservatives.  In short, he believed that individual and
corporate taxes should be low, government spending should be limited and effective, and
the government should do its best to keep the economy flowing according to demands of
the free markets.  This general economic philosophy aimed primarily at avoiding deficit
spending and the accumulation of a national debt.  “It became standard Republican
practice to denounce deficit financing and public works as unsound and dangerous, as
inflationary and inimical to private enterprise,” one scholar wrote.  “The balanced budget
was regarded as sacrosanct, whatever the state of the economy.”   Eisenhower believed4
strongly in the value of balanced budgets, and he opposed government price and wage
controls.  He sought to achieve real economic growth without inflation and believed that
the creation of a budget surplus was the best way to achieve those goals.  Low taxes and
limited government interference allowed the private sector to stimulate economic growth
through the proper use of financial resources.  5
Eisenhower was no laissez-faire capitalist however.  He accepted Social Security
as part of the American political landscape.  In accordance with the Republican Party’s
statement of goals for 1950, he even favored an increase in Social Security benefits “with
due regard to the tax burden on those who labor.”   In addition, particularly during times6
of war, Eisenhower expected labor and management to work together to ensure high
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levels of production.  If necessary, the government could help negotiate or even mandate
cooperation between the two groups.  He also supported a minimal amount of federal aid
to education.  Nonetheless, Eisenhower was regarded by Ann Mari May as “the most
fiscally conservative president of the postwar period.”7
In November 1945, Eisenhower became Army chief of staff.  In this position, his
primary job was to find the best way to carry out the Army’s mission as set by the
president.  That mission involved organizing a proper force structure within the context of
demobilization after World War II as well as providing for the modernization of the
armed forces, including the introduction of atomic weapons technology.  Other concerns
for Eisenhower included developing plans for military unification and for Universal
Military Training, as well as mediating disagreements between Army Generals Douglas
MacArthur and Lucius Clay.  It was a difficult task, even for the highly competent and
experienced Eisenhower, to manage a massive organization such as the Army under the
close watch of the president, the Congress, and the American public.  
By 1947, Chief of Staff Eisenhower labored to manage an Army of more than one
million men with a budget of $8.7 billion.  This was three times the size and three times
the cost of the Army of 1940.  “God knows this security business is costing a staggering
amount,” Eisenhower exclaimed, “costs are high – labor, materials, everything is out of
sight.”   He grew concerned about the size of the defense budget and the economic8
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troubles the high spending portended.  “I’m astounded and appalled at the size and scope
of plans the staff sees as necessary to maintain our security position now and in the
future,” Eisenhower remarked in his diary in December 1945.   “The cost is terrific. 9
We’ll be merely tilting windmills unless we can develop something more in line with
financial possibilities,” he continued.  “I am quite certain that unless we rapidly arrive at
some sensible solution of this problem,” Eisenhower concluded, “we are going to damage
the country financially and without adding to its defensive strength.”  10
The growing defense budget resulted in part from deepening interservice rivalries. 
After World War II the amended National Security Act combined the Army and Navy
Departments along with the newly created Air Force into a single Department of
Defense.   Now under one civilian leadership and required to cooperate and coordinate11
better than before, military leaders lamented the loss of political and strategic autonomy
for the individual branches.  They jealously guarded their defensive and strategic
priorities and stressed the absolute conviction that their branches required the best and
newest equipment in order to fulfill their missions to the United States.  Under the strain
of a growing Cold War, long-standing interservice rivalries grew more virulent and
costly.  In particular, Army and Navy leaders resented that the new Air Force held
primary responsibility to deliver atomic weapons in the early Cold War and consequently
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received priority in funding.  The Army and Navy demanded their own atomic weapons
stockpiles and the means to deliver them.  In addition, in the budget process, each service
was afforded a chance to lobby the Congress for the budget needed to improve its
strategic and tactical capability.  Eisenhower saw quickly that this development allowed
“shrewd investigators and analysts to play one service against the other to the detriment
of the whole.”   He had little patience for what he saw as selfish conduct.  Eisenhower12
reminded his colleagues that “in the national interest we must not engage in any race for
service supremacy.”  “Particularly because of the limitations in personnel and funds
placed on the Services in peacetime,” Eisenhower wrote the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April
1946, “it seems equally obvious that it is impossible for each Service to go its own way
without regard to the others.”   13
Despite accepting the position as president of Columbia University in 1948,
Eisenhower still made time to serve as a consultant to the new Secretary of Defense,
James Forrestal.  “Sec. Nat. Defense has called me to Washington for quick survey of
difficulties in way of achieving efficiency in coordination of defense services,”
Eisenhower wrote in his diary, “Idea is that I am to come here about Jan. 21, 1949 to
work as military consultant for 2-3 months to iron out many of these difficulties.”  14
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Forrestal had requested Truman’s permission to bring Eisenhower to Washington for a
few weeks to preside over the newly created Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) on an informal
basis.  Forrestal believed that Eisenhower was well qualified to lead the Joint Chiefs
toward an agreement about strategic planning in the Mediterranean specifically.  “It
occurred to me that the talents of Ike, in terms of identification of problems and the
accommodation of differing views, would be highly useful,” Forrestal explained to
Truman.  Forrestal also hoped to benefit greatly from Eisenhower’s military and
budgetary expertise and he reminded the president also that Eisenhower might be a great
ally “when we get into the money matters” with Congress.    The idea for a chairman of15
the Joint Chiefs worried some in Congress who were concerned about the establishment
of a single chief of staff for all American armed forces.  Forrestal thought the presence of
Eisenhower would alleviate those worries:  “With Ike here for sixty days I think we can
get the pattern set and prove its workability by pragmatic experience.”   16
Eisenhower would not interject himself directly into the budget process by making
specific suggestions, but rather he would offer general advice and broad
recommendations to Forrestal concerning the budget process itself and the ways to
balance fiscal and strategic requirements.  Eisenhower already had several ideas.  “Basic
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& firm strategic concept is 1  requirement.  Once this is achieved much else will fall inst
line,” he suggested.   Per Eisenhower’s plan, the president and the secretary of defense17
must coordinate with military leaders to decide upon each service’s major tasks and
responsibilities.  Then, “all services should work out a minimum (disaster averting)
strategic plan,” Eisenhower noted, “coupled with a decent program (arranged in priorities
coordinated among services) for successively higher levels of preparations.”   He18
recommended that studies should be made for every price point between 10 and 16
billion, but the key was to plan effectively.  “No economy & efficiency can be produced
in military preparations except on planned and steady basis,” Eisenhower insisted.  If the
government budgeted too much, unexpected cuts resulted.  If too little was budgeted, new
appropriations became necessary and even more costly.  The result of Eisenhower’s kind
of intricate planning would be less redundancy, less waste, greater efficiency, and more
effective spending.    19
The $14.3 billion and $11.7 billion allocated for the two fiscal years 1946/1947
and 1947/1948 were too low to provide for national security and to lower the national
debt as well.  Eisenhower estimated about $15 billion for all services per year would be
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sufficient.   “If we could use that sum intelligently & logically what a difference it could20
make,” Eisenhower believed.  He wanted $15 billion to be a high water mark at best or a
plateau at worst for spending in this area.  At the same time, “we should shoot for a sum
(call it capital expenditures) to make up the total or accumulated deficit.”    In making21
his case, Eisenhower insisted that it was not necessary to “sacrifice security to worship a
balanced budget.”  The United States  “wanted adequate security – we wanted no more
than adequacy,” he later explained.  22
The planning for fiscal year 1950 proved more difficult than Eisenhower
imagined.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff continued to argue amongst themselves and with
Forrestal about each service’s budget requirements.  These personal and political battles
played out in the press, and Eisenhower feared that they might appear soon in Congress
which might undermine all future budget requests.  Forrestal proved unable to rein in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff perhaps because he began to show the symptoms of the mental
illness which later contributed to his suicide.  The chiefs ultimately agreed upon $14.4
billion, but Eisenhower expected Truman to cut the request to below $14 billion.  If the
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Congress made additional changes to the budget upon which the military experts
coordinated and agreed, “the resulting organization is bound to be out of balance so far as
overall professional opinion is concerned.”  Eisenhower coached Forrestal not to accept
any budget which served only to allay internal dissent.  “You must believe in the
soundness of the method by which the decision was reached and in the eventual accuracy
of the result,” Eisenhower instructed.  23
In recent years, inflation had played havoc with military expenditures.  “During
46, 47 and early 48 I pleaded for a 15 b. budget.  We never got it & we’re suffering
because of it,” Eisenhower believed, “now inflation has raised everything so much that
even the 15 begins to look inadequate.”   The need to get defense spending under control24
and balance the budget grew more urgent every fiscal year.  The deficits in part spurred
inflation which further hampered the ability to buy what the military required at a price
the nation could afford.  Eisenhower labored “to balance the budget over the business
cycle, and thus keep the price of weapons, like the price of everything else, from
multiplying.”   25
President Truman appointed Eisenhower as primary military advisor to the
president and the secretary of defense and as temporary presiding officer of the Joint
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Chiefs of Staff on February 11, 1949.  “Pres. & Mr. F. apparently assume that I have
some miraculous power to make some of these warring elements lie down in peace
together,” Eisenhower remarked.   This was precisely the reason Truman and Forrestal26
continued to involve Eisenhower in these important developments.  Eisenhower’s
primary task in this position was to insure agreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
“must tasks and, therefore must appropriations, around which a desirable peace time
structure can be built.”  Eisenhower continued to believe “that 15-16 billion per year is all
that this country need spend for security forces – if it is done every year (with some
additional amounts to cover past deficits).”    Getting these funds and using them27
efficiently to prepare for the long term was Eisenhower’s central preoccupation both as
advisor to Forrestal and as temporary chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff .  Eisenhower
advised the chiefs to prepare a basic war plan, the first step in his “red brick” plan. 
Developing the necessary force requirements for that war plan followed, and finding the
minimum cost to procure these forces followed that.   This was Eisenhower’s task, and28
absent an agreement, Eisenhower remarked, “I’ll quit & begin criticizing.”  29
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His record as interim chairman proved mixed.  On the one hand, Eisenhower
persuaded the Joint Chiefs to accept a unified budget and set a precedent for all future
chairmen.  On the other hand, he became increasingly frustrated with President Truman
and the new Defense Secretary Louis Johnson, who filled the post after Forrestal. 
Eisenhower insisted that the defense budget be kept at a certain level consistent with
national security, but the White House and the Pentagon continued to cut the budget over
which Eisenhower had labored and for which he finally got the agreement of the Joint
Chiefs.  “General Alfred Gruenther, head of Joint Planning, and I wanted a $16 billion
budget as minimum,” Eisenhower remembered, “Secretary Johnson kept making it less
and less and I asked to be relieved.”   Eisenhower was angered that his hard work to get30
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to agree on a strategic concept, force requirements, and the
necessary minimum budget was being ignored by Johnson and ultimately the president.  
With Eisenhower’s input and consent, the final military budget for fiscal year 1950/51
was $13.1 billion.  After suffering an acute attack of gastroenteritis on March 21, 1949
which kept him away from his duties until May 11, Eisenhower gave up his temporary
duties at the Pentagon in July 1949 and concentrated exclusively on his job at Columbia.
Nineteen forty-nine proved a defining year for the Cold War and for Eisenhower. 
On August 29, the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb and ended the American
atomic monopoly.  To meet the new Soviet threat, Truman took action.  On September
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28, the president and the Congress agreed upon funding to create a new anti-communist
defense alliance, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  In addition, Atomic Energy
Commissioner Lewis Strauss wrote President Truman on November 25 to encourage
immediate action to build the thermonuclear bomb.  On January 31, 1950, Truman
announced America’s intention to build the hydrogen bomb with all possible speed.   31
In early 1950, the National Security Council began work on what eventually
became NSC-68, a document which reoriented the American government for the Cold
War.  The National Security Council agreed that the United States existed in a perpetual
state of war and the nation needed to respond accordingly.  The Soviet Union and
international communism constituted a hostile and immediate threat that demanded a
massive military buildup in the United States as well as the mobilization of American
society in this new conflict.  “We must, by means of a rapid and sustained build-up of the
political, economic, and military strength of the free world, and by means of an
affirmative program intended to wrest the initiative from the Soviet Union,” the
document explained, “confront it with convincing evidence of the determination and
ability of the free world to frustrate the Kremlin design of a world dominated by its
will.”   32
Despite these remarkable developments, Eisenhower avoided getting too involved
in the partisan political debates over these momentous issues.  He spent much of this time
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fending off requests from friends, associates, and others for him to enter politics.  Then,
on June 25, 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, and, like many others, Eisenhower
became greatly concerned.  “I have no business talking about the basic political decision
(to support or not to support South Korea),” Eisenhower wrote in his diary, but “I believe
we’ll have a dozen Koreas soon if we don’t take a firm stand.”  What the United States
needed now was proper strength.  “Remember, in a fight we (our side) can never be too
strong,” he continued, “we must study every angle to be prepared for whatever may
happen even if it finally came to the use of an A-bomb (which God forbid).”   On July 6,33
1950, Eisenhower traveled from New York to Washington to testify before a Senate
subcommittee and to meet with various officials including General Marshall, who would
soon become secretary of defense, and Truman.  He reminded the Senate that it was
vitally important that nations of the world know something about our “latent strength.” 
Later, Eisenhower “told the president that his decision of a week ago must be earnestly
supported.  Speed and strength, both are needed.”   The U.S., South Korean, and United34
Nations forces under General MacArthur seemed to take Eisenhower’s advice to heart.  A
landing at Inchon in September 1950 turned back the North Korean advance, and
MacArthur pushed the enemy back across the 38  parallel.  The war seemed to be goingth
better.  Though Eisenhower still attempted to keep his name out of the political fray, he
grew increasingly concerned with the Truman administration’s fiscal policies and the
subsequent effect on America’s ability to wage the Cold War. 
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b. The Fear of the Garrison State  
To meet the threat in Korea as well as future threats, Truman planned to augment
U.S. military capabilities.  Truman sent to Congress a $4 billion supplemental spending
request to support expansion of the Army, Navy, and Air Force as well as the Atomic
Energy Commission.  When he submitted the budget for fiscal year 1951, the president
requested a total of $69.5 billion for a variety of national security requirements.  Truman
forecasted he would request $56 billion for the following two years and $45 billion for
1955.  All of these numbers, Melvyn Leffler noted, “assumed that fighting in Korea
would be over by June 1951.”  Truman believed that an increase in expenditures for both
conventional and atomic forces best prepared America for the long haul.    35
Eisenhower was disheartened.  “Some of these officials think we can buy
security,” he commented, “solvency and security can scarcely be separated, yet I hear talk
of $55 billion a year for several years.  Tragic.”    According to Leffler, Eisenhower36
feared the results of a large budget:  “A new emphasis would have to be placed on the
production of military hardware; the economy would be strained; inflationary pressures
would grow; shortages would occur.”  Eisenhower worried that to relieve these economic
pressures the government would likely raise taxes, control prices and wages, and maintain
tighter control over credit.    The free market economy soon would become a controlled37
economy.  “We do not intend to become a garrison state,” Eisenhower later explained,
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“We do not intend to impose rigid controls over everything that the American people do –
their product, their going into uniform, their living, their thinking, their talking – not at
all.”   38
Eisenhower believed that American political leadership had failed the republic. 
“Goddamit, is there no desire to know where we are going?,” he exclaimed.  James
Forrestal did not have “the stamina to equal his honesty and sense” and George Marshall,
“the best public servant of the lot, obviously wants to quit.”  “And poor HST, a fine man
who, in the middle of a stormy lake, knows nothing of swimming,” Eisenhower mused,
still, “drowning people are forced to look to him as a lifeguard.  If his wisdom could only
equal his good intent.”     He believed that Truman and the Congress had overreacted. 39
Had the administration taken his advice, the $15 billion Eisenhower originally suggested
would have covered the nation’s needs, without increasing the deficit, risking inflation,
and undermining the American economy.  “Such price increases, spiraling indefinitely
upward out of anyone’s control,” Eisenhower wrote, “I am convinced can eventually
wreck the nation’s security.”   He worried that a growing national budget, largely the40
result of increasing expenditures on military hardware, would result in an overall loss of
national economic strength.  In the end, Truman’s failed leadership and poor planning
resulted in an inflated budget of $56.9 billion for fiscal year 1952. 
Eisenhower’s view of the American economy was basic but not simple-minded. 
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From General Fox Conner, Eisenhower learned that democracies such as the United
States needed to organize the whole of their industrial and economic base around warfare
in order to win any major conflict.  By 1935, according to one scholar, Eisenhower
“became one of the country’s leading experts on industrial mobilization.”   As much as41
anything, this led to his various appointments before and during World War II, including
roles in the office of the assistant secretary of war working for industrial mobilization
plans.  He worked closely with Bernard Baruch, Chairman of the War Industries Board,
where he “became a firm convert to Baruch’s creed that victory in a future war would
depend ultimately upon economic mobilization, a mobilization that would require the
government to take control of the nation’s economy.”  In World War II, Eisenhower42
employed this conception of total war to insure the United States provided proper
industrial mobilization to defeat fascism in Europe and the Pacific.  “We’ve got to go to
Europe and fight,” Eisenhower wrote in January 1942, “and we’ve got to quit wasting
resources all over the world.”   All the nation’s resources needed proper management43
and coordination to supply the vast allied armies to defeat ruthless and fanatical enemies. 
Government had to play a crucial role in this effort.
Once the war ended, however, Eisenhower adopted a view of the American
economy which could be characterized as classically liberal.  This was not well expressed
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by Eisenhower as he rarely commented on economic matters not directly related to
military procurement or budgets.  Labor discord captured Eisenhower’s attention in the
days after the war, and he expressed his economic ideas within that context.  In particular,
he worried about possible government intervention in a potential strike of 1946.  He
insisted that strikes would not be a danger if the public understood the nature and danger
of the communist threat. “We (our form of government) is [sic] under deadly, persistent,
and constant attack,” he believed, “if this understanding were universal we’d have no
strikes; capital and labor would easily solve their difficulties if both knew their very
existence depended upon accord.”  Though “all my sympathies are with the workers,”
Eisenhower insisted all aspects of management and labor relations required study:
“closed-shop, check-off, industry-wide unions, responsible, corporate organization of
trade unions (one side).  Effective antitrust laws, lockouts, control of raw materials, sound
financing – private and government – limiting bureaucratic (other side).”  Labor relations
laws should be fair and just, Eisenhower believed, but “government should stay out of
this field to the utmost extent.”44
A classical liberal on government’s role, Eisenhower was also a fiscal
conservative.  William Shannon called him a “true disciple of the Old Guard orthodoxy. 
He believed in the absolute primacy of thrift, he wanted to return government functions to
the states, he believed deficit financing was a sin, and he believed high taxes and
government regulations” smothered free enterprise.  Eisenhower was “closer to an Iowa
Rotarian than to a Wall Street banker,” Shannon continued, “He was the man from
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Abilene, Kansas, not the man from Morningside Heights.”    Economist Ann May45
recognized that to some Eisenhower was “the rock of fiscal probity,” but also described
him as a flexible conservative who as president was willing to accept budget deficits
during times of recession.   46
Still, Eisenhower worried about the growing number of government social
programs some of which he saw as financially unhealthy and ethically unacceptable. 
Truman, for example, proposed to the 81  Congress legislation to create federal healthst
insurance, a farm plan, a fair employment practices law, slum clearance, and federal aid
to education.  Congressional Democrats did not possess the majorities to pass any of
these pieces of legislation, save the Wagner-Ellender-Taft Housing Act which enjoyed
bipartisan support in Congress.   Eisenhower was appalled. “The trend toward47
governmental centralization continues – alarmingly,” Eisenhower noted.  “In the name of
‘social security’ we are placing more and more responsibility upon the central govt,” he
lamented, “and this means that an ever growing bureaucracy is taking an ever greater
power over our daily lives.”  “The ‘tax and tax – spend and spend – elect and elect’
formula is working wonderfully for the shortsighted persons who cannot (or do not desire
to) see beyond the next election date,” Eisenhower wrote.  This same scenario had already
created a problem for Columbia.  “Taxes leave prospective donors to university income
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so little in the way of spare income [sic] that only the most strenuous efforts keep us
going at all,” he remarked.  When money fell short, the rallying cry was always the same:
federal aid to education.  “It is a dangerous slogan,” he wrote.  Even worse, Eisenhower
continued, “the proposition is immoral, and its adoption, in this general sense, will lead to
statism and, therefore, slavery.”   Eisenhower reserved this harshest of language for48
fiscal recklessness.
Things began to change for Eisenhower in 1950.  In October 1950, President
Truman summoned Eisenhower to public duty again when he offered Eisenhower the top
job at NATO, Supreme Allied Commander for Europe.  Truman expected that
Eisenhower would bring immediate credibility and promise to the fledgling organization. 
If NATO were to succeed, Truman reasoned, the alliance required unassailable leadership
from someone committed to a European defensive alliance.  While working on building
NATO, Eisenhower stayed abreast of American domestic politics.  For months,
prominent Republicans had urged him to run for president, and in early 1952, after
slightly more than a year on the job at NATO, he declared himself a Republican and a
presidential candidate.
By this time, Eisenhower had already begun to express frustration with Truman’s
failure to plan appropriately, to allocate monies judiciously, and to build military strength
efficiently.  “I know that the men who have made the studies are capable, honest, and
patriotic,” Eisenhower wrote on January 22, 1952, but “I am well acquainted with some
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of the countries in which the size of national budgets has stifled initiative and caused
great difficulties otherwise.”   That morning, Eisenhower read in the newspaper of49
Truman’s $85 billion budget request to Congress, including approximately $65 billion for
national security and a $14 billion deficit.  Eisenhower noted, “there is newspaper
speculation to the effect that these budgets will continue to rise.”  “If this is true (and I
cannot believe for a moment that it is), then we are headed for worse than trouble.  The
effect will be disastrous,” he concluded.   He recognized the need to build up U.S.50
military strength, but he had long advocated that $15 billion would be sufficient.  With
proper planning and without allowing the Congress or other budget managers to chip
away at the military’s estimates, the United States could build, hold, and modernize year
after year consistently.  Eisenhower’s figure intended to avoid major fluctuations in
defense spending which often created deficits, spurred inflation, and made even carefully
planned estimates subject to price variations.  The result of uneven military expenditures
then was a loss not only of fiscal discipline, but also of the confidence that military
strength could be maintained.  By 1952, Eisenhower had concluded that Truman, the
Congress, the military leadership, and the country had succumbed to growing Cold War
hysteria and sought to spend themselves out of danger.
During times of war Eisenhower accepted fiscal policies for the short term which
in the long term might do harm to the American economy.  “Censorship, price controls,
allocation of materials and commodities, and the like are necessary in a great war,”




Eisenhower confided in his diary.  He even accepted that in times of peace “certain of
these controls could possibly be applied in unusual and serious circumstances.”  In both
these circumstances, the controls Eisenhower mentioned would be always temporary.  
Economic controls sustained over the long term to meet a continuing threat to national
security, however, could do “serious damage to the system of government set up by our
Constitution.”   To strike a balance between national preparedness on one side and51
national bankruptcy on the other, the republic needed to anticipate and prepare for
national defense priorities rather than to be surprised and reactive.  To meet the Cold War
threat, Eisenhower believed, “we must devise and follow a system that we can carry on as
long as there appears to be a threat in the world capable of endangering our national
safety.”52
This constituted one “horn of the dilemma” for Eisenhower.  The republic
required military power sufficient to meet challenges to its security and to that of the
nation’s allies.  As chief of staff, advisor to James Forrestal, and chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Eisenhower labored to stabilize the defense budget to $15 billion for
several years into the future.  According to Eisenhower, “the chiseling and cutting of
estimates” by the Congress “was accompanied and made worse by a steadily depreciating
value of the dollar.”  “Thus, in the fiscal years 1947, 1948, 1949, and 1950, the defense





allow the nation to wage the Korean War made these budget deficiencies apparent to
everyone.  Unprepared for the war fiscally, the nation had overreacted to the outbreak of
war and began a military buildup which promised economic troubles down the line.  
These economic troubles constituted the other side of the dilemma.  “I am afraid
that we are risking damage from the other horn of the dilemma,” Eisenhower worried,
“that is, the danger of internal deterioration through the annual expenditures of
unconscionable sums on a program of indefinite duration, extending far into the future.”  54
Eisenhower got the impression that the $14 billion deficit for the following year would be
the first of many.  Expenditures beyond revenue at this level risked significant inflation. 
“The president told me very solemnly that an aggregate national budget of more than $42
billion would quickly spell unconscionable inflation,” Eisenhower remembered of
Truman, “today we talk about $85 billion and apparently mean it to be indefinitely
prolonged into the future.”   “National bankruptcy would necessitate a type of control or55
confiscation of property,” he continued, “that would be in utter contradiction to the
assurances and safeguards of our Constitution.”   In short, Eisenhower believed that the56
result of those deficits might be national bankruptcy and the destruction of the republic. 
For the republic to sustain the Cold War indefinitely into the future, the
government required military and fiscal discipline to maintain proper economic strength. 
Democracies had to undertake military preparation on a defensive basis only, Eisenhower
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insisted.   To insure military strength for defense the republic required careful planning57
and a conservative, disciplined approach to modernization and growth that provided not
only proper force structure and size but also the flexibility to grow, adapt, and advance
technologically.  The building of economic strength required that the republic not
overreact to military threats, maintain planned spending levels even in times of great
danger, and build the most strength at the least cost over the long term. The Cold War
promised to be a long-term struggle between powerful nations and their alliances,
Eisenhower believed.
In that struggle, greater threats existed to the nation’s economy than to her
military.  “There is no greater probability of war today than there was two years ago; and
no one can say for certain that there is any greater probability of deliberately provoked
war at the end of this year or of next than there is now,” he argued in 1952.  Despite the
ongoing military effort on the Korean peninsula, Eisenhower was more concerned with
Truman’s budget follies.  Whereas the United States and the free world had met the
communist challenge in Korea, the same could not be said of the nation’s economic
response to the North Korean invasion in particular and the Cold War in general. 
Eisenhower believed a cumulative loss of economic strength would upset the delicate
balance and likely encourage more communist aggression.  “We can say only that
properly balanced strength will promote the probability of avoiding war,” he argued, “in
this sense, we need the strength soon – but it must be balanced between moral power,
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economic power, and purely military power.”   Any significant reduction of strength in58
one of these areas risked a loss of cumulative strength that by definition encouraged
aggression.  
Comfortable with America’s military position in Korea despite the stalemate, he
feared more the rise of the garrison state because of the effect that might have on the
nation’s strategic position.  He believed that lavish defense spending “will actually reduce
rather than enhance our chances of preventing a war.”  This will become reality,
Eisenhower argued, “because we will have aroused genuine doubt, both among our own
citizens and among our allies, as to the essential stability of the United States economy.”  59
For Eisenhower, a shaky economy led either to great skepticism about the United States’
ability to defend the free world against communism or suggested that democracy and
capitalism did have fatal flaws, as Lenin suggested, and was not capable of providing for
the people of the industrial world.  The implications of either of those alternatives proved
too terrible to contemplate.  
At the root of Eisenhower’s problem was the fact that defending lives and territory
was only one part of his overall defense concept.  Without maintaining fiscal discipline
during war time, Eisenhower noted, huge expenditures would not be serving the purpose
of defending freedom, for that would be sacrificed in the land of the controlled
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economy.   Instead, according to Richard Immerman, Eisenhower believed that “defense60
against Soviet attack was no more imperative than defense against inflated budgets that
might undermine America’s economic vitality.”  Indeed, if defending only property were61
the central goal, this could be accomplished without much worry or greater risk. 
Spending could be unleashed, blast and fallout shelters could be built for a great portion
of the nation at the government’s expense, and both a massive nuclear arsenal and a
tremendous conventional force could be built.  For Eisenhower, however, America’s
freedoms and her way of life would be sacrificed in the spending spree.  The economy
would be tightly regulated.  “These methods would almost certainly involve what is
euphemistically called a controlled economy,” Eisenhower complained, “but which in
effect would amount to a garrison state.”  62
From controlled economy to garrison state and then to dictatorial government, the
United States would cease to be American and the cost of war would be the reason. 
Indeed, if things continued and worsened, the risk to America was too high and the price
too high as well.  At one point, so disturbed and concerned about the economy of the
national security state, he wondered if, “in such circumstances, we would be forced to
consider whether or not our duty to future generations did not require us to initiate war at
 “Memorandum to the Secretary of State,” May 20, 1959, Papers of Dwight D.63
Eisenhower as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), DDE Diary Series, Box 3,
Folder 8 – 9/53 (2), DDE Library, 2.
 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 180.64
86
the most propitious moment that we could designate.”   A preemptive nuclear strike63
would remove the hostile military threat, Eisenhower reasoned, and eliminate the need for
massive military expenditures which might otherwise endanger America’s free
institutions.  Though Eisenhower did not seriously contemplate the possibility of
preemptive nuclear war for very long, the economy of the national security state plagued
him nonetheless.  Following his inauguration, Eisenhower sought to find a better to way
capitalize on what advantages the U.S. already had in an effort to advance all the goals of
national security, including fiscal discipline and economic strength.  Whereas Truman
had not let American security lapse in the military sense, Eisenhower believed Truman’s
fiscal failings did so in an economic sense.  Eisenhower next needed to decide just how to
insure that military strength was not sacrificed for economic strength.  Because of his
experience with atomic weapons, Eisenhower concluded that the proper use of atomic
weapons might allow the nation to build both equally well.  “It would be impossible for
the United States to maintain the military commitments which it now sustains around the
world (without turning into a garrison state),”  Eisenhower wrote later, “did we not
possess atomic weapons and the will to use them when necessary.”   Because64
Eisenhower saw both the fiscal and military value of the nuclear weapon he formulated
the New Look.
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c.  A New Look At Financial Strength
At the time of his inauguration, Eisenhower feared the rise of the garrison state
more than he feared atomic war.  Under Truman, the increased defense budget allowed
for the growth of both conventional and atomic armaments and a buildup of military
strength. Total expenditures for national defense grew steadily from the post-war low of
$16 billion in 1948 to $18 billion in 1950 and $25 billion in 1951.  Total military
personnel in the United States rose from 1.4 million troops in 1950 to a Korean War high
of 3.6 million in 1952.    From the paltry beginning in 1945, America’s atomic stockpile65
totaled well over one-thousand weapons and seventy-two megatons of explosive power at
the end of Truman’s second term.   Continuing innovation in military technology,66
including the thermonuclear bomb and the Redstone missile, suggested the nation’s
military power was on the rise, especially when considered against Soviet advances.  This
growth in military strength resulted in part from Eisenhower’s work as Chief of Staff and
advisor to Forrestal.  Between 1945 and 1952, Eisenhower helped build a large military
force.
As chief of staff, as informal chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as supreme
allied commander of NATO, Eisenhower required very little technical data on the nuclear
weapon to do his job.  Indeed, throughout his military career, Eisenhower had welcomed
new technology.  When the tank emerged as the next revolution in warfare during the
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Great War, Eisenhower wrote the army’s tactical doctrine for that new weapon.  He
learned the basic workings of the tank, including its armor, its mobility, and its firepower,
as this information was central to writing a new doctrine.  Atomic weapons were not
altogether different for Eisenhower.  He did not need to understand the physics of fission,
chain reactions, and radioactivity to put these weapons to work.  This precise technical
information proved largely beyond Eisenhower’s intellectual curiosity.  He was
concerned only about the explosive potential of atomic fission and later fusion in general
terms and what was required to deliver nuclear bombs quickly, accurately, and decisively. 
Between 1945 and 1953, Eisenhower’s briefings on atomic weapons did not
emphasize science.  During World War II, before Operation Overlord, he was briefed by
senior War Department officials about the possibility the Germans might use radioactive
materials on invading Allied troops.  This information did not prompt the general to
rethink the landings nor did he alter invasion plans to account for this new information. 
In fact, his briefing included little information in the way of protection against
radiological attacks.  For an army the size of the allied invasion force, no suitable
protection could be offered, particularly considering that Eisenhower’s briefing came less
than a month before the June 6 landings.  War Department officials waited until the last
possible minute to brief Eisenhower, as they understood they could offer no comfort, little
reassurance, and above all few specifics about the subject at hand.
As chief of staff, Eisenhower’s primary dealings with atomic technology centered
on the role played by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in formulating American atomic policy. 
Thus, his early arguments were not technical, but rather strategic and political.  He
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suggested “that there be developed a well considered analysis” and that the military
services be allowed to “discuss and justify their plans and programs for the near future
and distant future with specific relationship to atomic energy.”   In the meantime,67
Eisenhower advocated modernization and secrecy.  America needed to continue making
progress both on the bomb itself and on delivery methods.  From a military point of view,
“the maintenance of the highest possible degree of secrecy with respect to the atomic
bomb and refusal to give these secrets to any other nation or to the United Nations
organization” appeared prudent to Eisenhower.   68
For Eisenhower and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the issue of international control of
the atomic bomb was central to their discussions of the development of atomic weapons. 
Eisenhower recognized that the use of atomic technology by the United States in any
future conflict depended largely upon “action taken by the United Nations to outlaw or
control the bomb.”   In June 1946, Eisenhower’s friend Bernard Baruch had delivered69
America’s first proposal for international control of the atomic bomb to the United
Nations.  Baruch proposed the creation of an International Atomic Development
Authority which would be entrusted to control “all phases of the development and use of
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atomic energy.”  The United Nations would supervise all peaceful atomic initiatives and
once verifiable safeguards were in place, all nations including the United States shall
dispose of their bombs and pledge never to build new ones.    70
The same day Baruch delivered his proposal to the international community,
Eisenhower sent Baruch a letter.  “I completely agree with you that only through effective
international control of atomic energy can we hope to prevent atomic war,” Eisenhower
opened.  He then detailed his personal views, not necessarily those of the Joint Chiefs, on
Baruch’s proposals.  Eisenhower generally concurred with Baruch but he often
emphasized the challenge presented by Baruch’s proposals.  Independent and thorough
inspections to ensure compliance with atomic disarmament, for example, proved
exceptionally difficult, for “no system of inspection can be expected to guarantee
completely against the construction of some atomic bombs.”  In addition, Eisenhower
noted “the dilemma” of international control of these powerful weapons.  If nations enter
an agreement too quickly and without thorough inspections and guarantees, the
international community might find itself “in the position of having no restraining means
in the world capable of effective action if a great power violates the agreement.” 
Eisenhower saw something of a paradox.  “To my mind, this means, for the present, that
to prevent the use atomic weapons,” he explained, “there must exist the capability of
employing atomic weapons against the recalcitrant.”   In the end, Eisenhower reasoned,
“The problem of controlling, and finally preventing, the use of atomic bombs (and other
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decisive weapons), thus becomes the problem of preventing war itself.”  Still, he was not71
convinced that the atomic bomb brought security. “Bigger and better atomic bombs and
their exclusive possession by any one country do not necessarily represent the ultimate in
present or future possibilities of control by force or threat of force,” Eisenhower wrote.  72
The United States may indeed possess a lead in atomic armaments, but he speculated that
other nations pursued other weapons of mass destruction, namely biological weapons,
which might hold even greater potential for destruction.  To provide for international
control of atomic bombs without similar controls over other destructive devices left open
opportunities for mass destruction.  
Eisenhower’s primary concern in this discussion was for the fundamental national
interest of the United States.  The United States must not enter into any international
treaty for the control of atomic energy if the treaty in any way threatened America’s
national security.  This was a “scarcely debatable point.”  “We can yield much, even
certain points of our sovereignty, to reach this solution,” Eisenhower noted, but only if
the American people can be persuaded that America’s ability to defend the republic did
not suffer.  “To control atomic weapons, in which field we are pre-eminent, without
provision for equally adequate control of other weapons of mass destruction,” he argued,
 “Letter to Bernard Mannes Baruch,” June 14, 1946, Louis Galambos, ed., The73
Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: Chief of Staff, Vol. VII, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978), 1126.
92
“can seriously danger our national security.”    73
While serving as president of Columbia University and as NATO commander,
Eisenhower had few encounters with nuclear weapons.  Not from a scientific,
technological nor a strategic standpoint did Eisenhower have much time to think about
the power and function of nuclear weapons.  At Columbia, for example, Eisenhower
presided over a faculty of distinguished scholars and scientists, including Isidor Rabi,
himself a veteran of the Manhattan Project, and yet had virtually nothing to say about
atomic weapons.  While at Columbia, Eisenhower also served as an advisor to James
Forrestal and as interim Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  In these various
capacities, Eisenhower focused mostly on budget issues, on inter-service rivalries
brewing with the Joint Chiefs, and keeping his name out of the political discussions.
Otherwise preoccupied, Eisenhower even displayed little concern about Truman’s
decision to authorize the construction of the hydrogen bomb.  
Immediately after work began on the world’s first fission bomb, some physicists
including Edward Teller argued that a more powerful bomb could be constructed.  This
bomb would use a different fuel, hydrogen, and employ the process of fusion, not fission,
to create energy.  If the scientists who theorized the super bomb were right, the bomb
would be thousands of times more powerful than first atomic bomb and indeed all of
human civilization, not just cities or nations, could be in mortal danger.  Disagreements
within the scientific community prompted disagreements within the political community
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about whether a hydrogen bomb was possible or desirable.  Chief among those arguing
against the development of a fusion weapon was Robert Oppenheimer.  Oppenheimer
doubted the bomb would actually work, but he worried mostly that if the United States
constructed a thermonuclear weapon, an atomic arms race with the Soviet Union would
follow.  Convinced that it could be built and that the communists might already be
pursuing it, Teller and others advocated the hydrogen bomb’s construction, testing, and
deployment.  After the Soviet Union tested its first atomic bomb in 1949, Truman decided
the United States would build the hydrogen bomb.
Eisenhower’s reaction to Truman’s decision was skeptical and whimsical.  He was
not overly impressed nor was he even convinced that the new weapon could be built. 
“No matter how strong may be that hydrogen bomb,” he cautioned, it was “still just an
idea.”   Assuming the bomb could be built, Eisenhower expressed concern about the74
fantastic estimates of the explosive power cited in the popular press. All the doomsday
talk about the possible destruction caused by this weapon might “be an obstacle to clear
thinking and reasonable action.”  As a practical matter, he inferred, “if we are all to be
destroyed in the twinkling of an eye, what is there to do about it?”   The important thing75
to remember, Eisenhower believed, was that the hydrogen bomb “can be produced for
good or evil.  It is up to us.”  76
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In the meantime, Eisenhower took a leave of absence from Columbia in January
1951 and became NATO commander.  In this post, he sought to create an integrated
fighting force of conventional armies from the nations of Western Europe that would be
capable of resisting any Soviet military advance across the continent.  NATO was
founded with the premise that the United States alone could not afford to defend Europe
against the Soviet Union with a conventional army.  Americans, however internationalist
they might be, would never agree to pay the exorbitant cost associated with fielding an
American army to defend European interests on another continent.  Truman believed that
Eisenhower, perhaps more than anyone else, had the authority, the popularity, and the
commitment to make NATO a viable part of the free world’s security apparatus in the
Cold War.  The role of atomic weapons in this effort was initially unclear.  American
atomic weapons could be used to defend Paris, for example, but Soviet retaliation might
strike at Chicago.  This was a trade few in the United States would willing to make. 
Moreover, the use of tactical nuclear weapons to defend Western Europe proved more
complex than originally imagined.  The United States could easily decimate advancing
Soviet armies with atomic weapons, but the fallout from those weapons might irreparably
damage the European continent.  Eisenhower’s job however was not necessarily to make
these types of hard decisions, but to win European approval of NATO first and to build
the defensive alliance second.  Eisenhower did not worry too much about just how atomic
weapons would serve NATO.  He just knew that they could and must.
When he did comment about Truman’s national security policies as NATO
commander, he complained about the short sightedness of politicians in Washington who
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had failed to understand the great threat the country faced.  “Our country is at stake,” he
wrote in his diary, “man will give her lip service; few will give her self-sacrifice, sweat
and brains!!!”  America needed a re-examination of “our whole philosophy of defense in
its foreign & domestic aspects.”  Each defensive asset as well as the whole organization
of the military “should be ruthlessly pulled apart & examined in order to get down to the
country’s requirements.”  He recommended a dissection of current military spending,
including programs such as the B-36, the heavy carrier, and also the hydrogen bomb. 
Intelligent men from all sectors of American society should evaluate these programs and
others in terms of their “purposes, special & unique capabilities, inescapable need,
duplicatory [sic] effort, luxury.”   Technological advances notwithstanding, the U.S. had
not built better defenses, Eisenhower argued, but rather only more expensive defenses. 
“We can have security without paying the price of national bankruptcy,” Eisenhower
believed, “if we will put brains in the balance.”  On the other hand, without a
“professional examination that will show us where & how to proceed in this armament
business, we will go broke and still have inefficient defenses.”   When North Korea77
invaded South Korea in the summer of 1950, the reexamination of defense Eisenhower
advocated was put on hold. 
With the support of the American people to contain communism, Truman and the
United Nations sent forces to South Korea to defend freedom against Soviet aggression in
Asia.  The North Korean army advanced south in rapid fashion, until General Douglas
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MacArthur staged a landing at Inchon and the allied forces drove the North Koreans back
across the thirty-eighth parallel.  MacArthur then marched nearly to the border with China
when Truman ordered a halt.  The perceived American threat to China prompted Mao
Zedong to send approximately one million Chinese troops over the border into North
Korea to drive back U.S. and United Nations forces.  They fell back into South Korea,
and the war stalemated along a front which spanned the width of the Korean peninsula.
Despite the financial and human cost of conventional war in Asia and the very real
prospect of losing in a stalemate, Truman did not use the atomic bomb against either the
North Korean People’s Army or the Chinese People’s Liberation Army pushing south. 
MacArthur publically argued for the authority to use atomic weapons to relieve his army,
take the offensive, and defeat a vastly superior enemy force.  His heated rhetoric and the
risk of Chinese intervention prompted Truman to caution MacArthur about the growing
risk involved in escalating the war.  
In consultation but not necessarily cooperation with British Prime Minister
Clement Atlee, Truman nonetheless began making plans for the use of atomic weapons in
the Korean War.  Under pressure from members of Congress including Senator Joseph
McCarthy of Wisconsin and from the commander of the Strategic Air Command General
Curtis LeMay, Truman edged toward decisive atomic force to end the war in 1951.  
MacArthur submitted plans for the use of twenty-six nuclear weapons against multiple
targets in North Korea and China, a blockade of the Chinese coast, and the use of
Nationalist troops from Taiwan for an invasion of the Chinese mainland.  Although
Truman soon fired MacArthur for insubordination, the president also ordered atomic
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weapons to Okinawa for possible use against the Chinese.  Still, he decided not to order
the use of atomic bombings for the third time in his presidency.  Robert Bowie and
Richard Immerman argued that “Truman was deeply troubled by this reliance on atomic
bombing.”   “I don’t think we ought to use this thing unless we absolutely have to,”78
Truman said, “It is used to wipe out women and children and unarmed people, and not for
military uses.”   79
Eisenhower felt ill at ease with a perceived lack of consistency in Truman’s
actions.  Eisenhower possessed a broad view of the Cold War which involved not just
winning important battles along the way but preparing for the long pull against a
relentless enemy.  Rather than set some point of maximum danger, Eisenhower believed
in a sustained effort on all fronts to organize for war and for after the war.   With a80
budget now 400 percent above 1946 levels, Truman built more weapons of war to
preserve democracy against communism, but proved unwilling to order the use of those
weapons.  Truman’s increased military spending neither guaranteed victory in Korea nor
strength in the long term.   For Eisenhower, this simply made no sense.  Truman’s81
strategy of limited war would not stop North Korean or Chinese aggression and with
every foot of ground gained the communists further doubted the resolve of the United
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States.  For Eisenhower, Truman’s ad hoc military increases and a patchwork strategy of
limited war and atomic diplomacy had so far failed.  The United States required a broader
effort on both the economic and military front to deter Soviet aggression.  If that should
fail, the United States could meet communist advances with a variety of tools, including
strong alliances, a counterinsurgency campaign, a powerful military, and above all a
strong, vibrant economy. 
This opinion prompted Eisenhower’s run for the presidency in 1952 and his
reexamination of national security policy in the early days of his administration.  In the
campaign of 1952, Eisenhower muted his criticism of Truman’s national security policy. 
Indeed, the general had been instrumental in the formation of many of those policies and
could not enthusiastically challenge Truman without indicting himself to some degree. 
While Eisenhower campaigned on his personal popularity and command presence,
1 2Richard Nixon kept the ticket focused on the winning issues of K C :  Korea,
communism, and corruption.  On national security and the Cold War, Eisenhower’s most
popular campaign pledge was to go to Korea if elected.  82
Eisenhower’s reexamination of national security policy ultimately produced a new
national security strategy aimed in part at financial strength.  This proved possible only as
a product of fiscal discipline which in turn was achievable only through the effective
management and proper use of nuclear weapons for national security.  Eisenhower
believed that the mismanagement of the Truman administration regarding the role of
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nuclear weapons and the fiscal benefits they offered contributed significantly to the “mess
in Washington” to which he often referred in his campaign.  Accordingly, Eisenhower’s
first steps as president sought not a total revision of American nuclear weapons
production, deployment, or even strategy.  Rather, Eisenhower intended first to restore
fiscal discipline by restraining spending and balancing the budget and doing both without
a significant dip in military strength.  In July 1953, Eisenhower asked Defense Secretary
Charles Wilson, himself a fiscal conservative like Eisenhower, to help the president find
“the most effective employment of available national resources to insure the defense of
our country for the long pull which may lie ahead.”   In that effort, Eisenhower83
considered current military technology and strategy, including Truman’s use or nonuse of
the atomic bomb.  
Eisenhower explained this new emphasis on economic strength early in his
administration.   “The hope of freedom itself,” Eisenhower proclaimed to his national
security team, “depends, in real measure, upon our strength, our heart, and our wisdom.” 
That strength was built on free trade and American enterprise, but also on the fiscal
responsibility of the government including measured and considered spending,
particularly on national security.  Eisenhower “was convinced that a freer and a more
normal economy would in the long run provide the nation with greater economic
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strength.”   He explained that America’s problem was “to achieve adequate military84
strength within the limits of endurable strain upon our economy.”  “To amass military
power without regard to our economic capacity would be to defend ourselves against one
kind of disaster by inviting another,” Eisenhower argued.   85
As he explained in his State of the Union address in 1953, Eisenhower believed
the government’s first priority should be “to chart a fiscal and economic policy” which
recognized “the inescapable need for economic health and strength if we are to maintain
adequate military power.”  Through spending on New Deal and Fair Deal social programs
as well as increased military spending, Truman had created significant budget deficits, the
last of which would push America above the $275 million debt ceiling established by
Congress.  For Eisenhower, excessive national debt risked “the menace of inflation.”   86
He cited the need for removing wage and price controls and creating a labor policy that
would allow for bargaining but help provide stability in industrial production.  
Moving beyond just words, Eisenhower took steps early on toward economic
strength.  In February 1953, not even one month into his term, he removed the
government controls on wages and salaries in an attempt to stimulate an American
economy strained by the cost of war.  Two months later, he cut about $5 billion from
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Truman’s 1954 budget which nearly halved the deficit.   He announced in March 195387
that the secretary of the treasury, then George Humphrey, would attend all the meetings of
the National Security Council.  The president wanted to ensure that all examinations of
national policy would include a deep consideration of the economics of the matter.  88
Eisenhower expected the Secretary of the Treasury to keep the group grounded on just
how national security decisions would affect the nation’s economy.  At the same time,
Humphrey needed to be prepared with economic details so the National Security Council
could make better, more efficient, and perhaps more economical decisions when
discussing national security.  Eisenhower had no illusions of basing national security
policy exclusively on the financial cost, but rather he wanted to emphasize that military
strength and economic strength could not be divorced and that both most be accounted for
when deciding basic national security policy. 
For some time Eisenhower had been concerned about the real costs of national
security.  “Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fired,”
Eisenhower argued in his Chance for Peace speech of April 1953, “signifies in the final
sense, a theft from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold and are not
clothed.”  He also noted that at present, without a change in posture among the Cold War
superpowers, the best the world could hope for would be “a life of perpetual fear and
tension” including “a burden of arms draining the wealth and labor of all peoples.”  The
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result was “a wasting of strength” and a reduced capacity for nations “to achieve true
abundance and happiness for the peoples of this earth.”    He held out some hope that89
Soviet leadership might change its tune after the death of Stalin, and he intended to
jumpstart dialogue between the U.S. and U.S.S.R..  At the same time, Eisenhower could
not risk American national security while he pursued openings for peace.  He still
believed that the United States must plan for a long term conflict with the Soviets.  Under
the first national security policy for the Cold War, NSC-68, the United States needed to
prepare for war continuously and indefinitely out of the fear that the Soviet Union would
soon be in a position to launch a decisive first strike against the United States.  By 1953,
Eisenhower had concluded that the Soviet Union was not yet close to achieving a position
of strategic superiority nor would the Soviet leadership risk a general war with the United
States.  As a result, he believed that the nation’s success in the Cold War would depend
as much on her ability to sustain her way of life over the long term as on the building of
weapons.  Economic prosperity was as important as military strength, and national
security policy needed to reflect that crucial connection. 
Accordingly, Eisenhower created Project Solarium which amounted to a
reevaluation of the nation’s strategic goals in light of the new priorities.  The
administration set up three separate task forces which would make separate
recommendations for a new national security policy each of which might better
incorporate atomic weapons into U.S. military strategy.  Eisenhower understood that in
the absence of atomic weapons national security would depend upon building a massive
103
conventional army capable of countering the Soviet Union.  This would be tremendously
costly not only in terms of the economy but in terms of the ideals of the American
republic, which rejected large standing armies as a threat to democracy and individual
liberties.  Eisenhower believed the atomic weapon provided an appropriate, perhaps even
convenient, answer to this central question of national security in the Cold War.  The
Solarium team made their recommendation in the fall of 1953 and the members of the
National Security Council including the secretary of the treasury, the budget director, the
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission agreed upon NSC 162/2, a paper on basic
national security policy which established the New Look.
The New Look had two key requirements.  The first was military power. NSC
162/2 described the Soviet threat as the primary danger in the larger struggle with
international communism.  The Soviet Union possessed an inherent hostility to the non-
communist world, a sizable military force including atomic weapons, and a desire and
means to export communist revolution to the free world.  This threat did not diminish as a
result of Joseph Stalin’s death and there did not appear in the future any foreseeable
relaxation of Soviet hostility, militarism, or aggression.  The United States then had to be
prepared for a long term struggle, one in which the ability to match Soviet military
strength would be paramount.  The goal was to convince Soviet leadership that they could
not be victorious through any amount of aggressive military action.  As stated in NSC
162/2, military strength meant “a strong military posture, with emphasis on the capability
 NSC 162/2, October 30, 1953, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President,90
1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 6, NSC
162/2, DDE Library, 5.
 Ibid., 6.91
104
of inflicting massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power.”   This strength90
would be complemented by strong and committed allies and a sound mobilization base
capable of withstanding a Soviet first strike in the event of general war.  To build military
strength, the United States needed proper planning, solid intelligence about the enemy,
satisfactory manpower, productive scientific research, and reliable internal security.  Most
importantly, the military strength of the United States needed to be credible, modern, and
decisive.  Anything short of those goals meant that the Soviets might doubt America’s
willingness to challenge Soviet forces in Cold War battlegrounds.
Second, Eisenhower planned that the New Look would meet the Soviet threat
with military strength and at the same time “avoid seriously weakening the U.S. economy
or undermining our fundamental values and institutions.”  He also insisted that the new
policy recognize that any defense against the Soviet threat must include the maintenance
of “a sound, strong and growing U.S. economy.”  Achieved “through the operation of free
institutions,” this economy would be capable of providing the necessary strength “over
the long pull and of rapidly and effectively changing to full mobilization.”     NSC 162/291
specifically mentioned how “excessive government spending,” “persistent inflation” and
“repressive taxation” threatened the “strong and growing economy.”  According to
Eisenhower, these ills unnecessarily disrupted the system of free enterprise and risked
recession, and the avoidance of these pitfalls meant an increased chance for steady
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economic growth.  “Over the years an expanding national income can provide the basis
for higher standards of living and for a substantial military program,” the paper
continued.   92
In the face of the Soviet threat, “the United States must develop and maintain, at
the lowest feasible cost, requisite military and non-military strength to deter and, if
necessary to counter Soviet military aggression against the United States or other areas
vital to its security.”   If the economy of the United States remained prosperous,93
satisfactory fiscal policies could be devised to provide sufficient military strength. 
Indeed, having both meant that each served the other.  Neither could be sacrificed under
any circumstance or both would fail.  For Eisenhower, sustained military strength and
promising economic strength were not mutually exclusive.  With proper planning and 
intelligent management, the United States could build both.  
Eisenhower concluded that conventional military forces – whether those of the
United States or her allies or a combination of both – failed in both regards.  First, those
forces would be exorbitantly expensive, as demonstrated by the quadrupling of defense
spending and the doubling of the federal budget in Truman’s last three years in office.  94
Second, this force would not likely be credible enough to deter Soviet aggression in
Western Europe in particular.  The Red Army was simply too large and too well
positioned to be rooted out by any conventional force the U.S. or NATO could field. 
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Eisenhower saw a solution in the atomic weapon.  
NSC 162/2 reflected this faith in the ability of the atomic bomb to ensure fiscal
discipline and military strength.  “Within the free world, only the United States can
provide and maintain, for a period of years to come, the atomic capability to counter
balance Soviet atomic power,” the NSC concluded.  Assuming the nation’s atomic
arsenal included satisfactory delivery systems, atomic weapons were “indispensable for
U.S. security.”  “Such atomic capability is also a major contribution to the security of our
allies,” the Council also noted.    Eisenhower understood that once both sides have95
reached “a stage of atomic plenty” each will possess the ability to “inflict critical damage
on the other.”  In fact, the only thing preventing an attack and indeed general warfare was
the certain knowledge that major retaliation would befall the aggressor nation.  NSC
162/2 called the resulting impasse a stalemate, within which neither side could win and
neither side could lose.  Eisenhower could accept an atomic stalemate in the short term if
he could produce economic prosperity for the long term.
To make the nation’s atomic deterrent credible, NSC 162/2 reflected
Eisenhower’s willingness to use atomic weapons.  “In the event of hostilities, the United
States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions,” the
administration declared.   This policy had only one qualifier:  the consent of America’s96
allies would be sought in advance when the use would occur within or above allied
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territory.  Beyond that, no restrictions inhibited the employment of the atomic bomb.  In
accordance with the New Look strategic policy, Eisenhower planned to decrease the
funds spent on conventional forces, to increase the production of nuclear weapons, and to
invest heavily in research and development in new nuclear weapon delivery systems. 
Critics of the New Look abounded.  One, Henry Kissinger, believed that
Eisenhower had misinterpreted the strategic lessons of World War II.  According to
Kissinger, history taught the United States government that the maximum development of
technology equates to a successful strategy and victory.  In the case of World War II,
greater industrial production allowed the Allies to win.  That lesson did not hold in the
Cold War, according to Kissinger.  The United States had spent too much time building
more and better weapons and left little time to determining a suitable strategy in the new
atomic age.  This was largely because of the division of armed services and the budgetary
restraints forced upon them by the New Look.  The result was that each of the service
branches clamored for more money and more weapons, convincing Congress that they
must have the ability to destroy the enemy completely in order to fulfill their current
mission.  The strategy then was designed to fit the budget, rather than the opposite, which
should be the case.   General Maxwell Taylor believed that the New Look grew out of “a97
desire for budgetary economy” and “the American penchant for simple solutions.”  Taylor
rejected the emphasis on the economy reflected in the New Look.  He believed that the
reduction of armed personnel and the increase in more modern instruments of war, such
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as atomic bombs and air power, made the U.S. less safe.    Taylor later argued that the98
emphasis on massive retaliation left America with only two options in the event of
communist military aggression: to retaliate instantly and massively or to do nothing. 
Eisenhower rejected this criticism.  He complained that what Kissinger advocated
was “both the old and the new” which “would undoubtedly be a more expensive
operation than we are carrying on at this time.”   And cost was more important than any99
other factor because economic security had a great deal to do with overall strength and
deterrence.  “I say that in the long run if we spend much more than [35 billion a year for
defense] we will actually reduce rather than enhance of chances of preventing a war,”
Eisenhower argued.  “We will do so because we will have aroused genuine doubt, both
among our own citizens and among our allies,” the president argued, “as to the essential
stability of the United States economy.”  100
Critics including Kissinger and Taylor deemed comments such as these by
Eisenhower as far too risky.  They believed that the president put financial priorities
above those of national security.  They charged that in his slavish commitment to fiscal
discipline, balanced budgets, and reduced government spending, he unnecessarily risked
national security.  His policies put in jeopardy, they believed, the nation’s ability to meet
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and contain communist advances in the third world.  Because Eisenhower had chained the
United States to a policy of atomic deterrence via the New Look, they argued, Eisenhower
had sacrificed national strategic interests abroad as well as the lives and livelihood of
freedom-loving people under siege from communist subversion in distant lands.  Atomic
weapons could not protect those people and the U.S. would not risk a larger war in their
defense.  Therefore, the communists could infiltrate and overthrow democratic
institutions and the United States would stand idly by as Eisenhower praised his own
fiscal restraint.
These criticisms recognized the fiscal aspect of the New Look but concentrated
only on the military aspect when judging its worthiness.  In this sense, these critics
missed the point.  They failed to recognize that Eisenhower believed financial strength to
occupy equal footing with military strength.  “Eisenhower was firmly convinced that the
country’s economic prosperity was as important to its security as planes and weapons,”
Sherman Adams later recalled.   To build up overwhelming strength in one area without101
congruent action in the other weakened the republic overall.  “To strengthen the military
base, while ruining the economic base,” Eisenhower told Dean Rusk in 1962, “would be
catastrophic.”   In that weakened state, the U.S. would not be able to meet the Soviet102
threat.  Because Eisenhower believed that America’s democratic institutions were rooted
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in the economic freedom provided by the free market and capitalism, to undermine these
sources of strength was comparable to laying down one’s arms and surrendering to the
enemy.   
Eisenhower devised the New Look to lessen the financial burden of the Cold War
and allow for fiscal discipline while providing military strength.   Atomic weapons
greatly served these ends because atomic weaponry could both keep the budget at low
levels and deter a major Cold War confrontation.  Atomic weapons removed the economy
from the war-time footing of the early Cold War and allowed the United States to benefit
from a free-flowing market while not sacrificing military strength.  In this way, atomic
weapons became quite practical and even desirable to Eisenhower.  The great danger
would be if the United States failed to muster enough strength and became a tempting
target for the Soviet Union.  “My feeling was then, and still remains,” Eisenhower wrote
later, “that it would be impossible for the United States to maintain the military
commitments which it now sustains around the world (without turning into a garrison
state) did we not possess atomic weapons and the will to use them when necessary.”  103
Eisenhower’s understanding of atomic weaponry in this regard was practical and
reasonable.  He was not burdened with ethical doubt or by the concerns of his allies, but
instead was focused solely on augmenting American strength in the quickest and most
pragmatic way.  Eisenhower next needed to make sure that any potential communist
aggressor understood that atomic weapons would be available for use by the United
States under circumstances to be determined by the United States.  This required a
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buildup of military strength through nuclear weapons and a display of America’s
willingness to use them.
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CHAPTER FOUR: Projecting Military Strength
Following the same conviction with which he sought to restore America’s
economic strength, Eisenhower committed early and consistently to the buildup of
national military strength through the construction and deployment of atomic and
thermonuclear weapons.  He believed the United States was fortunate to be able to build a
vast nuclear arsenal and he aimed to employ those weapons in every possible manner as a
force for good against a ruthless enemy.  The president recognized the danger of a
massive nuclear buildup and was troubled by the idea of general thermonuclear war.  His
sincere concern about the fate of the republic in the event of nuclear exchange ultimately
did not dissuade him from committing to the nuclear weapon as the primary pillar of
national military strength nor from brandishing those weapons in crises.  Through the
proper management of the nuclear arsenal, Eisenhower concluded, nuclear weapons
provided tremendous military benefit to the republic.  
Eisenhower believed that the struggle with the Soviet Union mandated that the
United States display enough military strength so as not to tempt the communists with
weakness.  Soviet imperialism in Eastern Europe at the end of World War II and
continued communist subversion in places like Greece and Turkey represented a serious
threat to U.S. national security.  Because Eisenhower believed that waging the Cold War
required a responsible buildup of national strength, his understanding that the nuclear
weapon served that purpose was both realistic and practical.  He wanted peace in the long
term, but he believed the Soviet Union would never negotiate in good faith unless the
United States possessed sufficient national strength and demonstrated the willingness to
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employ that strength as needed.  Sufficient military strength would enable the nation to
deter enemy aggression if possible and to win a war if necessary.  To project military
strength, Eisenhower emphasized the strategic benefits of nuclear weapons.  He
understood and cared only that nuclear weapons worked well.  They were available,
reliable, and effective.  Moreover, Eisenhower committed to build military strength
through nuclear weapons and he cared little about which weapons provided the nation
that strength.  Though he understood the distinction between fission and fusion, between
atomic bombs such as those used on Japan in 1945 and thermonuclear weapons, the
president’s decision to utilize them both for military strength meant that, at least from
Eisenhower’s perspective, all nuclear weapons were the same.  Despite that Eisenhower
often indicated trepidation about nuclear war, he refused to describe nuclear weapons as
unusable and instead sought every military advantage the nuclear weapon provided.  For
this reason, Eisenhower chose first tactical atomic war and later thermonuclear deterrence
as the centerpieces of American grand strategy. 
a.  Tactical Atomic War in Korea
In the first military crisis of his administration Eisenhower resolved to end the
stalemated Korean war on terms agreeable to the war-weary citizens of the United States.
Eisenhower pursued diplomacy and negotiations, but those had stalled and he had few
military alternatives beyond what Truman had already tried.  Eisenhower’s trump card
was the atomic weapon which both the U.S. and the Soviets possessed, but which the
Chinese and the North Koreans did not.  Truman had ultimately chosen not to use the
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atomic bomb in Korea, and Eisenhower believed the president had missed an opportunity. 
As early as June 30, 1950, while still at Columbia, Eisenhower noted how he
thought the United States should respond to acts of communist aggression.  “In a fight,”
Eisenhower believed, “we (our side) can never be too strong.”  “We must study every
angle to be prepared for whatever may happen – even if it finally comes to use of A-bomb
(which God forbid.)”   He grew increasingly frustrated through late 1950.  “Something is1
terribly wrong,” he wrote in his diary, “I feel that my hunch of last July 1 was right – but I
was wrong when I supposed that both the Def. Depts & the White House would heed the
final advice I gave on preparation.”   With the country now committed to aid the South2
Koreans in their own defense, Eisenhower advised President Truman to apply as much as
possible American strength.   But when Eisenhower followed through on his campaign3
pledge to go to Korea, he saw a stalemated war.  United States and United Nations forces
had recaptured Seoul in May 1951 but had been unable to push North Korean and
Chinese forces much further north.  “There were no major military movements,”
Eisenhower later remembered, “but for many months more the war was to grind out
painful lists of casualties without significant changes in situation or disposition.”   4
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Eisenhower refused to accept the stalemate, but saw only a few options.  To stay
the course was unacceptable and to seek “an all-out military victory by conventional
means” was “the least attractive of all plans.”  Eisenhower considered various alternatives
to get the communists “to accede to an armistice in a reasonable time.”   He concluded5
that his best strategy was a show of strength.  He believed that a major offensive was
needed to achieve the desired ends.  This offensive involved an expansion of the war
beyond Korea into China, including air strikes against Chinese airfields and a blockade of
the Chinese coast, a significant buildup of American and South Korean forces, and
“finally, to keep the attack from becoming overly costly, it was clear that we would have
to use atomic weapons.”   Eisenhower did not take lightly the use of atomic weapons, nor6
necessarily did he strike a “cavalier pose toward nuclear weapons,” as one historian has
suggested.    7
Eisenhower then pursued a subtle and gradual escalation of the atomic dialogue. 
He understood that when talking about the deployment and use of atomic weapons, one
must be quite careful.    “He was very restrained, especially publicly, in any talk about8
weapons or military action,” Goodpaster remembered.   Sherman Adams also considered9
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Eisenhower a man of deliberation, one who would occasionally hesitate if the situation
allowed and if this approach served his interests.  Eisenhower believed that the Soviet
Union and China properly understood American national strength, but he also thought
that a diplomatic and military strategy of projecting that strength was needed to convince
those enemies to resolve the stalemated war.  Eisenhower decided to use some form of
diplomacy which included atomic deterrence if possible and tactical atomic war if needed
to bring the war to an end. 
Eisenhower’s understanding of tactical atomic war was framed by his study of
Carl von Clausewitz, the famed Prussian military theorist whose seminal work, On War,
was standard reading for West Point cadets, Command and General Staff College
students, and aides of General Fox Connor.  As executive officer to General Fox Conner
at Camp Gaillard in Panama, Eisenhower had waded through what one observer called
“an intellectual proving ground” during which he read On War at least three times.    He10
later recalled his time in Panama as “a sort of graduate school in military affairs.”   After11
the Bible, he claimed On War had the greatest effect on his life.   As president, however,12
Eisenhower could not always apply to lessons from his training in military history
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because much of them dealt too specifically with tactical battlefield decisions under
specific circumstances in past conflicts.  Eisenhower relied on his understanding of
Clausewitz to clarify the main issues of the Korean war.  On Korea, Eisenhower told a
reporter in March 1953, “I would refer you to Clausewitz.  He knew even 150 years ago
that there were various kinds of wars, and some partake of little more than police action,
others get to be great conflagrations.  So far as I am concerned, it is a war.”13
Clausewitz’s overarching themes on the nature and purpose of war shaped
Eisenhower’s understanding of tactical atomic war in the days before deliverable
thermonuclear bombs.  Key among Clausewitz’s ideas was the way in which he
connected war and politics.  He argued that war was an extension of politics and that a
nation-state waged war out of desire to achieve a specific political objective relative to
the enemy.  That political objective could vary widely within any particular scenario, but
the root of the war remained the same: a political goal attainable only through the
exercise of decisive force against a hostile or uncooperative power.   No doubt
Eisenhower understood this most basic principle and his belief in the need for decisive
force to achieve the desired objective shaped his view of tactical nuclear war. 
Eisenhower did not fret too much over the specific type of military force required in the
pursuit of the objective, but rather he insisted only that the force be decisive.  All other
factors aside, when the state decided to enter a military conflict no effort must be spared. 
If the cause was worth violence, then it was worth any amount of necessary violence to
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achieve the political goal. 
To Eisenhower this seemed an average solution.  Eisenhower often sought a
middle of the road or average solution which to him meant to avoid the extremes, to
reject a best and worst case scenario analysis, and to use common sense in war and peace. 
“The nature of the war itself had to be clearly understood,” Eisenhower believed, “if we
were to attack intelligently the problem of bringing it to an honorable end.”   “The14
struggle is to apply common sense,” Eisenhower wrote to a friend in July 1953, “to reach
an average solution.”   In seeking average answers to problems, political or otherwise,15
Eisenhower often fell back on historical or philosophical maxims.  In the case of Korea,
for example, Eisenhower applied Napoleon Bonaparte’s interpretation of individual
genius.  Napoleon believed that in times of war, when everyone around was panicking, to
find the average solution, calmly and resolutely, made a man a genius.  Eisenhower
believed that the average approach to the Korean problem was to consider all options in
search of an armistice and peace.
Eisenhower believed that atomic weapons should “be treated like other weapons
and that the taboo on the use of atomic weapons be abolished.”   He planned to make16
few if any distinctions between atomic and conventional armaments; to do otherwise
splintered unnecessarily U.S. military strength into usable and unusable weapons,
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effectively weakening the country overall.  Eisenhower’s first advisor for atomic policy,
Lewis Strauss, wrote that the president expressed exactly that sentiment to British Prime
Minister Winston Churchill in Bermuda. “The President touched upon his belief that
atomic weapons were now coming to be regarded as a proper part of conventional
armament,” Strauss wrote.   “Tactical atomic weapons,” Eisenhower later told his17
national security team, “have come to be practically accepted as integral parts of modern
armed forces.”   By May 1953, Eisenhower considered the fission bomb “as simply18
another weapon in our arsenal.”   19
Eisenhower believed that the average solution to the Korean conflict meant taking
the necessary steps to force enemy capitulation to U.S. demands.  Through John Foster
Dulles, Eisenhower hinted that the United States might expand the war with atomic
weapons but stopped short of threatening or guaranteeing military action.   In late spring20
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1953 while on a diplomatic mission in South Asia, Dulles conveyed to Indian Prime
Minister Nehru that should the stalemate continue with no new negotiations or should the
enemy launch an offensive, the United States would employ its full arsenal of weapons in
order to bring the war to a conclusion.  Of course, Dulles’ message was not so clear.  “In
India and in the Formosa Straits area, and at the truce negotiations at Panmunjom, we
dropped the word, discreetly, of our intention,” Eisenhower later explained.  “We felt
quite sure it would reach Soviet and Chinese Communist ears,” he continued.   The U.S.21
ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, remembered a vague, but clear threat of atomic
war.  Unless an agreement was soon reached, “the grim logic of the situation would
finally compel the United States to seek to win by new offensives.”  “In other words, if
the Communists continued to defeat all efforts to secure an armistice,” Bowles wrote,
“we would not deliberately launch World War III, but we would continue to expand the
Korean War until we had won it.”22
Though Eisenhower decided perhaps early on that he would use atomic weapons
in Korea, he saw no benefit at the start of his administration in clearly displaying his true
intentions to the enemy.  Indeed, General Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s friend and
aide, remembered that “he ultimately never told anybody whether he would or not, not
even within the administration.”  Goodpaster was not sure himself whether Eisenhower
had even made a decision on the matter, but he was certain that Eisenhower intended to
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keep his options open.  As Goodpaster noted, Eisenhower wore his poker face in his own
administration as well as for his friends and enemies abroad.     Indeed, Eisenhower was23
a formidable bridge and poker player and he often used poker analogies to describe the
world of international conflict.  Goodpaster believed without equivocation that
Eisenhower applied basic lessons learned from games to his decision making process. 
“He was a great poker player,” Goodpaster remembered, “and he did think of things in
poker terms.”   “He put on a mask of ambiguity,” Goodpaster said, “in the sense that you
did not show your hand to the other fellow.”   “One of the things he always talked about24
was getting inside the other man’s head,” Goodpaster remembered.   25
To continue the analogy, Eisenhower held many more chips than his enemy and
intended to force the enemy into a decision either to bet all of his chips on a single hand
or to fold his hand and stay to play again.  Eisenhower projected his readiness and
willingness to push all his chips into the pot, and he intended to see what the enemy was
willing to risk to win the prize of Korea.  This strategy was only available to Eisenhower
if the United States operated from a superior military position.  He had a significant
stockpile of atomic weapons and the means to deliver them.  At this opportune moment,
when the enemy could not be completely sure just how aggressively Eisenhower intended
to play the game, Eisenhower chose to project confidence in the strength of his hand to
see if the enemy felt as confident in their own.  Eisenhower predicted that the enemy
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would not call his bluff, but if they did, he was prepared to employ his atomic arsenal as
the most obvious, practical, and decisive step toward achieving the overall goal of the
ending the conflict.  “If you’re ever found making a bluff that you’re not prepared to
follow up,” Eisenhower continued, “then your word will be worthless in the future.”   If26
the enemy called his bluff, the enemy would steal away the pot and would never again
respect Eisenhower’s words or his show of strength.  Accordingly, Eisenhower needed to
display enough military strength to convince the enemy to reexamine his strategic goals.  
Eisenhower believed that this projection of strength could bring a successful
conclusion to the war.  In technical terms, convincing the enemy that atomic bombs might
soon be employed did not create deterrence, for the hostilities had already begun.  Instead,
Eisenhower tried to make known America’s willingness to use all measures to end the
war.  “We could not go on the way we were indefinitely,” Eisenhower routinely reminded
his advisors, and he hoped to make that point equally clear to the Soviet Union, China,
and North Korea.   To this end, Eisenhower underscored the importance of “deliberately27
impressing our enemies that these weapons were now conventional usage in our armed
services.”   Eisenhower hoped “to handle the matter in such a way as, on the one hand, to28
impress the enemy with our determination, without, on the other hand, unduly alarming
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our allies or our own people.”29
In early 1953, Eisenhower increased the pressure on America’s enemies on the
Korean peninsula to bring the war to an end.  He ordered a strategic redeployment of the
naval forces which, since 1950, had been stationed in the Straits of Formosa to guard
against attack by either the People’s Republic of China or Taiwan against the other. 
“This has meant, in effect,” Eisenhower remarked, “that the United States Navy was
required to serve as a defensive arm of Communist China.”   The Chinese had attacked30
South Korean forces in Korea, engaged in a war with the United Nations, and refused to
negotiate in good faith for peace on the Korean peninsula.  Eisenhower withdrew the fleet
accordingly and suggested at minimum that the U.S. would no longer shield the People’s
Republic of China from the Chinese nationalists on Taiwan.  “This order implies no
aggressive intent on our part,” Eisenhower told those listening, “but we certainly have no
obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea.”   Eisenhower later said that this “put31
the Chinese Communists on notice that the days of stalemate were numbered; that the
Korean war would either end or extend beyond Korea.”   If “military advantage dictated32
such use,” Eisenhower concluded, the United States planned to employ American
firepower to her best advantage in current and future Cold War contests.   His warning33
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was neither unnecessarily inflammatory nor confrontational, but muted and matter of fact. 
At that point in 1953, Eisenhower did not fear that the limited use of tactical weapons
would necessarily lead to what he called general war, or a large-scale exchange of
conventional, atomic, and thermonuclear weapons between the United States and the
Soviet Union.  The American thermonuclear weapon was still primitive.  Moreover, the
first deliverable thermonuclear bomb would not be tested by the United States until more
than a year later, on March 1, 1954 in the Castle test series in the Pacific Ocean.  With
only fission devices available, Eisenhower believed that a tactical atomic war could be
fought and won.  His allies were not so sure. 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had his doubts about the desirability of
tactical atomic war.  In late winter of 1953, Churchill sought a guarantee from
Eisenhower that if the United States decided to employ atomic weapons the British would
be consulted.  Churchill feared mostly for his own civilian population,  not for those of
South Korea or North Korea.  He later argued that “one good nuclear bombing” could
destroy his “small crowded island” and this catastrophe might very well be provoked by
the introduction of atomic bombs on the battlefield in Korea.   He even went so far as to34
argue that an atomic bombing of North Korea and China by the U.S. would be the
beginning of the end.   “There will be nothing left but to take a pill and end it all,”
Churchill exclaimed.35
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Eisenhower sympathized with the British because of “the exposed position of
Britain in the event of general war” but interpreted Churchill’s request for consultation as 
a request to allow the British to prohibit the use of atomic weapons in Korea by the
United States.  Eisenhower “declined to give such a commitment” on the use of tactical
atomic weapons.  He promised to “take every possible step to consult with Britain,” but
he stopped short of the making the commitment Churchill desired.   At an earlier36
National Security Council meeting in 1953, Eisenhower had already “ruled against any
discussion without allies of military plans or weapons of attack.”   Eisenhower would not37
ignore his friends but neither would he compromise the integrity of his atomic striking
force by providing others with a veto on his authority to employ all force necessary to
protect U.S. national security.  He would not sacrifice the atomic pillar of U.S. military
strength for the sake of allies who had not committed any significant conventional forces
to the battlefield.  “I earnestly assured Winston that I had no intention of acting rashly,”
Eisenhower wrote, “saying that I merely wanted our friends to know that past limitations
on our actions, in the event of a heavy attack on us, would not necessarily be observed.”38
At the same time, Eisenhower doubted that Churchill’s suicide scenario would
come to pass because the North Koreans and the Chinese would not be willing to accept
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an escalation of violence.  He thought that the communists in Asia believed their invasion
of South Korea could be swift and successful.  “It is quite probable that the Communists
expected, when they made their attack, a cheap and easy victory,” Eisenhower later wrote,
“believing that neither the United States nor any other Western power would assume the
risk of general war in order to defend that newly independent country.”  The communists
had miscalculated, Eisenhower thought.  So far under Truman, the United States had not
committed to use the force necessary to win in part because the use of atomic force risked
the outbreak of a wider atomic war between the superpowers.   Eisenhower did not share39
this view nor this specific fear.  “The tactical use of atomic weapons against military
targets,” Eisenhower told his Joint Chiefs of Staff later, “would be no more likely to
trigger off a big war than the use of twenty-ton ‘block-busters.’”   Violence was40
violence, Eisenhower reasoned, and atomic bombs held only as much chance of igniting a
larger war as did the large conventional bombs the United States currently employed in
combat.
Furthermore, Eisenhower explained to Churchill that the timing and nature of the
American tactical atomic response to renewed war in Korea likely precluded a Soviet
nuclear response.  What Eisenhower initially planned was “not the bombing of
Chungking or Peking but the pursuit of attacking aircraft to their bases and the
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destruction of enemy supplies and troop concentrations.”   Because Eisenhower would41
limit his response to tactical and not strategic targets, the Soviets would have little cause
for a major retaliation against the United States and her allies.  Eisenhower anticipated
instead that the Soviets might respond to attacks with tactical strikes of their own against
“the almost defenseless population centers of Japan” from which U.S. attacks would
likely originate.  This scenario, rather than the Churchill’s doomsday version, seemed
more likely, but not quite as terrifying to Eisenhower.  Though it weighed on
Eisenhower’s mind, the Soviet retaliatory threat did not impact his conclusion that the
United States would expand the war if necessary.   He was not immune to Churchill’s42
concerns, but he had other priorities beyond the view of his allies.
Eisenhower anticipated that some in the world would object to the use of tactical
atomic weapons.  “The use of even small atomic bombs,” he later wrote, “could scarcely
fail to result, for a while, in a worldwide feeling of revulsion against the United States.” 
But the sentiment “might be lessened if these relatively small weapons were used solely
against military installations, minimizing fallout and civilian casualties.”   Still,43
Eisenhower seemed frustrated with those who questioned the idea of tactical atomic war
in Korea.  “If they objected to the use of atomic weapons,” Eisenhower told his National
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Security Council, “we might well ask them to supply three or more divisions needed to
drive the Communists back, in lieu of use of atomic weapons.”   Tactical atomic44
weapons could end the war, and, “if people raised hell when they contemplated these
results the thing to do would be to ask them to volunteer for front-line action in a
continued Korean war.”45
Even so, Eisenhower was not completely convinced of the value of the atomic
bomb.  “My own idea is that if this hellish contrivance is really effective against ships,”
Eisenhower quipped in 1946, “it will be from some type of under water use rather than
from air bursts.”    Later in his deliberations over Korea, he even doubted whether46
atomic weapons would destroy concrete pillboxes or crater runways sufficiently.  Unsure,
Eisenhower nonetheless had specific suggestions about the uses of tactical atomic
weapons in the Korean conflict.  Less than a month after his inauguration, Eisenhower
suggested the Kae-song area as “a good target for this type of weapon” though he did not
specify precisely why.    He asked his military advisers “as to whether or not a test had47
been made at Bikini as to the effectiveness of a penetration type of atomic weapons.” 
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Though his advisors disagreed, Eisenhower held fast to the idea that atomic weapons
would be effective “against the dugouts which honeycombed the hills along which the
enemy forces were presently deployed.”   General Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff of the48
Army, suggested that atomic weapons could be used in a more direct manner.  Mustard
gas could drive “the enemy out of his caves and tunnels” and then “these troops would be
effective targets for our tactical atomic weapons.”   Eisenhower accepted that “to drive49
the Communists back” without the atomic weapon might require “three or more
divisions.”   This was an undesirable alternative because of the inevitable cost in lives50
and treasure.  Atomic weapons could do the job better, cheaper, and without spawning a
larger war, Eisenhower ultimately concluded.   51
Eisenhower was convinced and he then began making clear publicly the United
States’s willingness to use whatever military strength available to end the Korean War. 
Eisenhower’s veiled threat reached the enemy, and the combatants signed an armistice in
the summer of 1953.  Though historians do not always agree, Eisenhower himself
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appeared never to doubt that the possibility of facing an atomic attack by air helped to
convince the enemy to sign and honor an armistice.   Eisenhower expressed gratefulness52
that the United States possessed an atomic arsenal which he believed to be capable of
deterring the enemy from aggressive action and suitable for use in a limited war.  The use
of atomic weapons was nothing unusual or overly dramatic to Eisenhower, but rather a
singular act of warfare necessary in the Cold War.  Eisenhower made the end of the
Korean War a priority but refused to exaggerate the use of atomic weapons.  For a man
fond of the sayings of Shakespeare, Eisenhower must have believed that using atomic
weapons against enemy troops in Korea was much ado about nothing.  
Robert Divine has argued that no one knew for certain, then or now, whether
Eisenhower planned to use atomic weapons in Korea.  This, he argued, was the genius of
the man.   There was nothing mysterious about him however.  The president’s public53
hints about the use of atomic weapons in the Korean war were sincere, and, though he
hoped to avoid it, he was poised to use atomic weapons in that conflict.  All the evidence
suggests that Eisenhower planned to use atomic weapons.  On June 20, 1953, he 
approved the transfer of complete atomic weapons to the military for distribution to
military bases on land and at sea.   He consulted his advisors and his allies about the54
possible consequences of an atomic strike, and through John Foster Dulles he issued a
 Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 615.55
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warning to the enemy.  The only evidence to support the idea that Eisenhower would not
use atomic weapons was that in fact he did not. 
Eisenhower stressed the utility of the atomic weapon as a pillar of American
military strength.  He emphasized the value of atomic weapons as both a satisfactory
counterbalance to the communist conventional forces and as a viable option for tactical
warfare.  For Eisenhower, America’s atomic arsenal had become a central element of
U.S. military strength and in projecting that strength he needed to demonstrate a
willingness to use atomic weapons to achieve U.S. goals.  Not to use all those tools at his
disposal to bring the Korean war to an end, Eisenhower believed, was nonsensical,
irresponsible, and dangerous.  Accordingly, he sought to project military strength to force
an armistice, and, if that failed, to employ American military strength in defeating the
enemy in Korea.  The increasing progress on thermonuclear weapons both in the United
States and behind the Iron Curtain, however, threatened to alter fundamentally the way
wars would be fought.  Eisenhower understood fission weapons as simply a new version
of the old, and it only made sense to use them when necessary.  But as Eisenhower came
to understand the new thermonuclear weapons, he saw that the wars of which Clausewitz
wrote and in which Eisenhower was steeped might soon be a thing of the past.  
b.  The Threat of Massive Retaliation
Eisenhower’s understanding of the origins of World War II convinced him that
military strength discouraged enemy aggression.   The early days of the Cold War55
 Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman56
Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 511.
132
confirmed that belief. Still, Truman refused to order the most formidable piece of that
strength, the atomic weapons, into action to defend the free world.   “When the crunch
came, of course, Truman administration officials themselves never dared to use atomic
weapons,” Melvyn Leffler wrote.   As president, Eisenhower undertook a build up of56
American military strength through atomic weapons which took final form in the New
Look.  As previously argued, the New Look was intended first to allow for fiscal
discipline and economic strength through an increased reliance on atomic weapons as
cheaper, better alternatives to a vast conventional force.  The successful test of a
deliverable thermonuclear weapon in March 1954 required a strategy for incorporating
megatons of explosive power, not merely kilotons, into America’s national security plan. 
Eisenhower ultimately opted for a policy that was often called massive retaliation. 
This doctrine stipulated that the United States would retaliate instantly and decisively
against communist aggression anywhere in the world at any time.  Implementing a
massive retaliation doctrine suggested an end to long-term and expensive commitments
of conventional armies in faraway lands such as Korea.  In addition, massive retaliation
projected a threat to the Soviet Union that the Cold War would not be fought under
conditions set by the Soviet Union.  Eisenhower intended to retake the initiative from the
enemy and to determine the circumstances under which the United States would wage the
Cold War in the future.  In this way, Eisenhower emphasized massive retaliation as a
means to project U.S. military strength and thereby either deter a war or win it. 
 Edward H. Judge and John W. Langdon, The Cold War: A History through57
Documents (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1999), 74-75.
133
The formal announcement of the transition to massive retaliation as a strategy
came from John Foster Dulles in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on January
12, 1954.  In his speech, Dulles explained that the Soviet Union had built a Cold War
strategy premised on America’s inability to meet Soviet moves in many areas of the
world at once.  According to Lenin, the United States lacked the strength to meet Soviet
threats without succumbing to national bankruptcy.  Soviet strategy, according to Dulles,
aimed at subversion in multiple vulnerable areas at once, overextending the capitalists,
and then striking the decisive blow.  As Dulles observed, the National Security Council
decided that “the way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able
to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing.” To those allies who
might fall victim to “the mighty land power of the Communist world” the United States
promised the support of her “massive retaliatory power.”  
This strategy provided several benefits for American national security.  First, the
enemy would no longer be able to determine the timing and location of potential
conflicts.  “A potential aggressor must know that he cannot always prescribe battle
conditions that suit him,” Dulles announced.   Second, the policy allowed the United57
States to meet any aggression effectively at a sustainable cost.  With a $50 billion national
security budget and a total deficit of $20 billion for fiscal years 1953 and 1954,
Eisenhower had landed on a policy which afforded the United States the ability first to
deter and then to counter communist aggression in many places over the long term.  For
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Eisenhower, a buildup of nuclear weapons coupled with effective management of those
weapons properly prepared the American economy and the military for the long-term
struggle with the Soviets.  58
While formulating this policy, Eisenhower came to two separate but equally
important conclusions.  First, Eisenhower did not believe that peace was possible with the
Soviet Union.  He believed that Soviet leaders were inherently selfish and he doubted that
the Soviets would uphold their end of any diplomatic bargain struck between the
superpowers.  Second, Eisenhower concluded that general war between the United States
and the Soviet Union with thermonuclear weapons was unlikely.  Eisenhower accepted as
policy that the United States would never strike first with nuclear weapons, and he
concluded then that the only danger of general thermonuclear war with the Soviet Union
was through communist aggression.  Regardless of the circumstances, Soviet leadership
acted only out of consideration for their own selfish and imperialistic concerns,
Eisenhower believed.  NSC 162/2 reflected Eisenhower’s belief:  “Present estimates are .
. . that the USSR will not deliberately initiate general war during the next several years,
although general war might result from miscalculation.”   Through Eisenhower’s first59
term, neither atomic war nor thermonuclear war would have benefited the Soviet Union,
so they refrained from risking or conducting either.   
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 2, 58.60
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As a result of these convictions, Eisenhower leaned toward a policy which
addressed the situation.  If the Soviet leaders would not negotiate in good faith to solve
Cold War problems and if they did not plan to strike first, the United States would be in
for a long struggle.  In that long struggle, the United States needed strength to defend the
nation’s interests or those of her allies.  Accordingly, in the months after the end of the
Korean War, Eisenhower adopted a policy of massive retaliation and intended his
thermonuclear arsenal to serve one grand strategic goal:  deterrence.  Eisenhower believed
a policy of massive retaliation would take away any Soviet inclination to launch a
surprise nuclear attack.  Eisenhower believed that the more destructive a weapon
becomes, “the more value you place on the element of surprise in war.”  At Pearl Harbor,
the United States was surprised.  Now, the president reasoned, the next Pearl Harbor-style
attack might be carried out with atomic and thermonuclear weapons:  “then you will see
something of what the element of surprise has come to be.”  The only defense against the
surprise nuclear attack was “a strong retaliatory power” designed to prevent that attack
from ever happening, the president concluded.   Whereas limited war with tactical60
atomic weapons might be possible and desirable in the future, the goal of deterring major
Soviet aggression through a rigid strategic policy seemed the only responsible choice for
the republic.  This was especially true since the nation’s ability to wage war was
inherently compromised by the very principles of the republic, including separation of
powers, civilian control over the military, and checks and balances upon the three
branches of government.
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The Korean conflict confirmed in Eisenhower’s mind that the Soviet Union and
China intended to use force to achieve their imperialistic goals in Asia and elsewhere. 
But the Korean conflict also demonstrated to Eisenhower that, in the atomic age, any
conflict always possessed the potential to change quickly from a conventional conflict to
a nuclear one.  This had certainly been the case on the Korean peninsula where the
stalemate had convinced Eisenhower that decisive force was needed to end the war and
the nation’s atomic arsenal could provide that force.  Eisenhower understood that the use
of American atomic weapons likely would have resulted in retaliatory use of similar
weapons by the Soviet Union.  But that was before a deliverable thermonuclear bomb
with yields more than a thousand times those of the original atomic bomb. 
Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles routinely disagreed over
whether massive retaliation was a suitable long-term strategic posture.  The pair diverged
mostly over the dramatic and catastrophic consequences of a policy of massive retaliation
and the nature of modern war.   In particular, Eisenhower doubted whether war with61
thermonuclear weapons was even war at all.  Eisenhower relied on his understanding of
Clausewitz to grasp the essentials of modern warfare, noting its tendency to become
absolute. As James King noted in 1957, no combatant would settle for defeat in any
conflict if they still had weapons available to use.  Eisenhower similarly concluded that
any limited war would quickly escalate as one side inevitably faced defeat.  Limited war
would quickly become general war and general war with thermonuclear weapons
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effectively nullified the Clausewitzian notion of war to serve political ends.  No political
objective could be served by thermonuclear war as neither combatant nation would
survive the conflict in any form that would resemble its prewar state; no political
objective could thus be won.  In the hopes of deterring war altogether, Eisenhower
accepted this risk in adopting massive retaliation.   By contrast, Dulles believed limited62
war remained possible and indeed desirable to avoid the gradual chipping away of
democracy and freedom by communists who would exploit every weak point to their own
advantage.  For Dulles, massive retaliation offered too little flexibility to meet these types
of small, limited threats.  But Eisenhower was convinced that the threat of atomic war
and then thermonuclear war provided the greatest deterrent to Soviet aggression. 
Eisenhower thought much about thermonuclear war, and he concluded that any
nuclear conflict would be a long and costly affair.  He disagreed sharply with many of his
military planners who believed that a thermonuclear war would involve only an initial
destructive exchange of weapons lasting from three days to a few weeks.  After that, the
war would end and reconstruction would begin, they argued.  Eisenhower believed that
nuclear war would likely last up to four years.  “Those who argued that a future
thermonuclear war would be won or lost in a period of thirty days were crazy,”
Eisenhower quipped.   “The war wasn’t going to be over in a couple of days,”63
Eisenhower cautioned his staff in January 1954, “the continuous war effort that followed
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the initial strike was of great importance also.”   “The notion that such a war would last64
for only thirty to sixty days was just about as specious as the idea of a race between
himself and Secretary Humphrey to the moon,” Eisenhower joked.   65
After the initial exchange of thermonuclear attacks, Eisenhower believed the
conflict would evolve into a conventional war similar to World War II.  He cited the first
two world wars as evidence of a prolonged conflict.  In those conflicts, combatants
believed that the enemy could not afford, neither economically and physically, to fight a
sustained conflict.  That presumption proved false in those cases as it would in any future
thermonuclear war.   Eisenhower believed that the initial nuclear exchange perhaps66
lasting as long as week would be followed months and years of sustained conventional
military conflict between what remained of the combatant nations.  In the first strike and
subsequent retaliatory strikes, enemy missiles and bombs would focus redundantly on the
most valuable targets assuming that at least some of those bombs would miss the mark. 
The thinking was that it was better to guarantee complete destruction of those targets than
to waste weapons on smaller, relatively unimportant targets.  As a result, communities of
all sizes without significant industrial, military, or political centers would be left in
relatively good condition and in position to wage the second part of the general war. 
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Those targets would escape direct nuclear annihilation because of the nature of
thermonuclear war, Eisenhower concluded.  He knew that the enemy’s first strike would
be his only sizable strike.  The likelihood of an enemy’s counterattack meant that if any
weapons were not initially used then those bombs or missiles would be left vulnerable to
the immediate and inevitable enemy response.  Not to use those weapons at the outset
meant the nation might not be able to use them at all.  Therefore, the logic of
thermonuclear war held that the first strike would be massive and aimed at total victory. 
At the same time, Eisenhower knew that at the first sign of an enemy bomber or missile
attack the United States would instantly launch its own massive retaliatory strike.  “If we
really get into a war we should get off our striking power as quickly as possible,” he said
in 1959.   In the unlikely event the United States ever struck first, he extrapolated, the67
enemy would also respond with a massive counterattack.  The nature of this early conflict
meant that the outbreak of nuclear war would witness a rapid and complete spasm of
attacks.  The enemy’s initial strike would target the most strategic sites available
including the United States’ own nuclear stockpile because the enemy would understand
that because of the inevitable American response they would have very little or no
capacity for their own second strike.  The nuclear spasm at the onset of war would be as
quick as it would be exhaustive.  But, according to Eisenhower, neither attack would be
decisive because many non-strategic areas would be left intact.  
How to plan for this next stage was a question that troubled Eisenhower.  To
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conclude that all human civilization would suffer total destruction after the initial series
of thermonuclear strikes meant there was little need for further discussion or planning.  In
a July 1957 meeting of the National Security Council, for example, Robert Cutler,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affair, briefed Eisenhower on “Situation
Assumption No. 9," a surprise nuclear attack on the United States which resulted in 50
million casualties.  Just after Cutler began, Eisenhower interrupted, asking “why he felt it
was necessary to go any further, since by this time we would all be dead.”  The room
broke out in laughter.  In all seriousness, Eisenhower struggled with the difficulty of how
his administration could plan for a thermonuclear war.   As a military man whose68
instincts were to plan for war-time eventualities, Eisenhower regretted that “for the period
which followed the first exchange, there was virtually nothing that could be realistically
planned in advance.”   69
Eisenhower insightfully recognized that all recent planning for general war often
ignored a glaring contradiction.  All planning, including those estimates which supposed
an attack resulting in tens of millions of casualties, left the United States in no position to
rebuild.  In one NSC meeting, “the President observed that he had asserted many times
that if we assumed too much damage there would be little point in planning, since
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everything would be ashes.”   How could the United States possibly survive this70
holocaust, and therefore why initiate a whole line of questions and answers for this
eventuality?  Planning for a worst-case attack scenario held no practical value for
Eisenhower.  A massive and catastrophic attack complete with “ultimate damage” left so
much destruction that the nation might not be able to recover.   “We ought, rather, to71
plan on the basis of a situation from which we could emerge in time,” Eisenhower
insisted.   72
Eisenhower’s long military career had taught him the value not of plans
themselves but of the planning process.  Eisenhower “would repeat an old saw,” his
advisors knew, which held that “plans are worthless but planning is absolutely
invaluable.”   Eisenhower believed that military engagements rarely develop as73
anticipated and so the best laid plans often became obsolete after the first unanticipated
development.  The act of planning, however, produced expert knowledge of the enemy’s
force, the terrain, and other logistical factors, which allowed for fluid and successful
battlefield adaptation.  In this way, planning proved far more useful than plans.  For a
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general thermonuclear war, however, plans and planning had little value.  No amount of
contingency planning could improve a combatant’s situation once the war had begun and
no nation could win a general war given the numbers of casualties estimated by many
within the administration.  If the nuclear war began, no change in tactics, operations, or
strategy would negate the simple reality that the nation faced certain, massive destruction
from the enemy’s nuclear strike.  In the slim hope of surviving this damage and living to
fight another day, national leaders needed to launch as many of their own weapons
against the enemy before those same weapons were all destroyed by the incoming attack. 
This paradox bothered Eisenhower.  All of his military training and experience in a sense
had been voided because the thermonuclear weapon invalidated the basic nature of
Clausewitz’s type of war.  General thermonuclear war exposed the uselessness of plans
and planning, removed the political goal of a military conflict, and negated the concept of
military victory with which Eisenhower was so familiar. 
Accordingly, Eisenhower advocated as much thoughtful and realistic planning for
a nuclear exchange as possible.  He commissioned studies to ascertain how much
destruction the nation might suffer from a thermonuclear strike.  From those studies,
Eisenhower came to learn that in the event of general war the physical destruction would
be enormous.  But he was not prepared to accept even the most erudite estimates of
casualties and destruction.  Not until the end of his presidency after the U-2 spy flights
provided a more accurate glimpse of Soviet capability could the United States better
estimate the destruction to be expected from a Soviet first strike.  Meanwhile, through
most of Eisenhower’s two terms, estimates came in from a variety of sources on the
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damage to be expected from nuclear war.  In most cases, official government studies of
nuclear war which Eisenhower saw in one form or another predicted casualties between
25 and 50 million Americans.  Out of population of around 160 million, between fifteen
and thirty percent of Americans would be killed or injured in a nuclear exchange, studies
suggested.
In March 1956, the National Security Council requested a formal study of the
social and psychological effects of nuclear war upon human beings.  The study was
completed in November 1956 and titled “The Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons
Development.”  Dr. Frank Fremont-Smith chaired the panel which wrote study.  He
offered a grim summary of the effects of a nuclear attack on the United States that
anticipated casualties of around fifty million.  These heavy casualties, the panel
explained, would undermine public support for the government and might result in the
disintegration of the national government.  This scenario might be avoided, the committee
which wrote the report advised, if the public was prepared emotionally and
psychologically for the tremendous destruction and death that would assuredly result from
nuclear war.  A program of “involvement” might very well increase national unity in the
event of war, but only if the proper steps were taken in advance.  The panel recommended
solutions aimed at producing a better informed public which would be less likely to suffer
paralyzing grief during and after an attack.  The American people must be given the
proper knowledge to meet the perils of the nuclear age just as they had met the perils of
the past.  A magnificent effort of public information and preparedness had to be made by
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the government to avoid an apocalypse.74
Eisenhower’s reaction to this report was measured.  With no degree of
overstatement, he remarked that the report correctly concentrated on “the most serious
problem which had ever faced the world.”   Eisenhower told the National Security75
Council that he “was searching desperately to find the best thing for us to do at the
present time in order to minimize the terrible results of a nuclear attack on the United
States.”  Eisenhower was “certain that this could not be achieved by simply ignoring the
danger.”   At the same time he concluded that “this was a terrible kind of problem”76
which could not be solved “by talking of maintaining six divisions abroad.”   “It would77
seem that the only sensible thing for us to do was to put all our resources into our SAC
capability and into hydrogen bombs,” the president noted.  He also remarked during the
same meeting that the report “emphasizes again the vital need for an effective
disarmament program.”78
Another government-initiated report titled “Survival of Population Following a
Massive Nuclear Exchange” was surprisingly positive about the ability of the United
States to survive and recover from a nuclear attack.  A group of scholars assembled
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through Stanford University produced the report and maintained an upbeat tone
throughout the report.  This was largely because the study assumed a Soviet nuclear
attack which did not target American oil refinery equipment or petroleum storage. 
Therefore, the committee concluded that the United States would be able to begin the
recovery process quickly and successfully because of the availability of petroleum which
was necessary for just about everything, including food production and transportation,
communication, and industrial and agriculture services.   The group noted however that79
the anticipated Soviet attack would require only minor changes to destroy these petroleum
capabilities.  The statistics, charts, and general conclusions were far more depressing. 
They described a nation in complete destruction and total disarray.  Without petroleum,
the nation had virtually no chance for beginning the process of successful recovery. 
Beyond the physical destruction in lives and property, the American way of life would be
destroyed as well.  “It would literally be a business of digging ourselves out of ashes,
starting again,” Eisenhower summarized.80
The Department of Defense conducted a top secret study in 1958 which was later
published under the title The Emergency Plans Book.  The study presumed a Soviet
nuclear attack primarily from submarine-launched ballistic missiles and intercontinental
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bombers.  Seven days after the initial attack, blast and radiation would have killed or
fatally injured 25 million Americans.  Another 25 million casualties had the hope of
recovery.  One in five of all Americans would die, the report concluded.  The first priority
of the government would be to protect the remaining population from residual radiation. 
Given the depleted state of health care, the destruction of food sources, and the severe
disruptions to monetary, communication, transportation, and power systems, this would
be difficult.  The economy would suffer from complete paralysis, and government
control, especially at the federal level, would be severely compromised.  A return to
normal seemed unlikely in the near future, if at all.81
Assuming the survival of some or most of the population, Eisenhower believed
that “our great fundamental problem will be how to mobilize what is left of 165 million
people and win a war.”   “All of our initial effort would have to be devoted to keeping a82
government running,” Eisenhower reminded his staff.  Where only local governments
remained, Eisenhower debated the imposition of martial law, as Abraham Lincoln had
done in a time of another great national crisis.  After all, the retired general understood,
“you could not put Federal troops under the command of a Mayor.”   Also like Lincoln83
 “Minutes of Meeting,” June 17, 1955, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as84
President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Name Series, Box 6, Civil Defense Drills
(Cdr. Beach) November 1, 1954 (2), DDE Library, 5.
 “Minutes of Meeting,” December 22, 1960, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as85
President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, Box 12, 471  Meeting, DDEst
Library, 11.
 “Memorandum of Conversation between Eisenhower and Senator Bridges,”86
May 21, 1957, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman
File), Ann C. Whitman Diaries Series, Box 8, April 1956 (1), DDE Library, 5.
147
Eisenhower agreed with Attorney General Brownell that the government would need to
suspend the right of habeas corpus.   From government studies such as that of 1958,84
Eisenhower understood that the federal power would be displaced and ineffective at best
or severely crippled at worst.  In any case, the ability of the federal government to
continue the war or to begin reconstruction soon after the first thermonuclear exchange
would be greatly compromised.  Local governments would have to do the job as the
federal republic recovered and reorganized.
Eisenhower also understood that this new governmental reality would not allow
for free, representative government, particularly in the days and months immediately
following the beginning of nuclear hostilities.    Though the nation itself might likely85
survive, the constitutional republic would be compromised by the demands of recovery in
a postwar environment.  According to Eisenhower, “even assuming that we would
emerge from a global war today as the acknowledged victor, there would be a destruction
in this country that there could be no possibility of our exercising a representative free
government for, I would say, two decades at the minimum.”   Eisenhower accepted that86
this kind of national emergency meant temporarily sacrificing the ideals of the American
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republic in an attempt to preserve and protect the remaining Americans.  National chaos
would require a dictatorship and government by decree.  “We would have to run this
country as one big camp,” Eisenhower noted, “severely regimented.”   The government87
would do its best to preserve free institutions of government, Eisenhower reasoned, but
the nation would be “in no position to count on it or plan on it, in view of the catastrophic
nature of the third world war if it should come.”  Americans would be lucky if they88
survived, Eisenhower remarked, and they would likely have to accept also the loss of
personal property and significant restrictions on individual freedoms as necessary evils.  89
Eisenhower further understood that the rehabilitation of the country as described
in government plans would be gradual and deliberate, but also that those plans needed to
be aimed at winning the war.  Severely devastated areas of the nation would be beyond
help in the early days.  Those areas would have to be neglected temporarily while the
most attention would be paid to those areas which were “relatively undamaged.”  In the
heavily damaged areas so few would survive that no amount of immediate action taken
towards recovery offered even moderate prospects for success.  “We would not be able
for a long time,” Eisenhower reasoned, “to move into the devastated areas in order to get
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people into hospitals.”    At the same time, the destruction of industrial, military, and90
political centers meant a certain crippling of the nation’s hospitals.  Only the most remote
and isolated hospitals would remain, and those hospitals would be the least prepared to
handle the large numbers of seriously wounded people.   Neither would stockpiling of91
national resources such as medical supplies serve the republic after the war.  Eisenhower
doubted that the United States could stockpile enough materials to satisfy the demands of
the postwar environment.  Besides, any stockpile of provisions large enough to serve a
significant percentage of the population would likely be destroyed in the initial nuclear
attack anyway.   Eisenhower understood that national triage was needed to preserve what92
was left of the population so as to win what remained of the war.  
Still, Eisenhower struggled to plan for the post-war period because he believed
that the human mind could not contemplate the devastation of that war.  This failure of
imagination deeply bothered Eisenhower.  All his previous military experience allowed
him to consider and to anticipate the worst-case scenario; therefore, he could guard
against it.  Never before in human history were the stakes so high as in the thermonuclear
era, however, and Eisenhower could not imagine the consequences of a thermonuclear
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war between the United States and the Soviet Union.  No study could accurately
anticipate the destruction because there was simply no basis for comparison or analysis. 
“Our imagination could not encompass the situation which would result from an attack on
this country involving the explosion of 2000 megatons,” Eisenhower believed.   For a93
man of great optimism and stubborn moderation and discipline such as Eisenhower, this
future was unfathomable.  “We are in fact talking about something the results of which
are almost impossible to conceive of,” he told his staff.   Nuclear war would be “so94
terrible that the human mind cannot comprehend it.”  For Eisenhower, nuclear war95
would be an “unmitigated disaster” and a “catastrophe.”   It was “unthinkable.”  96 97
“Casualties of the magnitude being talked about would mean that civilization could not
be rebuilt in a century – or even two centuries,” Eisenhower predicted.   He mused that98
nuclear war might even bring the end of human civilization.99
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This failure of imagination contributed to Eisenhower’s decidedly moderate view
of nuclear war.  Eisenhower was neither a doomsday prophet nor a simple optimist.  His
view of a possible nuclear war was above all pragmatic and realistic.  He could not afford
to assume the worst because any apocalyptic scenario would make his job and that of the
American government moot on this important issue.  If there was no possibility of
recovery from the war, there would be nothing left for Eisenhower to do except of course
to avoid that final war.  This he tried to do but he could not guarantee that the enemy
would do the same.  Eisenhower anticipated that the targets of a Soviet attack would be
industrial, political, and military centers.  When he also factored in the short duration of
the nuclear exchange, Eisenhower concluded that about half of the American population
would survive the war.  This view represented the high end of projected casualties for
thermonuclear war, but it was not entirely a pessimistic one.  Rather, Eisenhower’s view
was a middle-of-the-road perspective which allowed both for the worst horrors
imaginable and the opportunity to recover and rebuild.  One out of two killed or severely
injured was not exactly hopeful, but neither did it necessarily mean the end. 
Eisenhower held the belief that a future general nuclear war would produce no
winners and only losers.  According to Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower maintained that
“nuclear wars are still loseable” or rather that “one side may lose a little more than the
other.”  But the president rarely entertained this “esoteric discussion of winability” and
instead argued that everybody involved in the conflict would suffer so much destruction
as to be incapable of declaring victory.   “We are in the era of the thermonuclear bomb100
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that can obliterate cities and can be delivered across continents,” Eisenhower told the
Republican National Convention in 1956.  “With such weapons, war has become, not just
tragic, but preposterous,” he continued, “With such weapons, there can be no victory for
anyone.”   With a wealth of military experience, Eisenhower “now realized that in this101
atomic age a war could no longer be won because it would bring destruction to both
sides.”   He repeatedly argued that nuclear war would not last thirty to sixty days, but102
instead would continue until the war had reached some indescribable state of destruction. 
The only thing likely to spare the United States, the Northern hemisphere, and human
civilization from nuclear Armageddon would be the limits of human endurance.  “There
was obviously a limit – a human limit – to the devastation which human beings could
endure,” Eisenhower believed.   He often asked others informally to study the precise103
limits of American endurance in the event of nuclear devastation, but the president never
received a satisfactory answer.   104
Eisenhower’s understanding of the nature and consequences of nuclear war
shaped his thinking on the desirability of blast and fallout shelters for the American
public.  Eisenhower was most familiar with blast shelters or bomb shelters such as those
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used by citizens of allied cities during attacks by German bombers and rockets during
World War II.  These shelters were no deeper than ordinary basements and were not
equipped to sustain human life for more than a few hours or a day at most.  American
families could dig their own blast shelters at little cost or could convert underground
basements into blast shelters without much effort.  Blast shelters only needed to provide
immediate, short-term protection from nearby explosions and flying shrapnel.  Fallout
shelters which would be required by potential survivors in a thermonuclear war were
more elaborate and more expensive.  Fallout shelters required greater physical protection
from blast, from radiation, and from fallout.  They needed to be built deeper into the earth
and required heavy locking outer doors.  Most important, they needed to be large enough
and comfortable enough to seal multiple people and sufficient provisions inside for a
week or longer without resupplying or even opening the door.  Eisenhower himself
appeared to make no distinction between blast and fallout shelters and seemed to believe
the two were the same.  Shelters became the key component of any civil defense
measures discussed in Eisenhower’s administration 
In the spring of 1953 after the Upshot-Knothole nuclear test series, Eisenhower
endorsed basic and local civil defense measures to protect American citizens from nuclear
blasts and fallout.   “The bulk of the responsibility [for civil defense] rests upon the105
locality and the private citizen,” Eisenhower later told Henry Luce, and “unless the
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private citizen does become interested and has a definite sense of responsibility for
himself and family, there is little that government, by itself, can do.”   “For certain106
obvious strategic targets – such as New York City, Chicago, or Gary, Indiana,” the federal
government would augment civil defense measures such as shelters, but local
governments bore the primary burden of civil defense.    Eisenhower encouraged the107
federal government to educate the citizenry on the best use of locales already available to
them which might provide some protection against blast and fallout.  Citizens on the
fringe of a potential blast area should take advantage of underground structures, such as
basements and cellars, which provided more protection than remaining above ground. 
These structures served best as blast shelters and offered little protection against fallout. 
Nevertheless, this was the best and most practical step for citizens lacking a private
shelter.  It was cheap, easy, convenient, and somewhat effective.  Eisenhower also
encouraged individual citizens with some disposable income to construct their own
shelters.  
The federal government could offer support for state civil defense and guidance
for individual efforts, but Eisenhower never wavered from his conclusion that the federal
government could not embark upon a massive civil defense program which primarily
included the construction of fallout shelters.  Specifically, he had three concerns.  First, a
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shelter program sufficient to protect a majority of Americans reached far beyond the
responsibility of the federal government.  The United States government must not
implement a program to protect Americans and their property from the consequences of
nuclear war, Eisenhower reasoned, simply because the government did not do so in
conventional conflicts.  In fact, just the opposite was true:  the government did not
provide protection for the citizenry in previous wars, but instead the government asked
Americans to provide protection for the whole community by putting their sons in the
armed forces.  The construction of federal shelters strayed in the opposite direction.  A
federal shelter program took responsibility for defense of the citizens of the republic away
from those citizens and placed it solely in the hands of the vast federal bureaucracy.  108
Second, Eisenhower also feared the larger psychological consequences of building
large numbers of shelters and of actually using them.  Eisenhower even worried about the
preparations already in progress to provide for all three branches of government,
including himself as head of the executive branch, to retreat to shelters at the necessary
moment.  “One trouble with the idea of key officials going into underground structures
was the morale problem of the public,” Eisenhower remarked.   The building of a109
shelter to provide protection from a possible nuclear war threatened to create “a defensive
or pessimistic attitude” which might make it more difficult to convince Americans of the
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need to maintain proper military posture.  Morale must be kept high, despite the likely
horrors of war, Eisenhower insisted.  He cited the example of an officer whom he had
fired when he found the gentleman hiding in a wine cellar in Normandy after the
Overlord invasion.   Defeatism and pessimism had no place in a nation at war, and110
shelters might very well contribute to that sentiment.  Indeed, the very notion of
encouraging individuals to build shelters worried Eisenhower.  “If we provide incentives
to individual shelter construction, it must be done without hysteria, must be accepted as
routine,” he remarked.   The nation balanced on a knife’s edge, Eisenhower waxed111
pragmatic, between “providing some degree of confidence through the medium of a
shelter program while at the same time not scaring our citizens to death by too elaborate a
program.”112
The president worried also about the consequences of building his own personal
shelter.  Eisenhower “had long been undecided as to whether or not it would be a good
thing for the president to build such a shelter and thus set an example to other people.” 
He worried that “if he went ahead and built such a shelter, the effect would be to scare
other people to death.”   In an NSC meeting of December 1958, Eisenhower queried113
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Federal Civil Defense Administrator Leo Hoegh about an American citizen who had built
himself “an extremely comfortable, commodious, and safe blast shelter at a cost of only
$15,000.”   Eisenhower wondered how deep the shelter was and how it was so cheap to114
construct.  Eisenhower was intrigued and thought he could only afford a decent shelter “if
he got a good job after he ceased to be President.”  Of course, he understood that many
others could not afford to build this level of protection and inevitably would turn to the
federal government for help.   He favored all efforts to encourage private construction,115
but what then for those who can not afford it?  Are they to be left to their own devices in
the event of a nuclear war?  Underground structures remained an option for those
Americans, but Eisenhower seemed to regard that option as insufficient.  Eisenhower
decided against building his own private shelter during his presidency  “for fear of the
public hysteria that such might cause.”   Nonetheless, he did approve the top-secret116
construction of massive fallout shelter under the Greenbrier Resort in White Sulphur
Springs, West Virginia in 1958.  The shelter was about two-hundred fifty miles away
from Washington, and it was accessible by car, train, or plane.  The site was situated far
enough from Washington to escape a nuclear strike on the capital but close enough to get
key government officials inside before the bombs fell.  Unknown to the general public
until 1992 the bunker could protect the all three branches of government from nuclear
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 “Letter to Freeman Gosden” September 25, 1961, Dwight D. Eisenhower Post118
Presidential Series, Special Name SubSeries, Box 4, Gosden, Freeman, 1961, DDE
Library, 1-2.
158
war and fallout for an extended period of time.  Eisenhower understood that some effort
had to be made to protect the federal government from the war for purposes of post-war
recovery, but that effort also had to be kept secret from the public.
After he left office, Eisenhower revisited the idea of building a fallout shelter.  He
thought building a fallout shelter as a private citizen might not receive as much as
attention from the public as it would have while he was in office.   In retirement,117
Eisenhower seemed to find some humor in either the uselessness of shelters or the
impossibility of providing them for all Americans.  “But even if I were persuaded that the
building of a shelter would be good,” Eisenhower told his golfing buddy Freeman Gosden
from Augusta, “I would most certainly insist that it would have to be ample to take care
of all the caddies, the workmen on the golf course, together with everybody that works in
the clubhouse, including waitresses, maids, janitors, and all the rest.”   118
Eisenhower’s third concern was about the actual value of shelters.  He became
convinced that, even with shelters, the United States would suffer tremendous devastation
in a nuclear war.  A variety of scientific studies commissioned by the executive branch on
the issue of shelters and survivability reinforced that view.  The goal of these studies was
to provide hard quantitative data on the survivability of nuclear war.  The latent intent
was to promote optimism and hope about the nuclear age.  As previously noted, “The
Human Effects of Nuclear Weapons Development” despite its grim theme proved
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surprisingly optimistic on the issue of recovery.  “We share a firm belief,” the panel
argued, “that the prospect is not a hopeless one.”  “Our pioneer background and
inheritance predispose us to count hardships as a challenge and fortify us against
complacency.  We are resourceful people,” the panel proclaimed, “inventive no less
socially and politically than technologically.”  American inventiveness and belief in
freedom were the “genius of American life,” and through this genius, the committee
insisted, the United States could survive even the worst nuclear disaster.  119
Another more influential finding which addressed the issue of shelters was the
Gaither report.  Titled officially “Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age,” the
Gaither report recommended that the Eisenhower administration make preparations to
strengthen America’s continental and civil defenses.   Among these improvements was120
a five-year $25 billion program for fallout shelters.  Eisenhower took issue.  In the event
of nuclear attack, the president learned, fallout shelters might save 35 percent of the
population. “We are talking about the complete destruction of the United States,” he
concluded.  Eisenhower thus opposed the Gaither committee’s recommendation to build
vast numbers of fallout shelters because in any nuclear exchange millions would die and
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fallout shelters would provide minimal protection for a limited number of people.  121
Echoing Eisenhower’s own conclusion, Vice President Nixon argued that the difference
between forty million dead Americans and sixty million dead Americans was
inconsequential in the grand scheme of the United States.    Why divert billions of122
dollars to a fallout shelter program which provided inadequate protection, Eisenhower
asked, when that money might be better spent improving America’s economy and
maintaining a high level of nuclear readiness to deter a war?  For Eisenhower, the answer
was clear.  The United States held a solid strategic position, despite the Gaither report’s
findings, and civil defense was costly and ineffective.  In the event of nuclear war, the123
United States would suffer horrific physical losses, but even without major civil defense
measures, the nation must remain hopeful in the belief that nuclear war was survivable. 
Eisenhower believed that the United States would do better to spend its time and
money in an effort to prevent nuclear war.  He concluded that only the preparation of
active defense measures in the form of massive retaliatory capability held some
possibility for success, remained cost-effective, and preserved hope for America’s future
in the thermonuclear age.  “A shelter program would interfere seriously with vital
programs for strengthening the active defenses of the United States,” Eisenhower
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believed.   If the United States intended to protect something absolutely, Eisenhower124
reasoned, it must be “our massive retaliatory capability” so that the enemy would have no
doubt about the consequences of war and thus be less inclined to risk a confrontation.  125
Working from this conclusion, Eisenhower implemented the policy of massive retaliation
which built upon the great power of the newest nuclear weapons and allowed him to
project military strength to America’s enemies.  He chose a logical and pragmatic policy
of nuclear deterrence.  He had confidence the Soviet Union did not seek a general war
with the United States, and he pledged that the United States would never launch a first
strike.  Instead, with some understanding of nuclear war, he placed his faith in the
strength of nuclear weapons in the belief that only strength could bring peace. 
Eisenhower manufactured a policy built solidly on the ability of these weapons to project
American military strength. 
c.  Projecting Strength in Asia
Following the end of the Korean War and the implementation of the New Look,
Eisenhower faced a crisis in Asia in September 1954 when the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) began shelling two small islands, Quemoy and Matsu.  Located in the
Taiwan Strait quite close to the mainland of China, Quemoy and Matsu, like other islands
in the vicinity, remained disputed by both parties.  Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist
162
government on Taiwan, then known as Formosa, claimed the two islands as its own and
even garrisoned a small number of troops on each island.  Mao Zedong and the People’s
Republic of China continued to insist that Quemoy and Matsu belonged to the PRC and
Chiang’s occupation of those islands and Taiwan as well was both illegal and temporary. 
In February 1953, Eisenhower removed the naval blockade which the United States had
held in the Taiwan Straits in the days since the beginning of the Korean war.  In essence,
the U.S. navy had occupied the straits to repel a Chinese attack against Taiwan but also to
deter a Nationalist attack against the People’s Republic.  Beijing perceived the removal of
the blockade as a signal of America’s intent to unleash Chiang and to begin the rollback
of communism in Asia.  Soon after the blockade’s removal, Chiang began moving the
first of 75,000 troops to Quemoy and Matsu.  
Despite American warnings to China not to take action against Taiwan, the PRC
began shelling the two islands on September 3, 1954.  In addition, People’s Liberation
Army airplanes attacked the Tachen islands, another set of disputed territories near the
Chinese mainland.  The government in Beijing took action because Mao perceived that
Chiang Kai-shek was developing closer relations with Washington.  The evidence seemed
to support Beijing’s view.  Shortly after the shelling began in September 1954, nine
months after John Foster Dulles announced the policy of massive retaliation, the United
States helped form the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO).  Similar to NATO,
SEATO intended to resist the spread of communism in Southeast Asia.  In December
1954, the United States also entered into a Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan.  Chiang’s
ties with the United States grew increasingly strong in the early 1950s, and for this
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reason, Mao believed Chiang’s retention of the islands signaled Chiang’s intent to use
those islands as launching points for an invasion of mainland China.  Mao believed,
moreover, that Chiang would not take this risky action without the permission and
backing of the United States.  In an effort to deter U.S. interference in what Mao
considered in an internal affair, Mao ordered the shelling.  He anticipated that this action
would put pressure on both Taipei and Washington and also expose to the world the
American plot to interfere directly in the affairs of a sovereign nation, namely the
People’s Republic of China.   In January 1955, Chinese forces seized Yijianshan Island126
approximately 200 miles north of Taiwan.  The Nationalist garrison there was destroyed. 
Military clashes between China and Taiwan increased in the early part of 1955 including
fighting on Quemoy, Matsu, and along the coast of mainland China.  To Eisenhower,
Chinese communists were becoming increasingly hostile and aggressive.
The problem faced in the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1954-55 was one with which
Eisenhower was familiar.  The danger of wider war always existed in areas where
national interests were at stake and where potential combatants failed to recognize the
great risks involved.  To Eisenhower, World War II was clearly the product of one man’s
drive for power, but both World War I and the Korean War came about as a result of
miscalculation.  In the case of the Great War, Eisenhower understood that “a prince was
murdered; there began to be an exchange of notes back and forth; and I believe that there
was a miscalculation of what Russia, France, and Britain would do, and that created that
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war.”  In Korea the situation was not altogether different but certainly simpler: “I feel that
the Korean conflict started because of our failing to make clear that we would defend this
small nation, which had just started, in a pinch.”   Miscalculation by the aggressor127
nation in these two cases resulted in a larger war than originally intended by the aggressor
nation.
In Taiwan, Eisenhower feared a “powder keg” war.  “To my mind, the danger of
Communists beginning a global shooting war is not too imminent,” Eisenhower told a
friend in 1952, “at least as long as we are not taking into account the danger of a ‘powder
keg’ war.”   “Wherever there is any kind of fighting and open violence in the world,”128
Eisenhower told journalist Chalmers Roberts at a press conference, “it is always sort of a
powder keg.”   Eisenhower believed that even the smallest spark, such as the murder of129
a prince or misunderstood intentions, could ignite a powder keg which would then
explode into a greater war.  The Taiwan Straits crisis held the potential to create that
spark.  “As long as actual fighting persists anywhere,” Eisenhower said of the Taiwan
Straits, “there is always the danger that some hot bullet will hit a powder keg.”   Given130
this view, he sought to make clear the United States’s intentions regarding Taiwan and
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the surrounding islands.  
Eisenhower was not anxious to get into war and he resisted those who seemed
eager to do so.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff repeatedly argued to Eisenhower the great
importance of Quemoy and Matsu to the stability of the military situation in the Straits. 
They believed that holding the islands was of great military value in the larger Cold War
struggle.  Eisenhower did not agree, and he cautioned his military advisors on the
consequences of placing great value where it did not belong.  The president was not
willing to risk a larger war over these strategically unimportant islands.  If the United
States decided to attack the Chinese forces bombarding the islands as well as other
Chinese forces in the region to relieve pressure on Chiang, Eisenhower believed that the
attack could not be limited.  Those strikes would be first steps only, Eisenhower thought,
and the following steps would likely involve atomic weapons.   But Eisenhower did not131
intend “to use the A-bomb in any ‘border incident,’” rather it “was to be reserved for a
major Communist attack.”   If the United States were to expand the war with atomic132
weapons over Taiwan, the president reminded his advisors, “we’re not talking now about
a limited, brush-fire war.  We’re talking about going to the threshold of World War III.  If
we attack China, we’re not going to impose limits on our military actions.”  Even more,
he continued, general war would likely result, and the logical enemy for such a war was
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Russia, not China.  The United States would attack there as well.   Eisenhower wanted133
to avoid that scenario, and through late 1954 he believed avoidance of a larger war in
Asia was still possible.
The crisis over Taiwan quickly worsened.  The bombardment which began in
September against Quemoy continued through the fall.  On November 1, 1954,
Eisenhower learned that the Chinese Communists had expanded the bombing to the
Tachen Islands, an island group north of Taiwan.  The shelling of Quemoy and other
small associated islands continued, as did the buildup of Chinese troops opposite
Taiwan.   Chinese Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai continued to speak of the liberation of134
Taiwan, and on November 23, 1954, the government of China announced guilty verdicts
and long prison sentences for American airmen shot down over Korea.  At the same time,
Eisenhower received little help in avoiding war from Taiwan’s President Chiang Kai-shek
who predicted a war in the near future and appeared to relish the likelihood.  The crisis
continued to escalate into the next year.  On January 10, 1955, the PRC conducted air
raids against the Tachen islands and eight days later they overran the small island of
Ichiang, seven miles north of Tachens.  
Though Eisenhower still saw none of these areas as worth the risk of war, at the
urging of John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower adopted a shift in policy.  In January 1955, the
United States agreed to an evacuation of the Tachen Islands, which the president believed
would be difficult to defend, but also pledged to hold those areas then in friendly hands,
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including Quemoy and Matsu.   In a message to Congress on January 24, Eisenhower135
explained just how and where the United States intended to meet the communist
aggression in the Taiwan Strait.  The president cited the continuing availability of the
Seventh Fleet and reminded the Congress of the Mutual Defense treaty between the U.S.
and Taiwan then under consideration by the Senate.  He recited the series of aggressive
military actions by China and noted that “the Chinese Communists themselves assert that
these attacks are a prelude to the conquest of Formosa.”  While waiting for the United
Nations to act appropriately, Eisenhower requested Congressional authorization for “the
use of the armed forces of the United States if necessary to assure the security of Formosa
and the Pescadores.”   In addition to providing support to Taiwanese forces, the United136
States “must be alert to any concentration or employment of Chinese Communist forces
obviously undertaken to facilitate attack upon Formosa, and be prepared to take
appropriate military action.”   Eisenhower accepted and signed the Formosa resolution137
on January 29, 1955 which afforded him authority to take the military action he deemed
appropriate within the confines of the resolution.
Eisenhower hoped that a Congressional resolution would reduce the likelihood of
a powder keg war.  He asked for and received from the Congress a resolution which
“would make clear the unified and serious intentions” of the United States.  The president
believed that a clear statement of American intentions and goals would “reduce the
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possibility that the Chinese Communists, misjudging our firm purpose and national unity,
might be disposed to challenge the position of the United States, and precipitate a major
crisis which even they would neither anticipate nor desire.”  He further wanted to
“remove any doubt regarding our willingness . . . to engage in whatever operations may
be required” to preserve freedom in Taiwan and the world.   Eisenhower wanted to138
guarantee that war did not occur “through mistaken calculations on the other side.”  “The
purpose is honestly and hopefully to prevent war,” Eisenhower explained.   Specifically,139
the resolution provided the president the authority to “to employ the Armed Forces of the
United States as he deems necessary for the specific purpose of securing and protecting
Formosa and the Pescadores against armed attack.”  Congress approved in advance those
measures the president judged “to be required or appropriate in assuring the defense of
Formosa and the Pescadores.”   Meanwhile, Eisenhower continued to explore the140
possibility that the United Nations might help mediate the conflict but China and the
Soviet Union had so far refused to cooperate.  
The evacuations of the Tachens began on February 4, 1955 and the reinforcement
of the Matsus followed.  “What we have done has apparently been interpreted by the
Chinese Communists merely as a sign of weakness,” Eisenhower wrote Winston
Churchill two weeks later.   John Foster Dulles agreed.  After returning from Southeast141
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Asia on March 8, 1955, Dulles told the president that “the Chinese Communists are
determined to capture Formosa.  Surrendering Quemoy and Matsu won’t end that
determination.”  Dulles told Eisenhower that he estimated the United States’s chance of
going to war was fifty-fifty.  “If we defend Quemoy and Matsu, we’ll have to use atomic
weapons,” Dulles continued, “they alone will be effective against the mainland airfields.” 
Eisenhower agreed with Dulles’ analysis and considered atomic war with China.  142
With tensions increasing, the press caught wind of a possible American atomic
attack and sought Eisenhower’s thinking on how the situation might develop.  The United
States has been “active in producing various types of weapons that feature nuclear fission
ever since World War II,” Eisenhower reminded a reporter.  Without revealing under
what specific circumstances these weapons might be used, Eisenhower did explain that
tactical fission weapons, not thermonuclear bombs, worked best against military targets.
“In any combat where they can be used on strictly military targets and for strictly military
purposes,” Eisenhower remarked, “I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just
exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”  Eisenhower did add a caveat:  “I
believe the great question about these things comes when you begin to get into those
areas where you cannot make sure that you are operating merely against military targets. 
But with that one qualification, I would say, yes, of course [fission weapons] would be
used.”   If he decided to use force in a war, Eisenhower continued, “then I know of no143
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reason why a large explosion shouldn’t be used as freely as a small explosion.”  Still, he
ridiculed “the indiscriminate use of [thermonuclear] weapons” as illogical.  “What would
you have left?” Eisenhower rhetorically queried.  During his press conference the
following week, Eisenhower used the term atomic to apply to all fission and fusion
weapons.  Clearly, “the indiscriminate use atomic weapons” might leave nothing
standing.  At the same time Eisenhower also noted that “the concept of atomic war is too
horrible for man to endure and to practice.”144
For his part, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill argued against the use of
atomic weapons to defend Quemoy and Matsu.  The United States need not defend them
at all, Churchill told Eisenhower, because the effort would simply not be worth it.  Going
to the brink over non-essential areas which proved vital only to the ego of Chiang Kai-
shek and not the free world, Churchill believed, made little sense.  In principle
Eisenhower agreed and hoped Chiang Kai-Shek would come to realize how unimportant
some of the disputed areas were.  For Churchill, waging nuclear war seemed an
unacceptable alternative to referring the matter to the United Nations and giving the
People’s Republic of China the benefit of the doubt over whether Mao intended to invade
and reclaim Taiwan.  
Eisenhower, however, believed that the risk of a larger war was small.  Indeed, he
appeared unconcerned about possible Soviet entry even if the war expanded.   The145
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Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: The Middle Way, Vol. XVI, (Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 1563.
 “Letter to Winston Spencer Churchill,” February 10, 1955, Louis Galambos,146
ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: The Middle Way, Vol.
XVI, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 1564.  Emphasis in
original.
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 3, 358.147
 Quoted in Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 480.148
171
U.S.S.R. would likely send supplies into China to assist, but the president concluded that
Kremlin leaders would ultimately decide not to risk the PRC falling victim to “the
bombing that we could conduct against her mainland.”   Eisenhower had already146
concluded that large-scale atomic attacks against China would likely be paired with
attacks against what he called the logical enemy, the Soviet Union. 
Eisenhower routinely refused to commit either to the use or non-use of atomic
weapons to resolve the Taiwan Straits Crisis.  He well understood that wars often failed
to follow a predictable pattern and that he could not and would not predict just how the
United States would meet an unknown series of future events.  “So I think you just have
to wait,” he concluded, “and that is the kind of prayerful decision that may some day face
a president.”   Eisenhower wanted to take all the time he was afforded before147
committing.  As he told Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn on March 20, 1955, “we
have not made that decision and will not make it until we know the circumstances
surrounding any given attack.”148
Ultimately, the large-scale Chinese attack upon Taiwan which would have likely
prompted an American atomic response never came.  On April 23, 1955, at an Asian-
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American conference in Bandung, Chinese Foreign minister Zhou Enlai publicly
expressed China’s desire not to go to war with the United States over Taiwan and
suggested that China would pursue liberation of Taiwan through peaceful means.  The
PRC stopped the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu on May 10, 1955 and an informal cease
fire fell into place on May 22, 1955.  At the end of May 1955, China announced the
release of the American airmen imprisoned for their participation in the Korean War. 
Although the area would flare up again in 1958, the first Taiwan Straits Crisis had ended
and the region calmed.
Eisenhower remembered the Taiwan Straits Crisis of 1954-55 as “one of the most
serious problems of the first eighteen months of my administration.”   He also saw the149
crisis as an opportunity to learn from previous mistakes, to repair lost credibility, and to
put to work his vision of Cold War conflict in the nuclear age.  “The mistaken communist
notion that under no circumstances would the United States” assist South Korea, for
example, led in part to that conflict.  This time, Eisenhower resolved that “no uncertainty
about our commitment to defend Formosa should invite a major Chinese Communist
attack.”150
Eisenhower intended to build the nation’s capacity to retaliate instantly and
massively and to project that strength in order to eliminate enemy doubt about American
resolve.  Eisenhower hoped the projection of strength was all he needed.  “It was the
threat that he was primarily talking about,” Andrew Goodpaster remembered, “Now
 Goodpaster Jr., April 10, 1982, OH-877, DDE Library, 6.151
 Eisenhower, Mandate for Change, 477.152
 Goodpaster Jr., April 10, 1982, OH-877, DDE Library, 6.153
173
behind the threat there has to be the reality, but he always put the stress on the threat.”  151
When asked if he would use atomic weapons in a general war in Asia, Eisenhower
answered that he would.  “I hoped this answer would have some effect in persuading the
Chinese Communists of the strength of our determination,” Eisenhower later wrote.   If152
this show of strength should fail to prevent aggression or to stop a war, “then they would
know that if their use of conventional force in fact threatened our vital interest, we would
not be limited, that the threat of nuclear attack would exist.”   He told his advisers that,153
as in Korea a year before, if the Chinese pressed the attack and threatened Taiwan, the
United States would respond with sufficient force to drive the Chinese back.  U.S. 
conventional military power hardly had this capability, and atomic weapons would be
used, first at the tactical level and then beyond as needed. 
Eisenhower believed that only satisfactory and indeed overwhelming military
strength could provide a deterrent to aggressive action, and he further concluded that only
nuclear weapons provided that level of force.  The U.S. Seventh Fleet offered only the
flimsiest of military protection to Taiwan from an invasion of the People’s Republic of
China and vice versa.  With SEATO in existence and with a mutual defense pact in place
between the U.S. and Taiwan, the United States committed not only its conventional
force to the area but the whole of its nuclear options as well.  By 1955, Eisenhower
sought to make all interested parties aware that the defense of Taiwan was perhaps more
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vital than the Soviet Union or China realized.  If the enemies of the United States
underestimated the lengths to which the United States would go to defend Chiang Kai-
shek’s nation, they risked a far larger general war.  Eisenhower intended to force the
communist powers to decide as to what goals they hoped to accomplish and at what cost. 
Eisenhower used a strategy of massive retaliation sought to raise the stakes of the Cold
War and simultaneously make sure that a larger war was far less likely.  For Eisenhower,
the crisis provided a test of his nuclear policy.  
Eisenhower intended for his nuclear strength to be a legitimate, practical, and
ultimately decisive strategic weapon.  He rejected the advice of the British who, he
believed, “had not as yet fully grasped the importance of atomic warfare.”   He designed154
the New Look to deter enemy aggression through the threat of use and also as an
appropriate strategy to achieve military victory should deterrence fail.  Eisenhower did
not take the use of nuclear weapons lightly, particularly not after the development of the
thermonuclear bomb, but he did not attach much special significance to those weapons
either.  The historical record showed that Eisenhower did not just avoid nuclear war
during his administration, but he avoided large-scale conventional war as well.  For
Eisenhower, only nuclear weapons, both tactical and strategic, atomic and thermonuclear,
created the military strength necessary to achieve this goal.  Eisenhower had little interest
in the science of fission or fusion, nor was he burdened by the weight of moral arguments
against the use of nuclear weapons that troubled many scientists in the United States and
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his British allies.  Through military strength, Eisenhower hoped either to preserve the
peace or win the war.  In either capacity, the nuclear weapon proved both useful and
good.
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CHAPTER FIVE: Supporting Industrial Strength
On June 11, 1955, two months before the start of the International Conference on
the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva, Switzerland, Eisenhower spoke at the
centennial commencement of Pennsylvania State University.  The topic of his speech was
the promise of nuclear power:  “In ten short years the curtain has been pushed aside
sufficiently to afford glimpses that have aroused atomic hopes commensurate with the
awful dimension of atomic fears.”  The atomic hopes of which Eisenhower spoke
included electrical power through fission as well as the use of radioactivity and
radioactive isotopes to explore “new horizons in medicine, agriculture, and industrial
processes.”  Unfortunately for the United States, “those few evil men” in Soviet Union
and other communist nations sought to “use command of this energy for their control of
human destiny.”   To combat those men, Eisenhower believed he could increase the1
industrial strength of the United States through the peaceful application of nuclear energy. 
 With the vast natural and human resources of both the Soviet Union and of the
People’s Republic of China, the communist world seemed poised to creep into a position
of industrial dominance.  Large natural reserves of coal, iron ore, uranium, natural gas,
petroleum and other natural resources, and foodstuffs such as wheat and rice seemed to
have given the communists the upper hand in promising lasting prosperity for future
generations.  In addition, communist centralized planning in the form of Stalin’s
successive five-year plans aimed at the goal of great industrial development in a relatively
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Armaments and American Policy,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954,
vol. 2, National Security Affairs (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1984), 1153.
177
short amount of time.  Engaged in a great Cold War, the United States could not allow
her enemies the same advantage in industrial output that they possessed in manpower and
landmass.  Eisenhower believed that the United States needed to seize upon her great
intellectual and entrepreneurial resources, the newest of which was nuclear technology, to
support American industrial strength.
Additionally, Eisenhower lamented the prospect of an atomic future filled with
fear as a result of advances in atomic science.  He well understood that the atomic bomb’s
military value grew from the great fear the weapon could instill in the enemy as well as
the great damage the weapon could cause.  But, the acquisition of the atomic bomb by
America’s enemy forced upon Eisenhower a reconsideration of the overall value and
prospects of the weapon.  He regretted that the bomb seemed not to inspire any hope for
the future but only fear of the destruction of nations and peoples by atomic attack.  As
president, Eisenhower sought to reorient atomic technology toward peaceful and hopeful
purposes.  A National Security Council analysis reflected the president’s view:  “Atomic
energy is an integral part of the new and tremendously constructive technology of western
civilization.  Developments in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes can in the
foreseeable future have immense practical and economic benefits.  Our national atomic
energy activities are and should be increasingly related to other areas of governmental and
industrial activity.”   Specifically, Eisenhower imagined that the creation of power2
through controlled fission and fusion could serve to help relieve the great demands for
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power placed upon American industry.  He sought revisions to the Atomic Energy Act of
1946 to provide private companies with the fissionable material and financial assistance
in order to make electrical power from atomic technology available to the American
public and the world.  He also advocated a variety of other atomic applications such as
the nuclear-powered peace ship and Project Plowshare which sought industrial uses for
atomic explosions.  With these applications Eisenhower believed he could transmute
nuclear technology into hope for the republic. 
The president believed that his use of nuclear technology for national industrial
strength fit well with his other initiatives to build strength in other areas such as the
economy or the military.  For Eisenhower, to put the atom to use in these ways was above
all obvious, practical, and effective.  From the beginning of his presidency, he celebrated
the civilian industrial applications of nuclear power.  He routinely advocated for the use
of atoms for peace in this way at the same time that he championed the military
application of the same technology.  Because the industrial application of nuclear power
served U.S. national interests as well as those of the developing world, Eisenhower
believed that this peaceful application further convinced the world of his desire for peace.
Moreover, Eisenhower’s discovery of what he believed was a suitable and desirable place
for nuclear weapons technology in domestic life further committed the United States to a
long-term relationship with nuclear energy and nuclear weapons.  Beyond use in military
conflicts, the citizens of the republic under Eisenhower saw nuclear technology become
part of their everyday lives.
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a. “A Wasting of Strength”
In the early years of the atomic age and the Cold War, Americans including
Eisenhower struggled to adapt to the new atomic age.  Historian Paul Boyer argues that
Americans experienced a variety of feelings in the period between the end of World War
II and the explosion of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949.  “The initial response of the
American people to the atomic bomb, then, was shaped by two intertwined cultural
moods,” Boyer argues, “intense fear and a somewhat unfocused conviction that an urgent
and decisive public response was essential.”   Boyer focused his research on the3
cacophony of voices offering unique visions of the atomic future.  The initial fear of
atomic destruction felt by some Manhattan Project scientists immediately after Hiroshima
juxtaposed with the prospect of a great atomic utopia among others.  “Along with the
shock waves of fear, one also finds exalted prophecies of the bright promise of atomic
energy,” Boyer wrote.  4
The practical applications of atomic energy seemed limitless in the late 1940s. 
Rudolph Langer of the California Institute of Technology described the atomic age as “an
era of unparalleled richness and opportunities for all.”   Boyer summarizes Langer’s new5
vision:  “the populace lives underground in climate-controlled atomic houses, surfacing
only for a dip in the above-ground swimming pool (which also provides insulation), for
trips in large, transparent atomic-powered automobiles suspended from overhead tracks,
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or in airplanes propelled by high speed particles emitted by U-235.  “The subterranean
houses are heated and cooled by walls of radioactive uranium and illuminated by
translucent panels aglow with the ‘fluorescence which occurs around U-235,’” Boyer
continues.   Atomic power provided light for the growth of fruits and vegetables upon6
which the family would live, and microwave ovens would cook the food instantly and
thoroughly.   Physicist John J. O’Neill speculated on the availability of cheap electrical7
power for all Americans, on atomic vitamins, on beams of radioactivity to mine and smelt
metals, and of atomic-powered airplanes, ships, automobiles, and rockets. 
Like radical technologies of the past such as gunpowder or steam power,
Eisenhower believed atomic power through nuclear fission was inherently harmless.  The
atom “wears no nationality and recognizes no frontiers,” Eisenhower believed, “it is
neither moral nor immoral.”  “Only man’s choice can make it good or evil,” he argued.  8
“These discoveries in the field of science present in themselves no threat to man,”
Eisenhower told the National Assembly of United Church Women.  “Like other scientific
developments,” Eisenhower explained, “they are susceptible to good or evil use,
depending upon the intent of the individual or group possessing them.”   In this way,9
nuclear technology was neither entirely wicked nor entirely benevolent.
When he came to the presidency in 1953, Eisenhower believed that atomic energy,
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however dangerous in the form of a bomb, could be trusted to civilian entities which
sought to provide power for profit.  Private companies and individuals, Eisenhower
believed, must be given access to atomic technology with which they could produce
energy from fission for the market.  In February 1954, Eisenhower submitted to Congress
his recommendations for amending the Atomic Energy Act of 1946.  As the United
States’ relationship with the Soviet Union deteriorated in 1946, American policymakers
labored to decide just how the atomic weapon would be used in current and future Cold
War struggles.  
The project to build the atomic bomb was a government operation from the
beginning.  The War Department, under Secretary Henry Stimson, built a laboratory in
the New Mexico desert as well as an elaborate network of production facilities to
manufacture all the necessary ingredients for an atomic bomb.  In addition to the site at
Los Alamos, uranium and plutonium production facilities were built in Tennessee and
Washington state.  Reactor research took place in Chicago at the Metallurgical
Laboratory, later the Argonne National Laboratory, and explosives research and bomb
preparation took place in California and New Mexico respectively.  From 1942 to 1945,
the United States government poured over $2 billion into research and development in the
Manhattan Engineer District, also known as the Manhattan Project.
The Manhattan Project included also a number of private citizens and companies. 
J. Robert Oppenheimer took leave from the University of California to assemble a team
of respected scientists from university campuses across the nation and the globe.  What
they shared was a quest for scientific knowledge in service of the allied powers.  The
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same was true for the numerous companies involved in one phase or the another of the
bomb project, including the Dupont Corporation that built the Hanford site along the
Columbia River in Washington state.  Other private companies provided necessary
supplies and service in a variety of production processes.  In sum, the building of the
atomic bomb depended upon a combination of individual citizens, universities, private
corporations, and government.  
The United States government was the dominant partner.  “Stated in its simplest
terms,” the author of the U.S. Army history of the Manhattan Project reported, “the
achievement of an atomic bomb resulted from the highly successful collaboration of
American science and industry carried out under the direction and guidance of the U.S.
army.”  Only the United States government through the Army, Vincent Jones wrote,
“could provide the administration, liaison services, security, and military planning
essential to the success of a program requiring ready access to scarce materials and
manpower, maximum protection against espionage and sabotage, and, ultimately combat
utilization of its end product.”10
Fresh out of the war and into the atomic age, those who had built the bomb now
argued over who would control it.  Great momentum developed quickly for the military to
manage atomic weapons.  Truman’s Secretary of War Robert Patterson believed that
control of the bomb must be placed in the hands of military men who “would be
representative of all that is best in our national life – men of demonstrated wisdom and
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judgment who would accept appointment not because of any emoluments that might
attend their membership but rather because of a profound recognition of the significance
of atomic power to the future of civilization.”    Congressman Andrew May, Chairman11
of the House Military Affairs Committee, and Senator Edwin Johnson, ranking member
of the corresponding Senate committee, introduced legislation which would entrust the
military with the responsibility to preserve and protect the nation’s atomic secrets and
establish American atomic policy.  Secretary Patterson, General Leslie Groves, Vannevar
Bush, and James Conant all testified before Congress in favor of the May-Johnson bill.12
The opposition featured a coalition of politicians and former Manhattan Project
scientists, including the newly created Federation of Atomic Scientists.  After the war,
some scientists who had labored to build the bomb now organized to make the public
aware of the power of the new weapon.  These scientists felt a moral obligation to ensure
proper use of their creation.  They argued that atomic energy was far too important and
too powerful to be left in the hands of the military exclusively and that the military had in
fact hampered the bomb’s building because its excessive secrecy restricted the flow of
scientific information.   These scientists also argued that in keeping with the traditions of13
the republic civilians, not the military, should control the tools of war including the
 Ibid., 70.14
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atomic bomb.  The debate continued in Congress through the fall of 1945, with hearings
in both chambers.  In the end, the scientists won the debate when Senator Arthur
Vandenberg of Michigan killed the bill in committee.  
Senator Brien McMahon of Connecticut proposed new legislation on December
20, 1945 that addressed the concerns of both the scientists and the military, but which
vested the control of atomic power in the United States in civilians.  McMahon’s bill
ultimately became the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 and it established a civilian-controlled
Atomic Energy Commission.  The five-member commission had sole responsibility for
and possession of atomic weapons, and before these weapons could be delivered to the
military, the Commission needed agreement and explicit presidential approval.  The
president alone possessed the authority to decide if and when to use the bomb.  In
deference to the military, the legislators created a Military Liaison Committee to advise
the entire Commission on military matters.14
The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 laid out six broad goals related to the research,
production, control, and applications of atomic energy.  These six goals were: 1) To
encourage private research and development in atomic fields so as to achieve maximum
progress; 2) To provide for the free exchange of basic scientific information and,
whenever possible, related technical information; 3) To study the social, political, and
economic effects of atomic energy; 4) To establish solid federal research in atomic
energy; 5) To provide for “government control of the production, ownership, and use of
fissionable materials to protect national security and to insure the broadest possible
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exploitation of the field”; and 6) To create an international policy concerning atomic
energy.  In addition, the authors of the Act allowed sufficient opportunities for Congress
to modify the legislation pending future developments in the field of atomic energy.  15
The act made clear distinctions between the prerogatives of the federal government and
the role of the private sector in atomic research.  While the private sector including the
scientific community, universities, and industry would participate, the federal government
held a monopoly in the production of fissionable materials.  Congress and the president
granted the federal government primacy in the field of atomic energy and confirmed that
national security and secrecy took priority over all other considerations.  For example,
according to historian Jack Holl, within the new national laboratories system “national
security asserted precedence in all areas: reactor development, physical research, biology,
and medicine, and even in the esoteric field of high energy physics.”  Nearly all of
Argonne’s efforts in 1952, Holl continued, sought to augment “America’s nuclear
muscle.”  16
For his part, army chief of staff Eisenhower supported the McMahon Bill.  “I
became very actively involved in the discussions both with the Senate Committee and
with several members of the Government,” Eisenhower explained to Secretary Patterson,
“my position has been that the terms of the McMahon Bill are acceptable to the General
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Staff.”   Eisenhower believed “that the security interests of the United States can be17
protected sufficiently under that bill” and it “gives us plenty of authority all the way
through to protect our position until there is something else done.”   Eisenhower18
explained further that President Truman had already expressed his general approval of the
Atomic Energy Act and that left the military “no recourse but to continue in our stand that
it is acceptable to us.”19
In the eight years between the adoption of the first Atomic Energy Act in 1946
and President Eisenhower’s request for revisions in early 1954, the atomic energy
industry in the United States grew significantly.  When the Soviet Union exploded its
own atomic bomb in 1949, President Truman authorized the full-scale pursuit of the
fusion bomb which commenced in earnest under the direction of Edward Teller and
resulted in the first thermonuclear detonation in 1952.  For purposes of the Cold War, the
United States now required adequate numbers of both types of weapons, fission and
fusion.  Money, facilities, scientists, tests, and secrecy all increased.  The production of
atomic materials accelerated and the number of available atomic weapons grew as well. 
In addition to the concerns over national security and the growing atomic infrastructure,
the idea that atomic energy must be for the benefit and not simply the destruction of
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humankind persisted.  From 1947 until the time of Eisenhower’s inauguration, the quest
for atomic power for industrial and public purposes made slow but steady progress. 
When Dwight Eisenhower assumed the presidency in January 1953, he expressed
deep concern that so much initiative, effort, money, and resources had been poured into a
technology intended only for destructive use.  Speaking before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors in April 1953, Eisenhower highlighted this worry.  In the eight years
since the end of World War II, he told his audience, fear and force had dominated the
global community.  The Soviet Union had turned the world down the path of dread with
only a few options open to the United States and the free world.  “The worst to be feared
and the best to be expected can be simply stated,” he noted, “The worst is atomic war.”20
The best seemed only slightly better: “a life of perpetual fear and tension; a burden of
arms draining the wealth and the labor of all peoples; a wasting of strength that defied the
American system or the Soviet system or any system to achieve true abundance and
happiness for the peoples of this earth.”  He cited the price.  “The cost of one modern
heavy bomber is this: a modern brick school in more than 30 cities.  It is two electric
power plants, each serving a town of 60,000 population.  It is two fine, fully equipped
hospitals.  It is some 50 miles of concrete highway.”  One fighter plane cost 500,000
bushels of wheat; one destroyer cost homes for 8,000 people.  “The sweat of [the world’s]
laborers, the genius of its scientists, the hopes of its children” were sacrificed on “a cross
of iron” leaving behind the hungry and cold people of the earth with no hope for
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“not a way of life at all.”21
Eisenhower proposed initial steps toward reducing “the burden of armaments now
weighing upon the world.”   He hoped to agree with Soviet leaders to limit the numbers22
of weapons and he also advocated “international control of atomic energy to promote its
use for peaceful purposes only and to insure the prohibition of atomic weapons.”   This23
would allow America “to dedicate our strength to serving the needs, rather than the fears,
of the world.”   While he expressed a desire to reduce both expenditures on and numbers24
of atomic weapons among the world’s nations, he argued that atomic technology needed
to serve peaceful and hopeful purposes as well.  Just as atomic fission brought the risk for
great death and destruction so too did it bring the opportunity for peaceful pursuits.  So
far, the world had seen only the dark side of atomic technology, and the growing Cold
War between the United States and the Soviet Union made the threat of atomic
destruction more likely.  The president recognized this cruel irony: “In the minds of most
people this new energy was equated with the atomic bomb, and the bomb spelled the
erasure of cities and the mass death of men, women, and children.”  Eisenhower
despaired that the bomb’s “awesome destructiveness overshadowed its potential for
good.”   25
Stalin’s death, the advent of the thermonuclear weapon, and the growing
 Ibid., 789-90.26
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likelihood that the next war might be the last war prompted Eisenhower to search for an
alternative atomic future which involved the exploitation of atomic technology for the
greater good.   “The free world is still overwhelmingly strong as compared to the Iron
Curtain countries,” Eisenhower told an Iowa crowd, “in the people we have, in their
levels of intelligence and understanding, in their skills, in agriculture, and in industry; in
their free adherence to a cause, rather than in regimented adherence to a government.”  26
Despite the ominous applications of atomic technology, Eisenhower believed that by
employing fission and fusion properly, in civilian power plants as well as for other
peaceful purposes, the nation could augment her strength, serve the cause of peace, and
do so without wasting American intellectual and scientific resources. 
b.  Civilian Nuclear Power
Throughout his presidency, Eisenhower placed a high priority of the development
of atomic energy for electrical power.  He sought a balance between atomic weapons for
national security and atomic energy for economic and industrial development.  In that
effort, he believed that private industry should be given every opportunity to succeed in
the realm of atomic power because private industry could do so more effectively, more
quickly, and at less cost to the American tax payer.  Accordingly, Eisenhower instructed
Lewis Strauss, the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy Affairs from
1953 to 1959, to work with the Atomic Energy Commission to prepare amendments to
the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 to allow for the private development of atomic power. 
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According to Hewlett and Holl, Eisenhower sought “to break the government monopoly”
on atomic energy and “to find some redeeming value in nuclear technology.”27
For Eisenhower, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 hampered progress in the
development of private atomic power.  Tight restrictions on the flow of scientific and
technical knowledge greatly limited any entity other than the U.S. government from
making any headway in developing atomic power.  As army chief of staff Eisenhower had
supported the Atomic Energy Act because he believed it provided the military with the
means to promote American national security.  But as a civilian he concluded that “in
order to strengthen national security through a sound industry, it is essential that
Government ownership of production facilities” be terminated.   Eisenhower wanted the28
Commission to provide advice, assistance, and incentives to private companies pursuing
atomic energy.   To accomplish this, Eisenhower believed the law needed to be changed. 29
As Strauss prepared those revisions, Eisenhower took his argument about the need
for peaceful atomic energy and the growth of industrial strength to the United Nations in
December 1953.  “The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no
dream of the future,” he noted.  “Who can doubt, if the entire body of the world’s
scientists and engineers had adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test
and develop their ideas,” he wondered, “that this capability would rapidly be transformed
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 1, 820-21.30




into universal, efficient, and economic usage.”  To this end, Eisenhower sought “to hasten
the day when the fear of the atom will begin to disappear from the minds of people.”  He
offered proposals aimed at creating an international bank of fissionable material and
suggested the application of atomic energy “to the needs of agriculture, medicine, and
other peaceful activities.”  “A special purpose would be to provide abundant electrical
energy in the power starved areas of the world,” he envisioned.  Eisenhower concluded
that the “contributing powers would be dedicating some of the strength to serve the needs
rather than the fears of mankind.”30
Two months later, Eisenhower spoke to his nation about the need to change the
Atomic Energy Act.  In glowing terms, the president explained the promise of atomic
power and the heretofore unrealized dream of cheap energy for America and the world. 
“The destiny of all nations during the twentieth century will turn in large measure upon
the nature and pace of atomic energy development here and abroad,” Eisenhower told the
Congress.   Yet so far, the “rich possibilities” for atomic energy remained unfulfilled.  31 32
Though “economic industrial power from atomic energy” was clearly within reach,
restrictions placed on the community of atomic scientists had impeded the proper
development of atomic power.   The United States had so far seen little return in the33
quest for the peaceful atom because only the government was allowed to pursue scientific
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and technological discovery.  Eisenhower wanted to make good use of “the enterprise,
initiative and competitive spirit of individuals and groups within our free economy” to
make the dream of atomic energy a reality.   He believed that peaceful applications of34
atomic energy “can be developed more rapidly and their benefits more widely realized
through broadened cooperation with friendly nations and through greater participation by
American industry.”   He sought to create a favorable climate in which American private35
industry could capitalize on atomic energy to give strength to the United States and the
free world.  Private initiative would expand opportunities for exploration and innovation
in atomic energy, and private corporations would find financial interest in the pursuit of
the best way to provide atomic energy to consumers.  According to the administration,
medical, agricultural, and industrial applications of atomic energy would soon follow.  36
After private industry found atomic energy to be a profitable and responsible business
model, the federal government could slowly cut back its own atomic energy efforts,
saving taxpayer dollars, and reducing the size of the federal bureaucracy.   37
To give the new initiative a jumpstart, Eisenhower recommended that the Atomic
Energy Commission supply the necessary materials and services at cost to private
manufacturers.   “I asked the Congress for legislation to permit the private manufacture,38
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ownership, and operation of atomic reactors,” Eisenhower remembered, “under licensing
systems administered by the Atomic Energy Commission.”   Under Eisenhower’s39
direction, Strauss worked with the Atomic Energy Commission and the Joint
Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, and particularly with Congressman W.
Sterling Cole and Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, to agree on the proper language to
achieve the desired result.  In the end, the proposed revisions reflected a consensus
between the Eisenhower administration, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint
Congressional Committee.   The Congress approved the changes, and the president40
signed the new law on August 30, 1954. 
The revised legislation established that “the development, use, and control of
atomic energy shall be directed so as to promote world peace, improve the general
welfare, increase the standard of living, and strengthen free competition in private
enterprise.”  To achieve these goals, Eisenhower aimed to create “a program of
conducting, assisting, and fostering research and development in order to encourage
maximum scientific and industrial progress”    In the distribution of fissionable material,41
“preference shall be given to those activities which are most likely, in the opinion of the
Commission, to contribute to basic research, to the development of peacetime uses of
atomic energy, or to the economic and military strength of the Nation.”   Under the new42
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law, the Atomic Energy Commission could grant licenses to private companies to
construct and run electrical power plants fueled by nuclear materials.  The Commission
would not be allowed to build nuclear reactors with the purpose of selling the resulting
power to the public.  Instead, the Commission would supply the license and the fissile
material, and private companies would invest in construction and maintenance of the
plant itself and in distribution of the electrical power produced.  These companies could
then earn profits and pay dividends to stockholders.  The time had come, Eisenhower
argued in his statement at the signing, for the “initiative and resources of private industry”
to be put to work in the national atomic energy program.  43
Eisenhower also pursued amendments to the Atomic Energy Act because he
wanted greater authority to share nuclear information with the British.   The new44
legislation also removed the restrictions on sharing information with America’s allies,
specifically Great Britain.  According to historian John Baylis, Eisenhower believed the
United States owed Great Britain something for holding off the Nazis for so long as well
as for British help in developing the bomb.  More importantly, a strong, stable, nuclear-
equipped Britain would go a long way toward making the rest of Western Europe better
prepared to defend themselves against the Soviets.  The United States could not afford to
defend Western Europe indefinitely, Eisenhower believed, and the quicker Europe turned
into a “third power block,” the soon the United States could improve its domestic
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economic situation.  45
Eisenhower understood that the peaceful applications of atomic power could also
provide strength in the form of inexpensive, private nuclear power for both America and
the developing world.  “As I sign this bill,” he told the nation at the signing ceremony, “I
am confident that it will advance both public and private development of atomic energy –
that it will thus lead to greater national strength – and that programs undertaken as a
result of this new law will help us progress more rapidly to the time when this new source
of energy will be wholly devoted to the constructive purposes of man.”   Greater national46
strength was Eisenhower’s priority, a goal more quickly achieved by allowing the
entrepreneurial spirit of American industry to work freely.  The new act created a more
liberal atomic marketplace where individuals and industry could compete against each
other and against the market to produce electrical power through splitting or fusing the
atom.  The country suffered from a lack of atomic opportunities, and “by enlarging
opportunities for peacetime development,” Eisenhower proclaimed, “we accelerate our
own progress and strengthen the free world.”   He hoped that appropriate legislation47
would release the stored energy of American innovation and propel the United States into
that era of progress and peace.  By amending the original Atomic Energy Act only a year
into his first term, Eisenhower sought to achieve the connected goals of achieving civilian
nuclear power and supporting America’s national strength.  One week after the signing of
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the new Atomic Energy Act Eisenhower presided over the groundbreaking ceremony for
the construction of the Shippingport Atomic Power Plant in Pennsylvania.  Shippingport
would not be the best example of private atomic power as Eisenhower envisioned it, but
it would be a start.  Disagreements among Atomic Energy Commission members, the
Congress, and private industry over funding as well as what type of nuclear reactor to be
built caused confusion and delay in the construction of the first private nuclear power
plant.  
In the late summer of 1953, the Atomic Energy Commission adopted a five-year
program that was intended to get the ball rolling on nuclear power plant production in the
United States.  This program included five separate plant projects, three of which were
under direct government control, two at the Argonne National Laboratory and one at Oak
Ridge.  As the only example of private development, North American Aviation, with
financing from the Commission, pursued a fourth project, a sodium-graphite reactor.  The
fifth reactor project was a pressurized-water reactor.   For this project the Atomic Energy48
Commission solicited bids from private industry to work with the Commission.  The
Commissioners ultimately accepted the bid of the Duquesne Light Company of Pittsburgh
in part because the company offered to absorb about $30 million worth of associated
costs.  According to Hewlett and Holl, “Duquesne offered to provide the site, build the
turbogenerator plant, and operate and maintain the entire facility.  The company also
agreed to assume $5 million of the cost of developing and building the reactor, which
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Westinghouse would design and the Commission would own.”   The government would49
provide the fissile material and build the reactor.  In the end, Shippingport was a
“government project with only a limited role for private industry.”50
In his remarks at the ground breaking on September 6, 1954, Eisenhower
described the goal of the Shippingport Plant.  Although the plant was not a purely private
venture, the United States had moved closer to the goal of private electrical power by an
atomic reactor.  The venture opened “new avenues to constructive employment, to
prosperity, to respite from burdensome toil,” he explained.  The atom had become man’s
“mighty servant and tireless benefactor” and brought mankind one step closer to “the
ancient dream of a new and better earth.”   Eisenhower made the dream even more51
palatable as he dedicated the Shippingport Plant in Pittsburgh from his summer home in
Denver through the wave of an “atomic wand” which set a bulldozer in motion from
thousands of miles away.   A little over three years later on December 2, 1957, the52
Shippingport reactor reached near-critical mass.  Two weeks later, Shippingport reached
full power and began producing 60 megawatts of electricity.  It was the first full-scale
atomic power plant to operate in the United States.53
Overall, Eisenhower’s efforts to achieve civilian atomic power produced
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substantial results.  Various experimental reactors began operating during Eisenhower’s
second term, including the experimental boiling water reactor, BORAX III, in Arco,
Idaho in July 1955 and the Sodium Reactor Experiment in Santa Ana, California in July
1957.   Construction had begun on pressurized-water reactors by Yankee Atomic Electric
in Massachusetts, by Consolidated Edison of New York, and by Pennsylvania Light and
Power in Liberty, Pennsylvania.  In addition, Rural Co-Op Power Association of
Minnesota began construction of a boiling-water reactor.  Nuclear superheat reactors,
organic-cooled reactors, sodium-cooled fast reactors, gas-cooled reactors, and heavy
water reactors were in design, under construction, or operating from California to Illinois. 
Pathfinder Northern States Power Company of Sioux Falls, South Dakota, Pacific Gas
and Electric of Humboldt, California and a host of others sought to create atomic power
for the American people.   At the close of Eisenhower’s second term, ten atomic power54
plants operated in the United States.  Between the U.S. government and private industry,
twenty-two more plants were in the early stages production, and universities across the
nation operated thirty teaching reactors.  55
Eisenhower sincerely believed in the benefits of atomic power for the nation.  His
efforts to spur the development of inexpensive electrical power from atomic reactors was
not a gimmick, nor was it meant as a distraction from the potential horrors of atomic
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war.   Atomic science and technology provided the U.S. a marvelous opportunity to56
increase the efficiency of electric power and at the same time to reduce the cost.  He
understood that inexpensive electric power might remake the landscape of the United
States.  Both businesses and citizens in rural areas across the nation could now benefit
from affordable power.  American industry required reliable electrical power.  Without a
steady supply, machines go idle, production ceases, and business collapses.  Even worse,
any interruption in industrial production meant similar consequences to the American
economy as a whole.  Cutbacks translated into unemployment, inflation, and depression. 
Eisenhower did not foresee an immediate crisis, but thought the prudent approach was to
diversify America’s electrical infrastructure with atomic power.  Facing a determined and
rising enemy in the Cold War, the industrial strength provided by atomic power would
serve to augment America’s cumulative national strength.  
c.  The Promise of Nuclear Science
In addition to civilian atomic power, Eisenhower believed that atomic technology
could provide industrial strength in a variety of other ways.  Though none of these other
nuclear initiatives bore fruit during or after his term in the way civilian atomic power did,
Eisenhower envisioned something akin to the atomic utopia first imagined in the days
after Hiroshima and before the Soviet atomic bomb.  As Paul Boyer noted, scientists,
politicians, philosophers and others believed in those early days that atomic technology
could be put to great use in everyday life and the result would be a more comfortable and
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more convenient world.  “We live in one of the great ages in the story of mankind,”
Eisenhower told the nation in November 1957.  “For millions of people science has
removed the burden of backbreaking toil.  For other millions the hope of a good life is
being translated into a definite promise,” he continued.57
On November 7, 1957, only a few hysterical weeks after the launching of the
earth’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik I, Eisenhower spoke to the American people on the
subject of science and national security.  He boasted of America’s military strength and
cited several examples of scientific developments that served the nation.  Ballistic
missiles, nuclear-powered submarines, an atomic depth bomb, aircraft, and artillery
pieces were all either powered by or dependent upon an atomic weapon for their deterrent
effect.  Soviet aggression forced America to build this magnificent arsenal, Eisenhower
lamented.  Though Sputnik suggested that the Soviets possessed superior satellite
technology and “are quite likely ahead in some missile and special areas,” the overall
military strength of the free world proved far superior.  But freedom required that the
United States continue to match and indeed beat the communists “in military power,
general technological advance, and specialized education and research.”  Scientific
research and development made this military strength possible, and Eisenhower promised
the nation“to put current scientific discovery at the service of your defense.”   58
Eisenhower also forecast the long range investments required to insure the nation
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friends” argued that a failure to place high priority on scientific education risked the
future of America’s freedom.   He announced changes and new initiatives.  Most of these59
involved America’s ballistic missile program, but they also included the creation of the
Special Assistant for Science and Technology and ultimately the President’s Scientific
Advisory Committee.   “I am not forgetting that there is much more to science than its60
function in strengthening our defense,” he remarked.   61
Another critical need, Eisenhower explained, was to give “higher priority, both
public and private, to basic research.”   He believed this investment in time, resources,62
and effort would foster a healthy and robust scientific community.  American citizens
who specialized in scientific disciplines held long-term promise for the nation’s
intellectual future. “Talent and quality are vital to our national strength,” he explained,
“they are the ingredients needed to carry us onward and upward to higher peaks of
achievement in science as well as in the non-material world of the mind and the spirit.”  63
Certainly American scientists would be able to make contributions to military strength as
they had in the past, but Eisenhower also imagined a strong scientific community
contributing to general prosperity and peace.  In this effort, he planned to strengthen
America’s commitment to basic scientific research.  
Though he did not often articulate precisely what he thought the United States
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would gain from this research, he did suggest that basic science and the resulting
intellectual and scientific growth contributed much to America’s overall strength. 
Eisenhower told the nation that the first task confronting America in 1958 was “to ensure
our safety through strength.”  He noted the “potential resources on other non-military
fronts to help in countering the Soviet threat: education, science, research, and, not least,
the ideas and principles by which we live.”   “And in all these cases,” he continued, “the64
task ahead is to bring these resources more sharply to bear upon the new tasks of security
and peace in a swiftly changing world.”   He sought a doubling of National Science65
Foundation money to support basic science and to improve science education.   More66
specifically, he planned for nation-wide testing to insure success among high school
students, incentives for students to pursue scientific studies, more money for laboratories,
a rejuvenated teaching program for math and science, and fellowships for promising
young teachers in science fields.   “With this kind of all-inclusive campaign, I have no67
doubt that we create the intellectual capital we need for the years ahead,” Eisenhower
concluded.   With some modifications, additions, and subtractions, the Congress68
endorsed Eisenhower’s vision, and, on September 2, 1958, less than one year after
Sputnik, the president signed the National Defense Education Act.
Eisenhower’s concern about the state of basic science in the United States also led
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him to elevate science into a position of power within his own administration.  In late
1957, Eisenhower appointed James Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, to the newly created position of Special Assistant for Science and
Technology.  Killian became also the first head of the President’s Science Advisory
Committee (PSAC).  Eisenhower expected Killian, supported by the Committee, to
advise him and the National Security Council directly on those scientific matters that had
an impact on national security issues.  Eisenhower wanted independent and unfiltered
technical advice to allow him to manage better the scope of America’s resources for the
Cold War.  He wanted to understand the differences in competing missile systems, for
example, to determine which programs could be cut to save the already growing security
budget without a loss of national strength.  He also needed advice on research and
development in the Department of Defense and for negotiating a ban on nuclear testing.69
Both the National Defense Education Act and the President’s Science Advisory
Committee brought basic science to the highest levels of government and solidified
Eisenhower’s commitment to fulfill the great promise of the atomic age.  A new atomic
lifestyle seemed both desirable and within reach.  A future atomic utopia might finally
realize the most abstract and greatest dreams of many Americans.  These dreams included
cars, planes, trains, and ships running on small amounts of uranium or plutonium and
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requiring no refueling.  Many believed that atomic technology also would bring
heretofore unthought of products and services to serve mankind.  Others imagined a
wealth of everyday industrial applications for atomic energy which would benefit from
limitless, cheap, and safe power.  Eisenhower saw multiple applications for atomic energy
and believed that each could contribute to the industrial strength of the United States. 
One project which served both industrial and psychological goals was the atomic-
powered peace ship, which Eisenhower proposed to his staff in May 1955.  The president
imagined an atomic-powered merchant vessel which would serve both as a tramp steamer
and a harbinger of the peaceful atom throughout the world.  The steamer could carry
cargo from port to port across the globe and offer “exhibits of peaceful uses of atomic
energy to be viewed by the people of each country in the ports visited by the ship.”   An70
atomic reactor would provide power for the vessel which could crisscross the world’s
oceans without stopping to refuel for a period of up to two years.  In addition to its
payload of industrial and commercial goods, the atomic peace ship might also be
constructed to carry passengers.  Eisenhower dreamed of luxurious quarters for VIPs who
could see first hand the peaceful uses of atomic power.   71
In a press conference of May 31, 1955, Eisenhower explained the value of the
peace ship.  “It is true, as I visualize it, it will be a peaceful ship with many an exhibition
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really of American culture, of the arts and industry,” the president explained.  “On top of
that, I would hope that it would actually carry cargo as it went around the world on
unscheduled runs, be ready to pick up such cargoes it could, so that everybody could see
it performing a useful service in the world,” he continued.  The peace ship would also
serve as an exhibition of American industrial know-how.72
Eisenhower lobbied Congress to approve funding for his atomic peace ship.  He
considered it a valuable venture both for its psychological value and for its industrial
applications for the future.   He believed that “apart from the psychological and political73
advantages of such a ship, we would almost certainly learn a lot of practical value from
the construction and operation of such a nuclear-propelled ship.”   This might translate74
into the building of many nuclear-powered vessels.  If in the future atomic reactors
powered all steam ships, international trade and commerce would be greatly served by the
reduced costs and increased pace of global shipping.  Eisenhower had so much faith in
the overall value of the atom peace ship that the project made it onto the Republican Party
Platform for the 1956 election.  “We should proceed with the prompt construction of the
Atomic Powered Peace Ship in order that we may demonstrate to the world, in this as in
other fields, the peaceful uses of the atom,” the Party agreed.   Eisenhower remarked that75
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he had “bled his eyes out” begging with Congressional leaders for the peace ship, but the
project did not materialize.  The atom peace ship was “a completely worth-while project
that Congress had refused to approve,” Sherman Adams remembered.76
Beyond the peace ship, Eisenhower envisioned other industrial tasks for atomic
weapons, many of which stemmed directly from Project Plowshare.  As early as 1955,
Manhattan Project veteran and unofficial “father of the hydrogen bomb,” Edward Teller,
excited Eisenhower with the possibility that clean atomic bombs might be used for a
variety of peaceful purposes.   Along with other scientists, including Herbert York and77
Harold Brown, Teller convened a classified conference of top national scientists at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in California in February 1957.  Teller opened
the conference by suggesting that nuclear explosions might increase the “temptation to
shoot at the Moon.”   At the conference, scientists explored other possibilities for nuclear78
explosives including the creation of diamonds, the search for oil, and landscaping on a
massive scale.  Eisenhower and Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Lewis Strauss
accepted the arguments of Teller and allowed the unnamed initiative to grow quickly in
the months after that February conference.  Not until after July 1957 was the project with
these lofty goals named Plowshare.  Isidor Rabi had skeptically commented to Harold
Brown that nuclear scientists like Brown and Teller now wanted to beat their bombs into
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plowshares, alluding to a passage in the biblical book of Micah.79
Plowshare advocates believed that the project’s success depended primarily upon
the availability of clean nuclear weapons.  In theory, clean bombs would produce little or
no radioactive fallout because they would produce no residual radiation.  Fission
reactions produce energy in several forms.  Blast comprises approximately 50 percent of
that energy while thermal radiation or heat comprises another 35 percent.  Fast neutrons
or prompt radiation makes up 5 percent with the remaining 10 percent coming from
residual radiation.  This residual radiation is responsible for fallout.  Thermonuclear
reactions do not produce residual radiation inherently, but because fission reactions are
needed to prime the thermonuclear bomb, both fission and fusion weapons produced
radioactive fallout.  Clean bomb advocates held that clean versions of both fission and
fusion weapons would produce energy in only two forms: 20 percent blast and 80 percent
prompt radiation.   No residual radiation meant no radioactive fallout.  If a fallout-free80
atomic explosion were possible, it would open up a range of potential industrial uses as
the proximity of the explosion to civilian populations now seemed not to matter.  
The idea of a clean nuclear bomb intrigued Eisenhower.  On June 24, 1957,
Edward Teller, Ernest O. Lawrence, and Mark Mills visited President Eisenhower in the
White House on the invitation of Strauss.   Only ten days earlier, the Soviet Union had81
publicly proposed a moratorium on nuclear testing, and Eisenhower was considering
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accepting the Soviet offer.  For the scientists, the principal goal of the meeting was to
persuade Eisenhower to continue nuclear testing in the United States.  They argued that
recent progress indicated how close scientists had come to developing a clean nuclear
weapon.  They told the president they had already succeeded in producing an “over 90
percent clean” weapon and needed only “six or seven years” to reach 100 percent clean.  82
To stop now, according to Lawrence, would be a “crime against humanity.”   83
The scientists apparently convinced Eisenhower at least for the time.  “No one
could oppose the development program [the scientists] had described,” the president
remarked.  He recognized that the delicate international situation he might create if the
United States hesitated to stop nuclear testing when the Soviets had already done so.  The
prospect of clean nuclear weapons and peaceful applications of atomic technology
warranted a reorientation of public opinion regarding nuclear testing.  Eisenhower
became convinced that in order to continue development of peaceful nuclear technology
nuclear testing needed to continue despite the risk to American disarmament and test ban
efforts.  He proclaimed that he would not allow America to be “crucified on a cross of
atoms” for failing to stop nuclear testing.84
To continue the required testing, Eisenhower needed to convince the world that no
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new harm to humanity would come from the clean tests.   Eisenhower wanted to make85
the three scientists available to the press, and he instructed Press Secretary Hagerty to
make it happen.   For his part, if asked at his next press conference why the U.S. had so86
far refused to stop testing, Eisenhower would “simply say that our tests are projected to
clean up weapons and thus protect civilians in the event of war.”   In a press conference87
two days later on June 26, The New York Times wanted to know Eisenhower’s thinking
on the suspension of nuclear testing.   He recounted his meeting with Teller and88
Lawrence and repeated the successful tests of 90 percent clean bombs and the likelihood
of 100 percent clean bombs in “four or five years.”  Eisenhower recited the arguments of
his scientists and connected nuclear testing directly with the progress on the peaceful
development of atomic science.  “So you realize that when you are making these
agreements to stop [nuclear tests],” Eisenhower explained, “you are not doing something
that may not have an adverse effect, finally, on what we hope to get out of this.” 
Eisenhower wanted to get “the best out of this new science for the peaceful uses of
mankind” and accordingly, he argued, “we should go right ahead with the plan” to
continue testing until an acceptable agreement with enforceable safeguards was
successfully negotiated.   89
Despite his enthusiasm for clean bombs and the possibility that they might limit
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 Scott Kirsch, Proving Grounds: Project Plowshare and the Unrealized Dream91
of Nuclear Earthmoving (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2005), 33.
 George B. Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House: The Private Diary of92
President Eisenhower’s Special Assistant for Science and Technology, introduction by
Charles S. Maier (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976), 365.
 Goodchild, The Real Dr. Strangelove, 285.93
 Kirsch, Proving Grounds, 38.94
210
civilian casualties in a thermonuclear war, he doubted publicly that clean bombs were
even weapons.  “If you had this clean, completely clean, product,” the president told John
Scali of the Associated Press, “I should think that in building of tunnels or, you might
say, moving mountains, and that sort of thing, you could have many economical, useful,
peaceful purposes for the thing.”  “Of course,” Eisenhower continued, “you wouldn’t
want to deny civilization the opportunity of using it” by incorrectly classifying it as a
weapon.   Eisenhower’s hope in the clean nuclear bomb grew from his meeting with90
Teller, Lawrence, and Mills into seventy-seven nuclear tests in only the first ten months
of 1958.   Eisenhower endorsed Plowshare wholeheartedly and according to his scientific91
advisor, George Kistiakowsky, he thought Plowshare was “terribly important.”  92
Eisenhower was further convinced by the success of a particular nuclear test in the
late summer of 1957.   Rainier, one of the last shots of the Plumbob test series, detonated93
at 1900 feet underground and yielded only 1.7 kilotons.  Willard Libby, Nobel prize-
winning chemist and Atomic Energy commissioner, testified before a Senate
Subcommittee that the blast bumped the mountain up about six inches and no
radioactivity escaped.   “There was no mushroom cloud, no fall-out radioactive or94
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otherwise,” Strauss gleefully remembered.   Not only did Rainier seem clean, but the95
technical evaluation of the Rainier shot confirmed for Strauss that underground nuclear
tests would be difficult to detect.  In short, Rainier suggested that it might possible to
conceal atomic explosions underground.   Like Teller, Strauss believed that if a country96
insisted on testing despite agreeing to a moratorium, the Rainier shot proved they could
do so without detection.  Rainier confirmed that a nuclear test moratorium could benefit
the Soviet Union and the United States should avoid an agreement and continue testing
out of a desire to improve America’s defense capability.97
Beyond this, Strauss found in Rainier another reason to continue nuclear testing. 
The test demonstrated that clean underground nuclear explosions could advance the goals
of Operation Plowshare.   Without the contaminating effects of radioactive fallout,98
nuclear explosions held great potential for moving earth and clearing land for a variety of
industrial applications.  Plowshare excavation projects involved the blasting away of
earth to construct harbors, build highways, open pit mines, and allow for the construction
of dams.  Nuclear explosions might also create massive holes for natural gas and oil
storage.   In addition, to liberate petroleum reserves from the earth, nuclear blasts might99
fracture stubborn oil shales in places such as Colorado, Utah, and Wyoming.   These100
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projects greatly intrigued Eisenhower, particularly the possibility that nuclear explosions
might provide an inexpensive means of recovering oil.  At a PSAC meeting in July 1958,
Eisenhower questioned Dr. Wolfgang Panofsky whether the Committee had considered
atomic weapons for the recovery of oil from tar sands.   The following October,101
Eisenhower pressed the issue of using atomic explosions to recover oil in a National
Security Council Meeting.   102
One Plowshare project involved the use of atomic explosions to dig a new Central
American canal to connect the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean.  This second canal would be
under American control like the one in Panama but, unlike the Panama canal, it would be
dug and built at sea level.  This would eliminate the need for locks as well as the resulting
bottleneck.  The Panama Canal was built above sea level because of the presence of a
huge amount of tough rock immediately below the canal’s location.  To build the new
canal, Plowshare advocates estimated that twenty-six nuclear bombs totaling 16.7
megatons of explosive power would be able to blast away the rock and debris and
eliminate the need for locks.   “From a remark of the president, I gather that he intends103
to address the UN general Assembly,” Kistiakowsky remembered, “and at that time
(September) announce that we are going ahead with the Plowshare program for digging a
 Kistiakowsky, A Scientist at the White House, 365.  Kistiakowsky mistakenly104
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second Atlantic-Pacific canal through Mexico, which has agreed to the project.”  104
Eisenhower authorized a detailed study of the project that was completed and presented to
him in 1960.  Proposals for the Isthmian Canal suggested several possible locations, all of
which promised a financial benefit for the nation.  In 1947, the cheapest estimates for
digging this canal ranged up to $2.3 billion.  With Plowshare, a sea-level canal through
Panama would cost $770 million and another through Colombia about $1.2 billion. 
Plowshare might save the United States between $1 and $1.5 billion beyond the economic
advantages of multiple, American-controlled routes from one ocean to another.105
For Eisenhower, Plowshare held potential for even more industrial uses.  At the
Second International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva in
September 1958, American scientists, including Teller, brought with them a short film
titled “Industrial Applications of Nuclear Explosives.”  One potential industrial use, the
film suggested, was the construction of an “instant harbor” in an unidentified coastal area
using 1.4 megatons worth of nuclear explosives.   “The world needs more harbors and106
canals,” Teller wrote in 1962, “There is much too little protection for big ocean-going
vessels along the western shores of South America and Africa.”  “More water
transportation, because it is the cheapest form of transportation, would speed the
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development of backward countries, would increase trade, and would strengthen ties
between people,” Teller concluded.   Not only did America require the industrial107
strength for the Cold War augmented by Plowshare, but “Plowshare was needed as a tool
of Third World development in order to prevent the spread of Soviet communism.”108
Between the Soviet proposal to stop testing in June 1957 and the American
moratorium in October 1958, Plowshare planning continued.  With Eisenhower’s
blessing, Strauss pursued and won larger budgets for Plowshare through the end of June
1958, including $6 million for Fiscal Year 1960.   Scientists at the Lawrence Livermore109
Radiation Laboratory sought early on to take the experiments out of the lab and into the
field for full-scale demonstration.   In late 1957, scientists chose a remote coastal110
location in northwest Alaska to excavate an instant harbor with nuclear explosives.  The
project was named Chariot.  The particular location at the mouth of Ogotoruk Creek on
Cape Thompson was chosen because a deep water port was possible in that location. 
Additionally, the area around Cape Thompson was composed of solid bedrock, not
permafrost, allowing for the immediate and relatively simple construction of railroads,
roads, pipelines, and large-scale industrial sites.   According to the Atomic Energy111
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Commission, “the absence of harbors on the northwest coast of Alaska close to important
large-scale mineral deposits has in the past hampered development of such deposits.”  112
Nuclear excavation provided both the opportunity to extricate these mineral resources and
to ship them out to market quickly and cheaply via a new harbor.  Teller explained to
skeptical crowds that Livermore Scientists and the Atomic Energy Commission wanted
“not just a hole in the ground, but something that will be used.”   Eisenhower delighted113
in “the wonderful prospects of this project” and despite the testing moratorium still
desired “to proceed with this type of experimental development work.”   Unfortunately114
for Eisenhower, the scientific community did not develop soon enough the clean bomb
technology that Teller had promised, and Project Plowshare never developed as
advertised, particularly after funding cuts through the 1960s and 1970s.
Nonetheless, Plowshare represented precisely what Eisenhower envisioned of
atomic energy for industrial strength.  Clean nuclear technology provided greater
opportunity for industrial development, from the recovery of oil stores and mineral
resources to the construction of instant harbors and underground natural gas storage. 
These and a host of other potential excavation-related uses buoyed Eisenhower’s faith in
the industrial promise of nuclear science.  
In the end, Eisenhower’s attempt to use atomic energy to support industrial
strength produced mixed results.  On one hand, he created the National Science
216
Foundation to encourage and fund basic science in the nation.  He and the Congress
sought to improve dramatically math and science education in the United States through
the National Defense Education Act.  Eisenhower intended this investment to produce the
high quality of teachers and students needed to challenge Soviet scientific power in the
Cold War.  The proliferation of units in the national laboratory system and the increased
prominence of science in public life bolstered basic and applied scientific research in the
United States.  Rapid advances in technology and a thriving scientific community
resulted.  Eisenhower intended all of these efforts to serve the public good and more
specifically to serve the cause of strength in the Cold War.  On the other hand,
Eisenhower’s efforts also met failure in several key areas.  First, Congress refused to fund
the atomic-powered ship which Eisenhower thought would have served the cause of
peace through a demonstration of the peaceful applications of atomic energy as well as
through global trade and commerce.  American industry would likewise benefit.  Second,
scientists and engineers were unable to develop a clean nuclear weapon, and as a result,
the various applications envisioned in the Plowshare project proved unfeasible. 
Plowshare survived the Eisenhower presidency but never achieved the full results he
desired.
Eisenhower believed that the scientific advances of the atomic era promised great
opportunities to support American industrial strength.  He imagined a world not unlike
the most utopian atomic fantasies described in the days immediately following the end of
World War II.  Atomic energy was to provide limitless energy for industry.  He
understood that this industrial energy served to increase America’s overall strength.  In
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 2, 267, 269.115
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the midst of a Cold War with an immoral and expansionist enemy, strength was one trait
of which the nation could not have too much.  Whether to outlast or to defeat communism
in the Cold War, the United States required economic strength, military strength, and
industrial strength.  For Eisenhower, the atom supported the nation’s industrial strength
through the successful creation of civilian atomic power.  In addition, American industry
benefited from the major investment made by Eisenhower in atomic research.  The
president believed his scientific investment would return a variety of industrial
applications, all of which would buttress American industrial power.  He believed that
atomic energy must serve humanity in ways unrelated to weapon production.  He
accepted that atomic weapons served a great purpose as guarantors of national security
and peace in an age of great fear and uncertainty.  This primary function however must
not deter the United States from pursuing peaceful and positive applications of atomic
energy.  To balance the negative function of atomic weapons for deterrence, Eisenhower
pursued positive value in atomic energy.  “The beneficent use of atomic energy is human
service,” Eisenhower believed, and he expected “atomic energy development, public and
private, to play a full and effective part in leading mankind into a new era of progress and
peace.”115
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CHAPTER SIX: Bolstering Moral Strength
Eisenhower sought to use nuclear technology in keeping with his own and the
nation’s religious foundation.  He believed that nuclear weapons served a national
purpose.  They retained a certain righteousness that befitted and benefitted an American
republic sustained by a religious faith and characterized by moral behavior.  According to
Eisenhower, the nation needed this moral strength to wage and to win the war with
atheistic communism.  “If we are to be strong,” Eisenhower told the Freedoms
Foundation in December 1952, “we must be strong first in our spiritual convictions.”   He1
had few doubts about America’s military strength against the Soviets, particularly
considering the superiority of American atomic technology.  But, according to historian
Richard Immerman, other “problematic variables in the national security equation”
existed.  Those variables included economic production, trade with the third world, allied
relations, domestic morale, and “even less tangible, more spiritual considerations.”   “The2
United States does not rely on military strength alone to win the peace,” Eisenhower told
the Canadian Parliament in 1953.  “Our primary reliance is a unity among us forged of
common adherence to moral principles,” he continued, “this reliance binds together in
fellowship all those who believe in the spiritual nature of man, as the Child of God.”3
The United States needed strength for the long pull against communism,
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 5, 798-99.4
 “Letter to Bela Kornitzer,” March 17, 1955, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as5
President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Ann C. Whitman Diary, Box 4, March 1955
(4), DDE Library, 5.
219
Eisenhower believed, and only moral conviction provided the kind of sustainable strength
required.  “The spiritual powers of a nation – its underlying religious faith, its self-
reliance, its capacity for intelligent sacrifice – these are the most important stones in any
defense structure,” Eisenhower told the nation in 1957.   For Eisenhower, national4
strength grew from “the ability of free men to rule themselves when they are informed”
and free men and free forms of government depend “on some deeply felt religious faith.”  5
Eisenhower sought to increase American national strength for the Cold War by improving
America’s moral standing in the eyes of the world with the positive and peaceful use of
atomic technology.  Eisenhower believed that these uses included the pursuit of
disarmament, an end to nuclear testing, and the promotion of Atoms for Peace.
Eisenhower’s commitment to nuclear weapons as a means to peace was as sincere
as was his commitment to wage war with thermonuclear weapons if necessary.  To
Eisenhower, the two initiatives were not unrelated or contradictory.  Rather the quest for
peace through threat of war has existed from time immemorial and is symbolized by the
annual awarding of a peace prize named after the man who invented dynamite, Alfred
Nobel.  Nobel’s belief that dynamite might bring an end to war was not too dissimilar for
Eisenhower’s hope that nuclear weapons might also make war unwinnable and thus
undesirable.  Until that point, Eisenhower emphasized the moral correctness of the use of
nuclear weapons for national strength and security.  He believed that to advocate peace
 “Letter to Nancy Bierce,” April 4, 1960, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as6
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while building for war was not paradoxical but responsible.  It was not radical thinking
but common sense, not shameful but pious .  “I believe there is no mutual antagonism
between a nation’s faith in God and her determination to defend herself against attack,”
Eisenhower wrote.  He quoted the Gospel of St. Luke: “When a strong man, armed,
keepeth his palace, his goods are in peace.”  6
a. Eisenhower’s Crusading Religion
As president-elect in December 1952, Eisenhower advocated faith as a means to
wage the Cold War.  “Now, it seems to me that if we are going to win this fight we have
got to go back to the very fundamentals of all things,” Eisenhower explained, “and one of
them is that we are a religious people.”  Even those “silly” people who denied the
existence of an Almighty nonetheless lived in a “religious civilization,” he continued,
simply because “the Founding Fathers said it was a religious concept that they were trying
to translate into the political world.”  In the middle of the Cold War, the republic needed
strength to defend the nation against the scourge of communism in this great “ideological
war.”  Strength would demonstrate to other nations that “our leadership is not one of
imperialism, but is one of purity.  It is one of integrity, with a belief in the dignity of
 “Text of Eisenhower Speech,” New York Times, December 23, 1952, 16.7
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man.”   The calls for moral strength reverberated throughout Eisenhower’s two terms.  “I7
patiently explain over and over again,” Eisenhower wrote to a friend in 1956, “that
American strength is a combination of its economic, moral, and military force.”   8
Eisenhower’s emphasis upon moral strength stemmed in large part from his own
religious faith.  Robert Linder and Richard Pierard argued that Eisenhower’s childhood
religious experiences included Bible readings, moral piety, and steady church attendance. 
According to Pierard and Linder, Eisenhower was not baptized as a child because his
parents belonged to a Christian sect called the River Brethren which believed in baptism
only of believers.  His parents later joined the Jehovah’s Witnesses, but young Dwight
apparently did not follow.  After that, Linder and Pierard concluded that “the evidence is
far too sketchy to render a firm judgment” about his faith.  During his time at West Point
and through World War II, Eisenhower held a “transdenominational faith” not unlike that
“propagated through the military chaplaincy.”  Throughout the war his religious faith was9
reinforced by his belief in the goodness of the Allied cause during World War II and he
understood the war against Nazi tyranny to be a crusade, a sentiment so strong he titled
his memoir of World War II Crusade in Europe.   He believed that the freedom of10
individuals “was a value derived from their status as children of God” and that the Nazis
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sought to destroy that freedom and replace it with quasi-religious adherence to the
nation.   Later, Eisenhower would attribute a similar creed to the communists who11
abolished religion. 
Before 1952, Eisenhower did not belong officially to any specific church or
religious denomination.  He attended chapel occasionally while in the army but never
joined a church or established ties with a religious community.  He considered himself
“very earnestly and seriously religious” but never described himself as anything more
precise than a Christian.  “I have always sort of treasured my independence,” Eisenhower
told a friend, “because I like to note the differences in several Protestant denominations.” 
After the election of 1952, Eisenhower was baptized a Presbyterian and joined the
Presbyterian church.  “It is much easier to say ‘I am a Presbyterian’ than to say ‘I am
Christian but I do not belong to any denomination,’” Eisenhower explained.    When12
Eisenhower spoke of religion before and after his baptism, he made few distinctions
among persons of differing faiths.  “Our form of government has no sense unless it is
founded in a deeply felt religious faith,” Eisenhower argued just after his first presidential
election, “and I don’t care what it is.”   13
Eisenhower’s professions of faith during his presidency typify what scholars such
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as Pierard and Linder have called civil religion.   Within the context of the Cold War,14
Pierard and Linder argue that Eisenhower embarked on a journey to lead America’s
citizens to national greatness.  He yearned to lead the nation through the difficult early
years of the Cold War and growing American global responsibility.  The Republican
National Committee remarked that Eisenhower served as “the spiritual leader of our
times.”   Pierard and Linder described Eisenhower’s civil religion as pastoral. 15
Immediately before he gave his first inaugural address, Eisenhower read a prayer for
those in attendance:  “Almighty God, as we stand here at this moment my future
associates in the executive branch of government join me in beseeching that Thou will
make full and complete our dedication to the service of the people in this throng, and
their fellow citizens everywhere.”   After the inauguration, Eisenhower convened his16
new administration with a prayer and a speech in which he asked for God’s help in
guiding the people of the United States.  
The Cold War brought a new dimension to Eisenhower’s civil religion,
specifically an anti-communist element.  The battle against communism, Eisenhower
argued, did not result from a difference of political ideology alone but also religion. 
Whereas the United States was founded upon Christian values of peace, love, and
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forgiveness, atheism spread by Soviet communism led to moral depravity, violence,
pestilence, and dictatorship.  Pierard and Linder asserted that Eisenhower’s personal faith
“emphasized God as the wellspring of individual and national strength, government as
resting on a spiritual foundation, faith as a public virtue, and the utilitarian nature of
religion in the apocalyptic struggle against communism.”   His moral campaign against17
communism was rooted in his belief that humans were born free, and any individual or
institution seeking to destroy that freedom did so in defiance of God’s will.  
Jack Holl argues that Eisenhower was a deeply religious man who used prayer to
strengthen his sense of universal brotherhood.  The United States was a religious place, a
chosen place, and Eisenhower saw it as his responsibility to save the nation from the Cold
War and nuclear annihilation through a return to basic religious values.  According to
Holl, Eisenhower struggled with the divine and demonic in life, particularly the nuclear
weapon which had potential for both good and evil.   In 1955, Eisenhower explained that18
the atom “wears no nationality and recognizes no frontiers” and that it was “neither moral
nor immoral.”  “Only man’s choice can make it good or evil,” he argued.  19
In the Cold War, Eisenhower’s faith helped him understand what he saw as the
central difference between freedom and communism.  He noted the deep divide between
a society such as the United States in which the value of individual life was rooted in a
belief in the Almighty and one such as the Soviet Union where life was rooted in atheistic
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materialism.  “Basic to our democratic civilization are the principles and convictions that
have bound us together as a nation,” he told graduates of the Naval Academy in June
1958.   “Among these are personal liberty, human rights, and the dignity of man,” the
President continued, “all these have their roots in a deeply held religious faith–in a belief
in God.”  More importantly, Eisenhower argued that “These are the truths with which we
must combat the falsity of Communist materialistic doctrine . . . Free world respect for
them and Communist disdain for them are the very core of the struggle between
Communist imperialism and Western freedom.”  20
Eisenhower believed that the greatest threat to those divine rights was the spread
of international communism from its source in the Soviet Union.  “Atheism substitutes
men for the supreme creator,” he told a television audience in 1954, “and this leads
inevitably to domination and dictatorship.”  “It is because we believe that God intends all
men to be free and equal that we demand free government,” the president continued.  21
Because the communists were atheists, Eisenhower believed that they operated without a
moral compass, without proper respect for the lives of others, and without concern for the
future of their own world.  “All our laws are rooted in values very different from the
Soviets’,” Eisenhower concluded, for example, “we speak of ‘good faith’; they believe, as
part of their creed, in any form of deceit and treachery which advances the cause of
Communist domination.”   He concluded in 1954 that “the future is shadowed by22
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mushroom clouds and menaced by godless men addicted to force and violence and the
continuance of anarchy among nations.”23
Though he often chided the Soviets for their unthinking atheism, he maintained
his conviction about the nature of man.  As Joseph Stalin lay dying in March 1953,
Eisenhower helped craft a letter to the Soviet people.  “The thoughts of America go out to
all the peoples of the U.S.S.R.,” the president wrote.  “They are children of the same God
who is the Father of all peoples everywhere,” he continued.  “Regardless of the identity of
government personalities,” Eisenhower concluded, “the prayer of us Americans continues
to be that the Almighty will watch over the people of that vast country and bring them, in
His wisdom, opportunity to live their lives in a world where all men and women and
children dwell in peace and comradeship.”   Still, the absence of religion among24
communists in general and Soviet leaders in particular made them an unstable adversary. 
The president did not believe that he could anticipate Soviet actions or account for Soviet
thinking on matters of life and death because the Soviet atheistic world view contrasted
so greatly with his own.  “We have no basis for thinking that they abhor destruction as we
do,” Eisenhower told the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 1956.   As president, he could do very25
little to change this situation, but he could take the moral high ground in the struggle with
the communists.  
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Eisenhower believed that the nation needed to muster enough moral strength to
challenge the communist threat.  “And because of the threat imposed by a militant and
aggressive atheism,” he explained in 1958, “I believe that the strengthening of all phases
of our moral and spiritual foundations has a profound significance for the actual security
of our nation.”   The building of moral strength did not involve an iteration of Christian26
doctrine as part of a missionary impulse to convert the non-Christian world.  Rather,
Eisenhower believed that national moral strength developed from a combination of
secular American political rights such as speech, suffrage, and liberty and basic Christian
values such as peace, love, and forgiveness.  This blend manifested itself in a desire to
preserve the natural right of men to be free and in the pursuit of peace for all of God’s
creatures.  It was confirmed by a universal hope for a bright and better future. 
Throughout his presidency, when Eisenhower spoke of spirituality, religion, or faith in
the context of national strength, he referred to this general mix of secular and religious
values and described nothing more specific than basic human morality and social
responsibility inspired and sustained by a lasting faith in an Almighty god.  Within this
context, Eisenhower believed that the United States could use nuclear weapons and
nuclear energy to make peace among men and to foster hope for the future of the atomic
world.
b.  Disarmament through Deterrence
The increasing tension of the Cold War, the subsequent arms race between the
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Soviet Union and the United States, and the pursuit of nuclear weapons by Great Britain,
France, and China created a stable if uncertain system of nuclear deterrence among the
superpowers.  Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems improved during the 1950s
and by the end of the decade, the United States and the Soviet Union possessed enough
firepower to destroy one another completely.  As the Cold War deepened, both sides
understood that one could not attack the other and expect to achieve victory without
suffering catastrophic damage themselves.  The fear that any nuclear attack would prompt
a devastating counterattack and certain destruction on both sides discouraged either
superpower from initiating the next great war.  This system was known as deterrence.  
For Eisenhower, deterrence was a byproduct of the great scientific and
technological achievements of the period.  “We continued to build an overpowering
military establishment,” Eisenhower remembered, “as the only feasible defense against
the menace and probings of international Communism.”   Despite the need, Eisenhower27
still thought that “the building up of large arsenals was just absurd on both sides.”   The28
arms race and deterrence which resulted seemed likely to continue on “into the indefinite
future” with little prospect for anything other than a paralyzing fear among the peoples of
the world.   “Because each side possesses weapons of incalculable destructive power and29
with extraordinary efficiency in means of delivery,” Eisenhower understood, “world fears
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and tensions are intensified.”30
Eisenhower recognized that the United States suffered from a “hysterical fear” of
nuclear war, but he worried that the enemy might not forever share that sentiment.   If31
the fear dissipated, deterrence would falter, which would lead to a catastrophic nuclear
war.  In addition, fear itself might encourage the enemy to launch a first strike under the
presumption that an effective attack might nullify any response.  Deterrence depended
upon each side responding rationally to danger, and the system allowed no room for error. 
This balance of fear seemed unreliable, and, as a result, Americans lived in fear of nuclear
annihilation.  
For Eisenhower deterrence over the long term seemed both necessary and
unacceptable.  He hated that deterrence bred fear and uncertainty.  At any one point,
nuclear deterrence preserved the peace, but over the long term deterrence offered no
prospects for lasting peace.  As Eisenhower prepared his nation for the long pull
economically, militarily, and industrially, he concluded that deterrence was not
compatible with his vision for the Cold War.  Deterrence then became equally as immoral
as fiscal irresponsibility.  Still, he accepted deterrence in the short term.  He found it
difficult to resist this convenient answer to the Cold War’s nuclear dilemma, and he saw
no immediate desirable alternative.   While the problems inherent in deterrence, the
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increasing tension of the Cold War, and the global consequences of general war weighed
heavily on Eisenhower’s mind, he reluctantly concluded that only on the “indispensable
platform” provided by deterrence could he pursue disarmament and peace.   32
For Eisenhower, general disarmament, or reduction of nuclear and conventional
weapons to a certain low level, was attractive for several reasons.  First, a reduction of
armaments would spare the superpowers the unbearable cost of building and maintaining
massive nuclear stockpiles.  The saved resources might then be directed inward on the
domestic economy or outward on developing nations where the shadow of imperialism
had retarded economic development.  Second, Eisenhower believed that disarmament
would reduce the great fear which dominated international relations.  “If nations, large
and small, feel compelled to produce costly weapons of war because of alleged or genuine
fear of attack,” he reasoned, “these fears would be lessened and cost markedly reduced if
trustworthy agreements on levels of military power could be achieved.”   33
He believed arms reduction or disarmament might achieve a genuine international
stability.  This stability offered a far better chance at avoiding the catastrophic war which
the world needed so desperately to avoid.  Eisenhower “felt that if arrangements of this
kind could be made they would bring stability and lessen the chance of nuclear war
occurring,” Andrew Goodpaster remembered.   The president insisted that the United34
States “find a way to arrest the development of weapons of massive destruction and to
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ultimately do away with them.”  “This objective seemed paramount in his mind,” John
McCone remembered “and he related it to a real fear of an ultimate catastrophe to
civilization.”35
On March 19, 1955, Eisenhower appointed Minnesota Governor Harold Stassen
as his first Special Assistant on Disarmament.  When asked by the press about his
thinking behind the creation of Stassen’s new job, the president replied, “the concept is
very simple.”  The United States has spent “billions and billions” of dollars to build and
maintain “these sterile, unproductive agencies we call defense units and organizations”
which served only the negative purpose of security through fear.   “Fear begets fear,”36
Eisenhower lectured, and the arms race gathered speed.  The president sought to break the
deadlock.  So far the varying disarmament proposals from the State Department, the
Defense Department, and others in his administration had failed because they were
uncoordinated.   “To the members of the Cabinet, accustomed to long and futile37
discussions on the subject, disarmament was something as theoretical and abstract as
calculus,” Sherman Adams remembered.  “But to Eisenhower and Stassen,” he continued,
“disarmament was a real and urgent necessity of today, the only means of gaining peace
and security.”   The president expected Stassen to work with the State Department, the38
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National Security Council and other involved executive branch institutions to develop a
unified policy for disarmament.  39
To keep the moral high ground in the disarmament initiative and to make progress
toward an agreement, Eisenhower believed that honesty and openness were key.  This
seemed the only way to convince the Soviet Union of American good will and to pursue
serious disarmament discussions.  This was far easier said than done, and his failure to
penetrate the depth of Soviet secrecy crippled his disarmament talks from the beginning. 
By the time of Stassen’s appointment, Eisenhower had already tried several times to
reduce the fear of war by opening the dialogue on disarmament.  In addition to the
“Chance for Peace” speech, Eisenhower had also labored on a speech a month before
designed to explain the realities of the nuclear weapon to the public.  Under C. D.
Jackson, the drafting process for a second candid speech on the nuclear weapons began in
March 1953.   40
Special Assistant to the President Bryce Harlow outlined and drafted a speech
originally titled “Age of Peril” but renamed it “The Safety of the Republic.”  Harlow
wrote of the billions of dollars spent on weapon research, of American nuclear weapons
equivalent to 500,000 tons of TNT, and of one American weapon which exceeded the
explosive power unleashed on Germany during World War II.  Subsequent drafts
circulated through the White House, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Pentagon, and
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the State Department through the spring of 1953.  Those drafts “have since been
characterized by a single word ‘BANG!’” reporter John Lear wrote, “because they
pictured the frightful wounds a H-bomb could inflict upon the United States.”  
Jackson presented early drafts to Eisenhower, who rejected all of them as too
frightful.   A State Department version dated June 16, 1953 contained the following41
cryptic passage: “The most important problem for our national defense today is the fact
that even now the Soviet Union could drop atomic bombs on this country and that within
the next two years, under certain conditions, may be able to deliver a crippling atomic
surprise attack against us.”   A draft dated June 22, 1953 replaced the section listed42
above (“the most important problem”) with the following: “The fact of transcendent
importance for our national security today is that the Soviet atomic stockpile has now
reached to point where if delivered on target in the United States – I repeat, if delivered
on target – could injure this country gravely, both in material damage and in loss of life.” 
If they were given the time to resupply and rearm, the Soviets would be capable of
delivering another attack which would “hurt us so critically so that our ability to carry on
the war thus forced upon us would be substantially impaired.”  Eisenhower remembered43
that, upon seeing the final drafts of the Candor speech, “Jackson and I agreed that the
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exposition left the listener with only a new terror, not a new hope.”   Eisenhower sought44
a speech which “provided the opportunity to tell America and the world about the size
and strength of our atomic capabilities – and yet to do it in such a way as to make the
presentation of an argument for peaceful negotiation rather than a story told in an
atmosphere of truculence, defiance, and threat.”   He ultimately settled upon the idea of45
encouraging nuclear nations to contribute fissionable material to the United Nations
which would use the material for nuclear power.  This later became the Atoms for Peace
program.  
A related attempt at disarmament was the president’s Open Skies proposal of July
1955.  “Open Skies” would include the frank and full exchange of military capabilities
which would eliminate the secrecy on both sides which had contributed so greatly “to the
fears and dangers of surprise attack.”  From there a system of inspections and monitoring
could be implemented to guarantee compliance with any future agreements on
disarmament.  To Eisenhower it was a necessary first step.  “The successful working out
of such a system,” Eisenhower continued, “would do much to develop the mutual
confidence which will open wide the avenues of progress for all our peoples.”   He46
hoped an agreement might instill “a spirit of non-aggressiveness on both sides and so to
create a fresh atmosphere which would dispel much of the present fear and suspicion.”  47
Way, Vol. XVI, (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 1866.
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When Eisenhower spoke about Open Skies in his spontaneous but considered
remarks at the Geneva Conference of 1955, he spoke broadly of faith.  The heads of the
United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France convened in Geneva,
Switzerland in July 1955 to discuss lingering Cold War problems.  Eisenhower joined
with British Prime Minister Anthony Eden, Premier Edgar Faure of France, and Soviet
Premier Nikolai Bulganin to consider issues such as East-West trade, international
security, and the arms race.  Eisenhower delivered remarks to the delegates about his new
vision for international security through disarmament on July 21.  To safeguard the
republic after World War II America needed great strength, he explained.  The nation
rearmed and built alliances “in a partnership for peace and for mutual security.”  Since
then, the Cold War had begun and the danger of nuclear war had grown.  He believed that
the preservation of peace through the building of nuclear arms had devolved from merely
ironic to paradoxical, from bizarre to catastrophic.  Working toward peace, Eisenhower
then concluded, no longer meant only building for war.  Specifically, he announced his
pursuit of disarmament to “lighten the burdens upon the backs” and to “ease the fears of
war in the anxious hearts of people everywhere.”48
The complicating matter of any disarmament negotiation was verification.  On
one hand, the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev insisted on preserving as much as possible
the closed nature of Soviet society.  He feared any disarmament verification apparatus
that included on-site inspections or listening posts.  Any agreement, the Soviets argued,
 “Diary Entry,” February 8, 1956, Louis Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight49
David Eisenhower: The Presidency: The Middle Way, Vol. XVI, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978), 2009-10.
 “Minutes of Meeting, February 18, 1960, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as50
President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), NSC, Box 12, Special Meeting of NSC, DDE
Library, 4.
 “Harold Stassen to Dwight Eisenhower,” January 26, 1957 quoted in Louis51
Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower: The Presidency: Keeping the
236
needed reliable verification but must not reveal Soviet state secrets or provide a window
into the regime for western spies.  On the other hand, both Eisenhower and the Congress
worried that without proper verification the Soviets would cheat on any deal and augment
their own military strength as America foolishly abided by the terms of a treaty.  For
Eisenhower, the United States bargained in good faith, but the Soviets did not.  He saw
the dilemma clearly:  “all disarmament proposals stumble over the seemingly insuperable
obstacle of Soviet opposition to any kind of inspection.  Since they have so often proved
faithless to their word, we cannot consider any move that does not provide for adequate
inspection and safeguards.”   Accordingly, Eisenhower insisted on rigid monitoring and49
inspections.  He told the National Security Council “that any agreement would have no
effect and would not be signed unless an inspection system had been agreed upon, set up,
and tested.”   By early 1957, the United Nations General Assembly had referred the50
matter of disarmament to the U.N. Disarmament Commission where Open Skies and the
Soviet counterproposal languished for the rest of Eisenhower’s second term.  As the
President’s Special Assistant for Disarmament, Stassen continued to work directly with
the Disarmament Commission, the Soviets and the British to take a sound first step
toward an agreement.   The president understood the difficulty in reaching an agreement51
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with members of his own administration, Congress, and other nations.  “There is,
however, no alternative to continuation of the effort,” Eisenhower reminded Stassen,
“with all the intelligence and patience that we can bring to bear on the matter.”  52
Beginning on March 18, 1957, the major powers began a series of meetings in
London under the banner of the United Nations Disarmament Commission.  Eisenhower
succeeded in opening a dialogue with the Soviet Union about a reduction in nuclear
armaments, and the Soviet leadership expressed a willingness to discuss the matter
further.  Within this promising climate, the London talks began.  Soviet and American 
delegates labored over the issue of verification as the central issue of any disarmament
deal.  The president needed a guarantee of Soviet compliance with any agreement to
placate all doubters.  The American delegation, which included Eisenhower and Stassen,
“worked very hard to find a position in the disarmament area that is as liberal and broad-
gauged as elementary considerations of security would permit.”   In June, the53
Eisenhower administration settled on a State Department paper that outlined the United
States’ position on the first phase of disarmament.  Nations willing to agree to that paper
would pledge “to cooperate in designing, installing, and maintaining effective inspection
systems to verify compliance.”  They would further agree that each nation’s compliance
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with the agreement would be conditioned upon “continued effective operation of the
agreed inspection systems.”  Under this proposal, agreeable parties pledged not to use
nuclear weapons unless vitally necessary and “to devote all future production of
fissionable materials exclusively to non-weapons purposes.”  The deal included trust-
building measures such as the creation of initial inspection zones and a temporary nuclear
test ban.  On disarmament, the United States suggested that three months after the
conclusion of an agreement the parties disclose “inventories of fixed military installations
and numbers and locations of military forces and major designated armaments (including
nuclear weapons delivery capabilities but excluding nuclear weapons)” within the
inspection zones.  One year after the agreement, the United States and the Soviet Union
would transfer “specific quantities of designated types of armaments, substantial in
amount, significant in kind” to internationally managed storage sites.   Discussions54
dragged on with no resolution in sight.
The president exchanged letters first with Bulganin and then with Khrushchev
pleading with the Soviet leadership to change their intransigent attitude toward
disarmament negotiations.  He reiterated past overtures including Atoms for Peace and
Open Skies and became increasingly frustrated at Soviet unwillingness to conclude even
the most basic agreement to reduce the danger of nuclear war.  U.S. disarmament
proposals made since 1953 had either been ignored or rejected outright by the Soviet
Union, and Eisenhower labored to maintain his optimism.  “For several years we have
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been seeking a dependable ending to the accumulation of nuclear weapons stockpiles and
a dependable beginning of the steady reduction of existing weapons stockpiles,”
Eisenhower wrote to Khrushchev in April 1958.  “However,” Eisenhower continued, “the
Soviet Union continues to reject the concept of an internationally supervised program to
end weapons production and to reduce weapons stocks.”55
Despite his efforts, the president knew his disarmament accomplishments were
“meager, almost negligible.”  “No matter how deeply preoccupied my associates and I
became with other urgent situations,” Eisenhower later wrote, “never for a day was there
absent from our minds and organized work the search for some kind of agreement that
would mark a first, even if only a small, step toward a satisfactory disarmament plan.”
Disarmament had been a moral imperative for the nation, he believed.  “To lighten the
burdens of armaments” meant “to lessen the likelihood of war,” and “any progress would
be an important step toward the ultimate goal of establishing a universal peace with
justice and freedom.”   Fear compelled governments to amass tremendous military56
power, Eisenhower believed, but that fear had not entirely destroyed the hope for peace. 
The building of armaments by both the United States and the Soviet Union created a
system of deterrence which for the time at least was preventing war.  But Eisenhower
refused to accept the moral bankruptcy of succumbing to fear and relying on deterrence
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forever.   “Hope is more difficult to kill than men,” Eisenhower wrote, “and humanity is57
not ready spinelessly to accept the cynical conclusion that war is certain to recur, that the
law of the jungle must forever be the rule of life.”   Only though the economic, military,58
and industrial strength provided for the United States by the nuclear weapon could
Eisenhower negotiate a reduction or elimination of armaments and bolster America’s
moral standing.  “In the meantime, and pending some advance in this direction [of
disarmament], we must stay strong,” Eisenhower wrote in his diary, “particularly in that
type of power that the Russians are compelled to respect – namely, destructive power that
can be carried suddenly and en masse directly against the Russian economic structure.”   59
Eisenhower’s quest for peace through deterrence supplied the United States with moral
strength as America demonstrated her desire to remove the paralyzing fear which had
long defined the Cold War.  The president sought to retain the moral high ground for the
United States and use the atom in service of disarmament, peace, and hope.
c.  Moratorium for Peace
Eisenhower pursued a cessation to nuclear testing to contribute to the cause of
disarmament and peace.  While Eisenhower valued nuclear testing because of its
contribution to U.S. military strength through improved nuclear weapons and to industrial
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strength through the development of clean nuclear weapons to be used in Project
Plowshare, Eisenhower also emphasized the building of moral strength.  When he quoted
Luke’s Gospel to Nancy Bierce in 1960, he did so in order to articulate what he perceived
to be the great moral purpose nuclear technology served when used properly.  He
explained that nuclear weapons were necessary for defensive military strength, and he
also noted that the prohibition of tests bolstered America’s moral standing in the eyes of
the world as well.  On one hand, Eisenhower hoped to stop nuclear testing to demonstrate
to the world the United States’ steadfast commitment to peace and her hopeful vision for
the future.  On the other hand, he also sought to ease the growing controversy both in and
outside the United States over nuclear fallout from testing.  Eisenhower lamented the
harmful human effects of fallout in the United States and the South Pacific, but was never
fully convinced that nuclear fallout was as dangerous as critics suggested.  The real
danger of nuclear testing, Eisenhower believed, was increased international tension, a
continuing arms race, and a greater likelihood of nuclear war between the superpowers. 
To Eisenhower, fallout was an unfortunate political issue which unnecessarily
complicated his ability to negotiate disarmament and peace with the Soviet Union.
Eisenhower’s search for a nuclear test ban began in his first term.   According to60
Benjamin Greene, “Eisenhower entered office horrified at the thought of nuclear war” as
a result of watching a top secret film on Operation Ivy and of hearing only nine months
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later of the Soviet Union’s first thermonuclear detonation.   In May 1954, the National61
Security Council debated a testing moratorium which Eisenhower seemed inclined to
endorse.  The president worried in particular about the size of recent Soviet nuclear tests
and about the ability of the Soviet Union to hide future tests from the international
community.  His primary concern was how a moratorium might contribute to peace and
security in the Cold War.  He “could perceive no final answer to the problem of nuclear
warfare if both sides simply went ahead making bigger and better nuclear weapons.” 
Though he did not want the Soviets to surpass the United States in nuclear arms, he
thought it wrong “to take a negative view of this terrible problem.”  “We must try to find
some positive answer” to this deep “despair” caused by looking out at “a future which
contained nothing but more and more bombs,” the president offered.  He warned that if
the United States continued on “a course which had no future for us” then nuclear testing
would only enhance “our capability to destroy.”   The idea of test cessation of any sort62
met significant opposition from some of Eisenhower’s key advisers including Lewis
Strauss and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  But Eisenhower’s failure to achieve a test ban in his
first term, according to Greene, was the result of “a series of highly complex technical
matters beyond [Eisenhower’s] realm of understanding.”63
Between the first failed push toward a moratorium and the presidential election of
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1956, the controversy surrounding fallout from nuclear testing grew at a considerable
rate.  In the United States and around the world, politicians and citizens grew more
organized and vocal in their concerns about nuclear fallout.  The global fallout
controversy began in Japan on March 14, 1954, the day the Lucky Dragon returned to
Yaizu harbor.  Two weeks earlier, on March 1, 1954, the Atomic Energy Commission
had begun a series of nuclear tests code-named Castle.  Bravo, the curiously named first
shot of the Castle series, unexpectedly released a large amount of radiation upon
detonation and generated a significant amount of radioactive fallout.  After a gray ash
began falling in the immediate area, American naval units stationed in the vicinity began
to evacuate islanders and took precautions to decontaminate their own ships.  Eighty-five
miles away, however, Japanese fisherman aboard the Lucky Dragon soon experienced a
light rain accompanied by a white ash almost like snow.  The Lucky Dragon was dusted
with radioactive fallout.  Because the boat had inadvertently strayed into the test zone
unnoticed by the AEC, the fisherman had not been made aware of the potential danger
and they took no steps to decontaminate themselves, their vessel, or their catch.   When64
the crew returned to harbor on March 14, a majority of the crew presented symptoms of
radiation poisoning, and two days later Japanese newspapers reported that the men had
been made ill by an atomic test.   American newspapers picked up the story, and they65
looked to the government for more information about the dangers of nuclear fallout.  “It
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is quite clear that this time something must have happened that we have never
experienced before,” Eisenhower admitted.  “Very properly,” he continued, “the United
States has to take precautions that never occurred to them before.”   The president66
“expressed regret over the incident on March 1 in which 23 Japanese fisherman were
injured – one fatally – by the fall-out of radioactive materials following a nuclear test in
the Pacific.”   67
The Castle-Bravo test and the Lucky Dragon incident soon spurred new
investigations into fallout.  In a meeting of May 24, 1954, Brigadier General Kenneth E.
Fields, head of the Atomic Energy Commission’s office of military applications,
illustrated in graphic detail what would have happened had Bravo been detonated in
Washington, D.C.   The nation’s capital, Philadelphia, and New York would have
received lethal amounts of radioactive fallout which would have stretched as far north as
Maine.   Ralph Lapp, a independent journalist, soon published articles explaining the68
details of fallout in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and the New Republic.  According to
Hewlettt and Holl, the feeling in Washington was the “sweet taste of success with a
sickening reality: mankind had succeeded in producing a weapon that could destroy large
areas and threaten life over thousands of square miles.”  When Lewis Strauss told the69
White House press corps that the United States’ new hydrogen bomb could be built large
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enough to destroy an entire city, any city, the public debate accelerated.   70
In the United States, politicians, scientists, activists, and ordinary citizens began a
campaign for less secrecy regarding atomic weapons and a halt to nuclear testing. 
Around the world, Castle-Bravo and the Lucky Dragon prompted widespread
condemnation.  From Jawaharlal Nehru to Albert Schweitzer to Pope Pius XII, world
leaders expressed great concern about thermonuclear testing and fallout.  Even in Great
Britain, the United States’ staunch ally in the Cold War, Labour Party leaders in
Parliament advised Prime Minister Churchill’s government to seek a bilateral test ban
with the Soviet Union.   The U.S. government’s release of an unclassified version of the71
Operation Ivy film which chronicled the world’s first thermonuclear test further
stimulated national and international concern over nuclear testing and fallout.72
On February 15, 1955, to meet the growing controversy, the Eisenhower
administration released its first official report on Castle-Bravo in particular, and of fallout
in general.  The report addressed nuclear fallout and its effects on the human population.
The report further described the danger from Strontium-90, a radioactive isotope created
by nuclear explosions, but concluded that “the amount of radiostrontium now present in
the soil as a result of all nuclear explosions to date would have to be increased many
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thousand times before any effect on humans would be noticeable.”   The total exposure73
of human populations to radioactive products was only a fraction of that which
individuals would receive over their lifetimes from normal background radiation.   The74
risk of radioactive fallout was far less than the immediate threat of communism to the
security of the free world, the author of the report concluded.
With the public debate increasing in volume, Eisenhower hoped the report would
calm the situation.  He admitted that the issue of nuclear weapons was “one of the most
serious problems facing us today.”  But the purpose of the Atomic Energy Commission’s
report was to provide the public “a considerable amount of information on the effects of
thermonuclear weapons, and, particularly, the fallout,” he continued.  “You have to look
facts in the face,” the president reminded the nation, and “you have to have the stamina to
do it without just going hysterical.”  On the issue of fallout, Eisenhower refused to state
clearly if he believed fallout was as dangerous as others had argued.  “There could be
very serious consequences” downwind of test sites, but “it is also possible for the
individual to take care of himself.”   In March 1955, Eisenhower seemed genuinely75
unsure if fallout posed a serious health hazard to human beings in the United States and
around the world. 
In December 1955, The Scientific Monthly published a study titled “Effects of
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Nuclear Weapons Testing,” which had some impact on Eisenhower.  The author, Gordon
Dunning, was a medical doctor with the Atomic Energy Commission and his analysis was
quite optimistic.  He concluded that the radioactivity emitted from nuclear tests was
negligible and did not constitute a significant threat to human health.  He did note some
exceptions, including Lucky Dragon sailors and the Marshallese people both of whom
were directly affected by fallout from the Castle-Bravo test.  Dunning cited only one
death in the case of the Lucky Dragon and explained that fatality resulted from hepatitis
which he argued was not directly attributable to radiation.  Anecdotally, he asserted that
the tuna exposed to nuclear fallout on the Lucky Dragon would be “considered safe for
unlimited consumption.”   The testing of nuclear weapons did not pose a serious threat to76
Americans and furthermore, he concluded, any associated risks were necessary and
acceptable because “the continuation of our nuclear testing program is mandatory to the
defense of our country.”   77
Eisenhower seemed to accept this view then and later.  “The best scientific
information available,” Eisenhower later wrote, “indicated that the present level of testing
did not imperil the health of humanity, while our latest tests were enabling scientists to
learn better methods for reducing fallout.”   The president placed his faith in testimony78
from the Atomic Energy Commission and the National Academy of Sciences, “the
nation’s foremost scientific body,” which contradicted the “misleading statements
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presented by partisans on the advice of their ‘experts.’”  The view that radioactivity from79
nuclear weapons tests posed no significant biological hazard to humans was further
supported by a National Academy of Sciences study of October 1956.   “That is the80
authoritative document by which I act up to this moment,” he told the press, “ because
there has been no change that I know of.”  The Academy “gave a very full discussion of
the whole matter,” including a discussion of radiation exposure “from natural sources.” 
From the sun all the way “down even to include phosphorous on the dial of your watch”
background radiation existed and fallout contributed only minimally to that slight risk. 
Indeed, when and where scientists disagreed on this issue, they were either “out of their
own field of competence” or participating in “an organized affair.”   In addition to81
scientists, politicians also entered the debate.  In the 1956 presidential contest, Democrat
Adlai Stevenson criticized the president for his failure to enact a test ban treaty. 
Eisenhower did his best not to address the fallout controversy in his campaign.  The
president thought that the matter was far too complex for a political campaign. 
Eisenhower won in 1956 by an even greater margin than in 1952, but Stevenson had
succeeded in interjecting fallout into the political debate, a development Eisenhower
detested.  
For Eisenhower the danger of fallout had been exaggerated. “The widespread and
growing fear of radioactive fallout from nuclear tests was, according to the best
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authorities, unreasoning,” Eisenhower later explained, “but it was real.”   Testing itself82
was not evil, but many “have been brought to believe that it is.”  Terrifying weapons such
as flamethrowers and fire bombs produced great blast and heat, but were accepted as tools
of war, Eisenhower reasoned.  The danger of radioactivity was little understood and
“therefore deeply feared by populations.”   As a result, Eisenhower felt obliged to83
respond to public fear about fallout.  
Through a test ban, Eisenhower believed he could steer the conversation toward
his efforts at peace.  “Everybody seems to think that we’re skunks, saber-rattlers and
warmongers,” Eisenhower complained in 1954, “we ought not to miss any chance to
make clear our peaceful objectives.”  The president saw the potential for a great public
relations coup for the United States.  Assuming the maximum possible effectiveness in
nuclear weapons had been achieved, “it might give us a tremendous psychological
advantage over the enemy if we could propose a moratorium on future tests.”84
Eisenhower “accepted that the abolition of tests would probably hurt us comparatively in
a military sense,” but believed the national credibility and demonstration of American
good will served the United States’ interest as well.  Eisenhower told the former
Manhattan Project scientist and Columbia University professor Isidor Rabi that “our
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world situation requires that we achieve the political benefits of this action.”   The85
peoples of the world seemed greatly more afraid of atomic warfare than “the long list of
Russian violations of agreements,” Eisenhower concluded, and he insisted that the United
States take steps which account for and take advantage of that reality.   It was “simply86
intolerable to remain in a position wherein the United States, seeking peace, and giving
loyal partnership to our allies, is unable to achieve an advantageous impact on world
opinion.”  To pursue a test ban promised political and psychological rewards far beyond
any risk to America’s military standing.  In addition, as he explained, the pursuit of a test
ban offered “some basis for hope for our people and for world opinion.”  87
Test ban negotiations however proved even more difficult than he imagined.  The
principal problem for the Eisenhower administration in negotiating a test ban treaty with
the Soviet Union was that Eisenhower did not trust Soviet leaders to honor any bargain
struck by the two sides.  Issues of psychological advantage, fallout, disarmament, hope,
and peace all motivated Eisenhower to reach an agreement, but the Soviets, Eisenhower
believed, did not reciprocate that sincerity.  Some of Eisenhower’s advisers, including
Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Strauss, warned the president about Soviet
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duplicity, a characteristic the president well understood.   “The Soviets had no intention88
of allowing a true agreement on nuclear testing,” Eisenhower told his staff in January
1959, but the United States needed to press the issue to achieve either an agreement or a
propaganda advantage.    89
In order for Eisenhower to have faith in any agreement with the Soviet Union, the
agreement needed reliable safeguards to guarantee complete compliance.  Eisenhower
however was convinced that modern technology provided the answer to the verification
problem that he required.  The twin pillars of verification of compliance were monitoring
and inspections.  Eisenhower insisted that the two parties agree to a system of
appropriately situated monitoring stations both in and around the territorial boundaries of
the superpowers in order to detect any underground or atmospheric nuclear test.  If any
doubt arose about a suspected test, inspection teams would be sent in to ascertain whether
a test had been conducted.  Already wary about monitoring stations that would be placed
so close to Soviet territory, inspections proved another great hurdle.  The Soviets greatly
valued the secrecy of their state and worked hard to preserve it.  To allow both
monitoring stations and on-site inspections threatened the secrecy of the Soviet Union. 
To sacrifice that secrecy meant to give away the only real advantage the Soviets
possessed.  Despite these difficulties, Eisenhower continued to press his advisors to find
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an agreement, “even if the arrangement is not necessarily a perfect one.”  If the Soviets
rejected an unlimited number of inspections per year, for example, the number of manned
or unmanned stations would be need to be increased in order to compensate.  90
As negotiations toward a test ban limped along, Eisenhower became increasingly
concerned about America’s testing program.  In December 1956, he “expressed some
doubt as to the advisability” of a series of nuclear tests proposed by the Atomic Energy
Commission for the beginning of May 1957.   The following summer, John Foster91
Dulles noted that “the President had been appalled by the number of these tests.”  92
According to Dulles, the president worried that, because he had said the country was on
track to build smaller, clean bombs, large tests struck at the president’s credibility.  “The
main dilemma in conducting tests of this magnitude,” the president explained, “is that of
planning and carrying out extensive tests on the one hand while professing a readiness to
suspend testing in a disarmament program on the other.”  This conduct “may bring
accusations of bad faith,” he noted.   Although he approved the Hardtack series of 1958,93
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he argued that the clean weapons test of 1958, Operation Pinon, “should be called off.”   94
In late March 1958, Eisenhower heard from British Prime Minister Macmillan
about the possible Soviet testing moratorium, and the president “gave very serious
thought to anticipating a possible Soviet move on suspension of testing by a statement of
our own.”  The United States was “being pushed into a rather difficult position from the
standpoint of world opinion,” he understood, but maintained that the best course of action
at that point was to do nothing.   He also did not want to announce a moratorium until95
after the British had completed an important test series of their own.  On March 31, 1958,
the Soviet Union announced a suspension of nuclear tests.  The Soviet moratorium
followed a series of tests begun the previous August which sometimes included
numerous, multiple-megaton bombs detonated in a single day.  In a letter to the new
Soviet Chairman Nikita Khrushchev, Eisenhower noted the irony.  “It seems peculiar that
the Soviet Union, having just concluded a series of tests of unprecedented intensity
should now, in bold headlines, say that it will not test again,” Eisenhower noted, “but add,
in small type, that it may test again if the United States carries out its already long
announced and now imminent series of tests.”  Eisenhower reminded the new chairman
that a stoppage of tests was merely a means toward disarmament and requested the new
Soviet leader reexamine his government’s attitude toward Eisenhower’s previous
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proposals for disarmament.  “Surely, the heart of the nuclear problem is not the mere
testing of weapons,” the president reasoned, “but the weapons themselves.”   Still, the96
Soviets had beaten Eisenhower to the punch on announcing a test suspension and the
president knew it.  The Soviet moratorium frustrated Eisenhower personally and wounded
him politically.  At his press conference of April 2, Eisenhower referred to the “testing
thing” as simply “a side issue,” “a gimmick,” and something not be taken seriously.   97
He took steps to repair the damage done to America’s international reputation.  In
addition to considering seriously a matching American moratorium, Eisenhower
instructed Dulles to chair a new committee aimed at revising the administration’s
disarmament proposals.  He also proposed to Khrushchev a disarmament conference in
Geneva.  At the conference to begin on July 1, scientists from the United States, Western
Europe and the Soviet bloc would join to discuss detection of nuclear tests.  If he decided
to institute his own testing moratorium, he wanted reliable means to verify the Soviet
pledge through a conference of experts in Switzerland.   Soviet and American scientists98
at the conference ultimately reached an agreement on four technical methods to detect
nuclear tests.   On August 12, 1958, Dulles wrote Eisenhower to inform him of the99
impending agreement and the urgent need for an official administration policy on nuclear
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testing.   According to Eisenhower, “world opinion is shifting, if not toward the Soviets,100
at least away from the West because of our alleged intransigence about all aspects of
nuclear testing and so on.”  To regain the moral high ground, Eisenhower could not wait
out of a fear that the Soviets would argue that America only begrudgingly entered into a
moratorium out of guilt when Eisenhower genuinely sought to emphasize American good
will and sincere pursuit of disarmament and peace.101
On August 22, 1958, Eisenhower announced the United States would halt nuclear
testing for one year.  The president briefly celebrated the success at Geneva and proposed
that all nuclear powers begin negotiations for a worldwide suspension of nuclear testing
and control system based on the Geneva experts’ agreement.  His moratorium was to be a
key step toward an abolition of tests, control of weapons, and ultimately disarmament. 
“To facilitate the detailed negotiations,” Eisenhower continued, “the United States is
prepared, unless testing is resumed by the Soviet Union, to withhold further testing on its
part of atomic and hydrogen weapons for a period of one year from the beginning of the
negotiations.”  The United States also pledged to renew the moratorium, assuming
satisfactory progress in negotiations on a yearly basis for an indefinite period of time.  For
now, the moratorium would begin on October 31.  The president genuinely believed the
moratorium would lead to further discussions and “more substantial agreements relating
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to limitation and reduction of fissionable material for weapons and to other essential
phases of disarmament.”   102
Eisenhower made this proposal with great hope for the future of the atomic world,
and in doing so the president sought to restore worldwide faith in America’s peaceful
intentions.  According to one source, Eisenhower “saw a test ban as necessary in a long-
term solution to the danger of nuclear warfare.”   The United States held a moral103
obligation, the president believed, to begin the end of the nuclear arms race and to relieve
the dread of the overall atomic menace.  Testing was an obstacle to progress.  As nations
continued to test nuclear weapons, their capacity to destroy improved and international
tension increased.  American tests made hollow Eisenhower’s  push for disarmament and
made the United States appear guilty of poisoning the world’s air, soil, and water.  The
more American bombs exploded, the more the world became convinced that the United
States was a nation to be feared, not loved, a nation that wanted war, not peace. 
Eisenhower pursued a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union and instituted the
American testing moratorium because he sought to take concrete steps toward
disarmament and because he wanted to demonstrate to his friends and enemies his
nation’s sincere desire for peace.  The pursuit of these broad goals served U.S. national
interests, Eisenhower believed, because they announced to the world the United States’
firm intention to encourage constructive dialogue, to support basic human morality, and
to defend the rights of all citizens to live in peace with their neighbors.
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d.  The Hope of Peace in the Nuclear Age
In the nuclear age, Eisenhower’s central dilemma was to preserve the hope of a
bright future despite the great fear of a perpetual arms race, nuclear weapons
proliferation, and thermonuclear war.  The buildup of nuclear weapons and technology as
directed by Eisenhower afforded the United States financial, military, and industrial
strength.  That same growth in strength however generally increased the danger if not the
likelihood of nuclear war.  Fear followed, and throughout Eisenhower’s administration,
Americans’ worry about nuclear war grew.  A national poll conducted by the American
Institute of Public Opinion in February 1953 showed that 66 percent of Americans
believed that the hydrogen bomb would be used against their country if another war
began.  The percentage steadily grew from 63 percent in April 1954 to 71 percent in May
1957.  In May 1958, three out of four Americans believed the hydrogen bomb would be
used against the United States in the event of war.   104
Within this climate of fear, Eisenhower also had to compete with the fearful
images of nuclear war in American popular culture.  The film On the Beach for example,
which premiered on December 17, 1959 depicted the end of human civilization after a
massive nuclear war.  Nevil Shute, the author of the novel upon which the film was
based, and the movie’s director Stanley Kramer hoped the graphic images of nuclear
holocaust would force world leaders to eliminate the threat of nuclear annihilation
through whatever means necessary.  For Eisenhower, On the Beach presented problems. 
 Philip K. Scheuer, “Chilling ‘On the Beach’ Premiers in 18 Nations,” Los105
Angeles Times, December 18, 1959, part 1, pg. 2.
258
On the one hand, Eisenhower and his advisors feared the film would be a huge success
and convince Americans that the world would be best served by unilateral nuclear
disarmament and by joining radical “ban-the-bomb” organizations.  On the other hand,
the film threatened to erode American moral strength by feeding the overwhelming fear
of nuclear war.  The depictions of death from nuclear fallout might bring a spiritual and
emotional depression.  The film’s main characters wait for the fallout cloud to descend
upon the last bastion of human existence in Australia.  As the cloud can not be stopped,
humanity ends with the closing credits.  To Eisenhower’s great dismay, On the Beach
offered no hope for the future of a nuclear world.
Many observers anticipated that On the Beach would be a huge success.  Large
advertisements like those in the Los Angeles Times celebrated the film as a “really
extraordinary motion picture event.”   Dr. Robert M. Hutchins of the Fund for the105
Republic called On the Beach “no ordinary film” as it dealt seriously with the “greatest
threat hanging over our free society,” atomic war, and Dr. Linus Pauling thought it would
be remembered for saving the world.  
While the book described the war in detail, the motion picture showed only the
results.  Viewers are told early on that radioactive fallout from a nuclear exchange is
expected to arrive in Australia in five months.  Apparently nothing can be done to stop it. 
The main characters attempt to live out their lives with as much dignity, strength, and
enjoyment as possible.  Produced and directed by Stanley Kramer, the film starred
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Gregory Peck as Captain Dwight Towers, commander of the American submarine
Sawfish which is patrolling the South Pacific when the war begins.  He and his crew are
all that remained of the United States.  Ava Gardner plays Moira Davidson, an Australian
socialite whose free-wheeling approach to life only compounds her despair in the final
days.  Fred Astaire portrays the cynical scientist, Julian Osborn, who fulfills his final wish
of racing automobiles before his death.  Anthony Perkins plays Australian Navy
lieutenant Peter Holmes whose primary role is to counteract the overwhelming feeling of
dread felt by his wife, Mary, played by Donna Anderson.  
In a moment of high drama, the Holmes family hosts a party which quickly
deteriorates into a discussion on the cause of the deadly war and the fate of mankind. 
“We’re all doomed, you know.  The whole, silly, drunken, pathetic lot of us,” Julian
laments, “Doomed by the air we’re about to breath.”  “Stop it! I won’t have it, Julian”
Mary screams.  “There is hope.  There has to be hope.  There’s always hope.  We just
can’t go on like this. We can’t,” she cries.   In the meantime, the Australian Navy106
detects a radio signal which seems to originate in California where, according to data, no
one should be alive to send a message.  Captain Towers and his crew, along with Osborn
and Holmes, volunteer to make the hopeful journey north both to find the source of the
signal and to see if the radiation levels have lessened from rain and snow.  In San Diego,
the crew discovers that the signal was being made by a soda bottle which dangled from a
cord and was being raised and lowered by the wind on a telegraph machine.  
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After the return of the Sawfish to Australia, Australians begin to line up to collect
from their government poison pills to avoid an excruciating death from radiation
poisoning.  The characters manage to entertain one another, racing cars, having dinner
parties, and relaxing on the beach.  But as the time approaches, they become more
depressed and hopeless.  Osborn sits in his race car in the garage, running the engine and
asphyxiating himself in carbon monoxide.  Holmes and his wife poison their daughter and
themselves.  Powers enjoys his time with Davidson, but his crew elects to return to the
United States to die rather than remain in a foreign land.  The Sawfish sails just as
Davidson arrives at the harbor, late and left behind.  The final scene shows an empty
downtown area with garbage blowing in the poisoned wind, and the banner reminding
audiences “there is still time, . . . brother.”   107
As the premiere of On the Beach drew near, the Eisenhower administration
prepared for the worst.  The Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) of Eisenhower’s
National Security Council distributed an information packet prepared in early December
1959 by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the State Department to U.S.
missions in cities around the world.  The packet provided an official response to
questions likely to be raised about the film and instructed personnel how to conduct
themselves to achieve the desired result.  The USIA and State Department advocated
exposing the film’s fundamental flaws and then letting the issue die from neglect.  “Our
attitude should be one of matter-of-fact interest, showing no special concern,” the Board
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recommended, and “We should refrain from public criticism of the film, which would be
counter-productive.”  The administration should be equally careful to “avoid any
implications of U.S. government approval.”  Beyond this, the merits of the film should be
discussed only in private and only when necessary.   108
U.S. officials overseas were instructed to concentrate on what the USIA and State
Department saw as the three major issues raised by On the Beach.  First, viewers might
have a “strong emotional experience” and emerge with an urgency to push for nuclear
disarmament.  In this case, officials should stress that the U.S. government was pursuing
this objective and that “real progress is attainable.”  Second, if “the scientific inaccuracies
mislead people and drive them to pressure for ban-the-bomb-type solutions to the nuclear
weapons problem,” officials should stress two major flaws in the film’s scientific data. 
One, fallout from a war in the northern hemisphere would never reach the southern
hemisphere even if the maximum number of nuclear weapons were used.  Two, despite
the film’s portrayal of a civilian population with no options, civil defense measures
currently in place would save humans from fallout.  The third and final point concerned
the human response to disaster conditions and reflected Eisenhower’s commitment to the
preservation of hope in the nuclear age.  “The film grossly misconstrues the basic nature
of man,” the Board argued.  “The resort to mass suicide is not only unnecessary but
wholly fatalistic, misinterpreting the vitality of the human spirit,” they continued, “It is
inconceivable that even in the event of a nuclear war, mankind would not have the
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strength and ingenuity to take all possible steps toward self-preservation.”  109
Eisenhower’s cabinet discussed On the Beach in a meeting of December 11, 1959. 
“In view of the attempts made [by third parties] to get Cabinet members, collectively or
individually, to endorse or even sponsor the December 18 Washington premiere, and to
attend it,” the Operations Coordinating Board thought to provide the appropriate
information to Cabinet members.    Karl Harr informed the Cabinet that the110
“unprecedented publicity given to this movie” made its discussion by the Cabinet
necessary.  He reiterated the contents of the USIA-State instruction sheet.  Former Iowa
Governor Leo Hoegh of the Office of Civil Defense Mobilization took particular offense
at the film’s effect of undermining civil defense initiatives.  Governor Hoegh found the
film “very harmful because it produced a feeling of utter hopelessness.”  
The problem the film presented for the Eisenhower administration was not the
threat of nuclear war but the image of a world without hope.  Though the actual war did
not appear on the screen, the post-war world was hardly one worth living in; life would
soon be over and there was little that any person could do but wait for the end.  
Eisenhower recognized that any nuclear war would cost a huge number of American
lives, but the nation and its people would live for another day.  To combat the kind of
hopelessness On the Beach fostered, Eisenhower had six years earlier considered
Operation Candor, a program intended to brief Americans on the survivability of nuclear
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war, but he had abandoned it because as the ideas proved too morbid for distribution to
the American people.   When On the Beach hit theaters in 1959, Candor had long been
extinct, but the threat of nuclear war remained.  The Eisenhower administration prepared
for the film’s release with trepidation, anticipating some public reaction to the film.  But
no significant public response came.  A fear of nuclear war already existed in the United
States by 1959.  Gallup Polls indicated that civil defense drills and government-sponsored
scientific reports on nuclear war had already made Americans aware of perils of the
atomic age.  Perhaps because Americans resisted looking forward to a world without
hope or perhaps because they had already been contemplating this world for some time,
Americans recognized the fallacies of On the Beach and were largely unaffected by the
film.  To the delight of the Eisenhower administration, the movie was not the blockbuster
some had anticipated, and it had little measurable effect on America’s fears of nuclear
war.
On the Beach debuted to mostly negative reviews.  Newspapers, popular and
scientific magazines, as well as religious publications all condemned the film as too dark,
too morbid, and too implausible.  “Although possessing unwavering concern for life,”
film historian Joseph Keyerleber wrote, On the Beach “is a film of overwhelming
nondistinction.”   Viewers did not respond to the film the way producer-director Stanley111
Kramer hoped or the way the Eisenhower administration feared.  Kramer meant for the
film to be powerful and thought-provoking, and officials in Washington feared it would
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be powerful and thought-numbing, pushing people either to indulge in hysteria or to join
pacifist movements.   Robert Hatch, a reviewer for The Nation, noted the applause112
which erupted at the film’s end.  “That is unusual movie-house behavior,” he wrote, “and
I wondered what they were applauding.  Had they ‘enjoyed’ the picture or were they glad
to be alive?”  113
The depiction of human nature in the film greatly disturbed many in both popular
and religious publications.  Life commented that the film would prove controversial as
critics would shun a film suggesting that “real people would die with so little shouting”
and advocating the use of suicide pills.   Hatch argued that Kramer’s expectations of114
human behavior in the face of the end of the world were “optimistic to the point of
fantasy.”  When all hope is gone, “men do not go about muttering ‘bad show’ and
preparing for decorous death.  They turn horribly mad.”   America, a Catholic115
publication, thought On the Beach suffered “from the inability of human skill and
imagination to measure up to its awful theme.”    116
But a writer for Catholic World best articulated the general concern over the
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film’s lack of hope.  James Schall argued that Kramer had intended to make a film which
brought to the world a message of hope that “men will realize the danger of the present
situation.”   Schall quoted Kramer:  “There are differences and fears and mistrust in this117
world and always the sober reminder of the need for realistic thinking.  We have tried to
be aware of this, and then tried to transcend it by a concept of hope on celluloid – namely,
to reach out to the hearts of people everywhere that they might feel compassion – for
themselves.”    Despite Kramer’s intent, for Schall the movie offered no hope at all. 118
Man should have demanded of himself that life should not be destroyed on the earth; life
should continue and should be peaceful.  But Kramer’s film did not demonstrate any
measure of hope as man accepted death calmly and willingly.  Schall expected a film
about the hope of humanity, but left the theater disappointed.   On the Beach depicted119
the exact image of a hopeless world that the Eisenhower rejected.  Eisenhower opted
instead for Atoms for Peace which he imagined would prove uplifting and full of hope in
a world with nuclear power.
Eisenhower’s single most important initiative aimed at restoring hope was Atoms
for Peace which he announced before the General Assembly of the United Nations in
December 1953.  “I know that the American people share my deep belief,” Eisenhower
told the United Nations, “that if a danger exists in the world, it is a danger shared by all –
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 1, 814-17.120
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and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that hope should be shared by
all.”  The proliferation of atomic weapons from the United States to the Soviet Union and
Great Britain suggested that soon other nations might also possess the atomic bomb, the
president noted, and the danger of massive surprise attack and subsequent retaliation
would not only persist but grow.  But, Eisenhower continued, “to pause there would be to
confirm the hopeless finality of a belief that two atomic colossi are doomed malevolently
to eye each other indefinitely across a trembling world.”  He rejected the state of
perpetual fear.  “My country’s purpose is to help us move out of the dark chamber of
horrors into the light,” he continued, “to find a way by which the minds of men, the hopes
of men, the souls of men everywhere, can move forward toward peace and happiness and
well being.”  120
The president hoped to trade fear for hope.  “In the capitals and military
headquarters of the world; in the hearts of men everywhere, be they governors or
governed, may they be the decisions which will lead this world out of fear and into
peace,” Eisenhower hoped.  He imagined that he might be able to redeploy the atomic
weapon to the cause of peace, “to help solve the fearful atomic dilemma,” and “to find the
way by which the miraculous inventiveness of man shall not be dedicated to his death,
but consecrated to his life.”   Eisenhower told his brother Milton only three days after121
the speech that he believed Atoms for Peace might “bring some hope to replace fear in
 “Eisenhower to Milton,” December 11, 1953, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower122
as President, 1953-1961 (Ann Whitman File), Name Series, 12, Eisenhower, Milton 1952
thru 1953 (2), DDE Library, 1.
 Ferrell, ed., The Eisenhower Diaries, 261.123
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 5, 207-8.124
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the world.”   In his diary Eisenhower wrote that in his Atoms for Peace speech he122
intended “to make a clear effort to get the Soviet Union working with us in some phase of
this whole atomic field that would have only peace and the good of mankind as a goal.”  123
Though Eisenhower offered few specifics in his original Atoms for Peace
proposal, the program ultimately included a variety of measures aimed at either a
reduction of fissile material available for bombs or the peaceful applications of atomic
energy.  To accomplish both tasks, he hoped to have all nuclear powers donate fissile
material to an international bank held by the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).   “The International Atomic Energy Agency would provide a practical meeting
place–a common ground of cooperative effort among nations,” Eisenhower wrote in a
message to Congress in March 1957.  Americans had already seen the potential benefit of
the peaceful atom, Eisenhower remarked, including “electric power, treatment of disease,
and extraordinary service to agriculture, industry and science itself.”  Other peoples in
other nations of the world also saw the “great hope of the atom for the development of
their economies and advancement of their welfare,” he continued.  The president
explained that the primary purpose of the IAEA would be for improve the lives of the
world’s citizens as well as a demonstration “of our fixed and unending determination to
open and widen all possible avenues toward a just and enduring world peace.”124
 “Letter to Strauss from Eisenhower,” February 23, 1965, Papers of Lewis L.125
Strauss, 1917-1974, Atomic Energy Commission Series, Box 26E, Eisenhower, Dwight
D., 1959-1961, Hoover Library, 1.
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Atoms for Peace also involved the pursuit of international agreements to help
stem the proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Eisenhower imagined he could allow
individual nations to share the benefits of nuclear power and scientific knowledge without
giving away the bomb itself.  It was a difficult balancing act.  On one hand, Eisenhower
needed to convince the world of the United States’ sincerity to use atoms for peaceful
purposes by providing the neediest nations with nuclear technology in support of
electrical power where none had previously been available.  On the other hand, if the
United States provided too much information and technology, the receiving nation might
easily turn Eisenhower’s good intentions into weapons of war and increase the number of
nuclear-armed nations dramatically in a short period of time.  “But there is a great feeling
that the atom can and should be used in a variety of peaceful uses,” Eisenhower told
Lewis Strauss, “and I believe that every country that wants to work toward this end
should be encouraged.”   125
Accordingly, the Eisenhower administration negotiated agreements to establish
atomic research reactors in foreign countries.  Through these “research bilaterals” the
United States government provided unclassified information on the design, construction,
and operation of atomic reactors.  Because the U.S. also promised to provide enriched
uranium to participating nations, those nations had to promise to institute safeguards for
the protection of that material, to allow American inspections of the facilities, and to
return spent nuclear fuel to the United States.  The first research bilateral was signed
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between the U.S. and Turkey.  Thirty-seven more agreements were concluded by the end
of 1961.   126
In addition to the bilateral treaties, Eisenhower supervised the negotiations of
EURATOM, the European Atomic Energy Community, which was a pact designed to
promote the generation of electrical power for European industry.   In the midst of a127
disagreement with the Atomic Energy Commission over the implementation of Atoms for
Peace and EURATOM, Eisenhower announced he would make available to foreign
nations fissile material under the authority provided by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954.  
“This action demonstrates the confidence of the United States in the possibilities of
developing nuclear power for civilian uses,” Eisenhower stated in February 1956.  “It is
an earnest of our faith that the atom can be made a powerful instrument for the promotion
of world peace,” he concluded.   According to Hewlett and Holl, Eisenhower put128
pressure on the AEC to move quickly toward EURATOM because the president believed
that a European atomic community “was a prerequisite to a stable Western alliance and
world peace.”129
To sustain America in the Cold War against an atheistic enemy, Eisenhower
believed the United States needed to bolster moral strength.  He further believed that the
nuclear weapon could serve in a variety of ways to build up this moral strength.  He
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 2, 551.130
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sought to convince the world community of the peaceful goals of the United States and
the desire to make science and technology work for the benefit of man.  Through effort
and faith, he made Atoms for Peace a part of the global dialogue and he countered Soviet
claims about American militarism.  But Atoms for Peace, like his push for disarmament
and a nuclear test ban treaty, ultimately served the larger goal of building American
strength through nuclear weapons.  “The more people in the world that understand that
atomic energy and all of the newly developed sciences can be of benefit to them and do
not have to be, and should not be, sequestered off in some dark corner to be used merely
for destructive purposes,” Eisenhower explained in a 1954 press conference, “the greater
the moral force will be in favor of general peace, general disarmament, and a better life
for all of us.”  The president struggled to accept the negative aspect of deterrence, the130
dangers inherent in weapons testing on the natural world, and the great threat of nuclear
weapons proliferation throughout the world.  But he also believed that nuclear weapons
possessed an innate potential to serve mankind.  For Eisenhower, the nuclear weapon may
not have been divinely inspired, but the basic nature of the atom had been provided by the
Almighty and because it had, the United States could use nuclear technology to support
the natural right of man to live in freedom, in peace, and without fear.  In the Cold War,
the United States needed to occupy the moral high ground in the realm of nuclear energy.
 Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, with a foreword by1
Gordon Dean (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), xi.
271
CHAPTER SEVEN: Conclusion
“A revolution cannot be mastered until it develops the mode of thinking
appropriate to it,” Henry Kissinger argued in 1957.   Rapid and dramatic advances in1
science and technology revolutionized warfare after World War II, and humans struggled
to adapt their intellectual paradigms to the new reality.  In the twelve years after the
world’s first atomic explosion, fission had begotten fusion and kilotons of explosive
power had become megatons.   The primary challenge of the nuclear age which faced
Eisenhower, his successors, the citizens of the American republic, and the inhabitants of
the world was how to reconcile the desire for security with the risk of catastrophe and
how to win a cold war when there was no alternative to peace. 
When Eisenhower became president of the United States, he faced this challenge
directly, and produced a new mode of thinking for the nuclear revolution, just as
Kissinger suggested.  Eisenhower established the basic intellectual framework for
presidential understanding and utilization of nuclear weapons in the United States, and
solidified the practice of using atomic weapons as a force for good in the world.  Because
the president understood that atomic weapons could not be uninvented, he concluded that
the United States government must expand the nation’s atomic assets and allow atomic
weapons to serve national security in a variety of ways.  
Just as he discouraged other nations from building atomic weapons, Eisenhower
emphasized the proper management for nuclear weapons technology to nourish and
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 1, 161.2
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augment American national strength in the face of Cold War threats.  He believed that
nuclear weapons contributed to economic, military, industrial, and moral strength, all of
which helped prepare and sustain the nation for the long pull against international
communism. “We have learned from bitter and conclusive experience that peace cannot
be defended by the weak,” he continued, “It demands strength – strength of our armies,
strength of our economies and, above all, strength of our spirit.”    He believed that2
cumulative national strength over the long term best served the republic because he
believed “that properly balanced strength will promote the probability of avoiding war.”3
Eisenhower believed that balanced meant strength which grew from four sources: 
“industrial and economic strength,” “necessary military strength,” and a “complete
devotion to democracy, which means a faith in men as men (essentially religious
concept)” accompanied by “moral probity in all dealings.”   The communist attack4
against the free world was “so broad in its character that we cannot be complacent in
anything, in the realm of the spirit and the intellectual world, the material world, and the
economic.”   For these reasons, Eisenhower championed the role played by nuclear5
weapons and technology, including both civilian and military uses.  The president needed
then only to abolish the taboo on the use of nuclear weapons in order to build satisfactory
strength to defend U.S. national security.
 “Estimated U.S. and Soviet/Russian Nuclear Stockpiles, 1945-1994,"  Bulletin of6
Atomic Scientists (November/December 1994), 58-9; National Resources Defense
Council, “Table of Nuclear Warheads,” [on-line]; available at http://www.nrdc.org/
nuclear/nudb/datab9.asp; accessed August 22, 2007.
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At the end of his presidency in 1961, Eisenhower could count many
accomplishments in the realm of nuclear weapons and power.  He had built a sizable
nuclear arsenal.  When he left office, America’s stockpile totaled 18,638 nuclear weapons
which could yield 20,491 megatons of explosive power.  From 1953 levels, this
represented an increase of more than 2,000 percent in the number of weapons and 400
percent increase in total explosive yield.  At the end of 2002, the United States possessed
just under 9,000 nuclear weapons, less than half the total 18,000 weapons at the end of
1960, but more than ten times the 800 weapons held by the United States at the beginning
of the Eisenhower administration.   Though the American stockpile has been reduced in6
the years since the end of the Cold War, the number of nuclear warheads has not dropped
below the pre-Eisenhower level.  In addition, Eisenhower advanced and introduced new
systems designed to deliver nuclear weapons accurately to targets around the world. 
These systems included the B-52 intercontinental jet bomber, the Jupiter, Thor, and
Polaris intermediate range ballistic missiles, and the liquid-fueled Atlas intercontinental
ballistic missile.  The solid-fueled Minuteman ICBM was also under development.  The
handful of nuclear power plants operating or scheduled to begin operating in the United
States in the early 1960s grew to 66 by 2005 and the number of reactors exceeded one
hundred four decades after Eisenhower.  The Atomic Energy Commission became the
Department of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in the 1970s, but the
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basic functions of initiation, coordination, and regulation of atomic energy projects
continued to be housed in the federal government.  Indeed, the bulk of Eisenhower’s
nuclear establishment survived his term, his life, and the twentieth century. 
During his final press conference, Eisenhower was asked what was his most
“heartbreaking failure” of his eight years in office.  “The big disappointment I felt is one
not of a mere incident,” Eisenhower explained, “it was the fact that we could not in these
8 years get to the place where we could say it now looks as if permanent peace with
justice is really in sight.”  He explained that his greatest disappointment was “that we
haven’t done better in getting a more constructive and positive indication that real
disarmament is around the corner.”    He made a similar point in his farewell message7
when he regretfully noted that “disarmament, with honor and confidence, is a continuing
imperative.”  “I confess that I lay down my official responsibilities in this field with a
definite sense of disappointment,” he concluded.    Eisenhower’s last, best push toward a8
test ban treaty with the Soviet Union and disarmament died after the downing of a U-2
spy plane over Soviet territory and the resulting collapse of the Paris Peace Conference in
1959.
Eisenhower believed another failure in the realm of nuclear weapons was his
inability to rein in the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy (JCCAE),
which he considered both anachronistic and troublesome.  In December 1960,
Eisenhower met with President-elect Kennedy at the White House.  In the midst of the
 “Diary Entry,” December 6, 1960,  Louis Galambos, ed., The Papers of Dwight9
David Eisenhower: The Presidency: Keeping the Peace, Vol. XXI, (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1978), 2193.
275
discussion, the president remarked how the JCCAE had made it more difficult for NATO
to contribute to American security because the JCCAE limited Eisenhower’s ability to
negotiate nuclear policy with his European allies without Congressional input and
oversight.  The JCCAE had been formed when the U.S. had a monopoly on atomic
weapons and secrecy was paramount.  With the monopoly broken, Eisenhower thought it
was ludicrous to allow a committee whose primary function was operational in nature and
not policy making to exercise heavy influence over decisions about nuclear policy.  He
thought the JCCAE had intervened too much in the formation of policy related to nuclear
weapons when the actual function of the Committee was to insure proper operation of
those institutions which had control over nuclear weapons.  He suggested to Kennedy that
the new president work to eliminate the committee altogether.   9
 Beyond these two tangible failures, Eisenhower also expressed concern in the last
days of administration about what exactly he had built in the pursuit of nuclear strength.
In his often-quoted farewell address to the nation, Eisenhower warned his fellow citizens
about the danger of misplaced power in the form of a military-industrial complex.  His
warning seemed to be as much an admission of responsibility for helping to create this
new danger as anything else.  The president also warned the nation in that speech about
the dangerous possibility that “public policy could itself become the captive of a
scientific-technological elite.”  In the midst of gathering nuclear resources to build
national strength for the long pull against communism, Eisenhower had simultaneously
 Eisenhower, Public Papers, vol. 8, 1039.10
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and unwittingly knocked out of balance the delicate equilibrium of American life.  In his
farewell address, Eisenhower remarked that any imbalance between the power of the state
and the rights of the individual, between the desire for security and the necessity of liberty
risked an erosion of what Eisenhower called “the supreme goals of our free society.”  10
Overall, this study makes several contributions to the scholarly literature on
Eisenhower. In contrast to a large number of works which detail what Eisenhower did or
did not accomplish in terms of nuclear weapons and energy, this works focuses on why
Eisenhower pursued the initiatives that he did.   Despite the claims of the orthodox
scholars that Eisenhower was aloof and unintelligent, it is clear that Eisenhower was the
primary intellectual architect of the nation’s nuclear policy from 1953 to 1961.  This
argument supports the conclusions of revisionist scholars such as Hewlett and Holl who
argued that Eisenhower was the guiding political force behind the nation’s nuclear policy
during his term. 
But Eisenhower was also the brains behind those policies.  The president’s
thinking about the tactical value of atomic weapons, the consequences of nuclear war, and
the desirability of fallout shelters, for example, drove him to implement policies such as
the New Look and massive retaliation.  His thinking on the costs and benefits of civilian
nuclear energy and the threat of nuclear proliferation led him to launch Atoms for Peace. 
In addition, because he believed he could negotiate peace only from a position of great
national strength, he continued to build more and better nuclear weapons, while
simultaneously lobbying for disarmament.  The common theme that unified Eisenhower’s
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disparate array of ideas and programs for nuclear weapons was the pursuit of national
strength.  Eisenhower valued and utilized as much as possible nuclear weapons in pursuit
of his national goals.  Perhaps more than any other president, he made nuclear weapons
abundant in the United States and indispensable to national security.  He used the nuclear
weapon for national strength and in the process fully integrated those weapons in national
life.
This study also supports the conclusions of post-revisionists who have argued that
Eisenhower’s successes and failures as president were his own and that the president’s
two terms were marked as much by failure as by success.  Despite the fact that he largely
conceived of and sincerely believed in the initiatives of his administration in the realm of
nuclear weapons, he met significant failures.  For example, although he instituted policies
to limit military spending through the use of nuclear weapons, the president failed to rein
in defense spending over the long term.  He did manage to balance the budget, but
spending on national defense including nuclear weapons continued to grow through the
end of his presidency.  In addition, as others have documented, the threat of massive
retaliation deterred large-scale conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union
but did not prevent communist agitation in places such as Vietnam and Cuba.  Civilian
nuclear power proved to be more complicated, expensive, and risky than the president
imagined and private electric power from nuclear reactions never became the boon for
industrial energy he hoped it would be.  Despite his efforts, Eisenhower failed to
negotiate a nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union and made no significant progress
toward disarmament.  Even worse, Atoms for Peace may have contributed to the
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proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Eisenhower did export fissile material to energy-
deprived nations under Atoms for Peace, but the proliferation of nuclear weapons
continued to France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea.  In the case of a
nuclear test ban treaty, Eisenhower’s failures were the result of his inability to gain the
support of the Congress or create a consensus among his key advisors.  The unwillingness
of the Soviet Union to compromise ruined his chances for real disarmament, and the
inability of scientists to deliver a clean nuclear weapon fatally wounded Plowshare. 
These were failures of implementation not necessarily of intellect. 
The president’s faith in the nuclear weapon to provide national strength in several
ways remained virtually unchanged throughout his two terms.  The invention of the
hydrogen bomb forced Eisenhower to reconsider the proper military function of nuclear
weapons, but he successfully adopted a strategy to integrate the new bombs.  He quite
clearly saw the fiscal and tactical benefits of the fission bomb and he sought to take
advantage of those opportunities.  The successful test of a fusion  bomb on the eve of his
election and the shocking Castle-Bravo test of 1954 startled Eisenhower into a new
reality.  The president understood immediately that the thermonuclear weapon posed new
risks and even greater dangers.  But, he was not dissuaded from using nuclear weapons to
achieve his goals.  Instead, Eisenhower devised a new strategic doctrine for the
thermonuclear weapon so he could take full advantage of this new device.  In so doing,
Eisenhower asserted the right of the United States to pursue nuclear weapons and nuclear
technology for her own national interests and the responsibility to protect the interests of
the free world by denying that right to others.  It was a burden Eisenhower willingly but
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regretfully bore as did all who have followed him as president of the United States.
Dwight Eisenhower died on March 28, 1969 at Walter Reed Army Hospital in
Washington, D.C.  Five days later on April 2, he was interred near his home on the
grounds of the Eisenhower Center in Abilene, Kansas.  He last resided in Kansas in 1911,
before the Great War, before the Russian Revolution, and even before science fiction
writer H.G. Wells had introduced the idea of an atomic bomb in his book The Last War
(1914).  Then only twenty years old, Eisenhower could never have imagined the great
responsibilities he would hold, the challenges he would face, or the power he would wield
in his long career in service to the United States of America.  As military officer and
public servant, Eisenhower struggled through two great global conflicts, World War II
and the Cold War.  In one contest, he occupied the highest military post, and, in the other,
the highest political office.  In neither contest could he afford to fail.  In World War II, he
commanded armies the size and strength of which the world had never seen.  In the Cold
War, he led the United States through the hour of maximum danger when communist
military strength and aggression made Americans more fearful than any other time in
their national history.  
At times like these, Eisenhower believed that the United States was fortunate to
possess the nuclear weapon.  He concluded that the American republic was not as
prepared as totalitarian states to manage a long, sustained conflict against a powerful
enemy, that the United States’ democratic traditions put the nation at a disadvantage in a
global Cold War, and that the nuclear weapon could provide some relief.  The nuclear
weapon was a scientific and technological springboard which could propel the nation
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ahead of the enemy in a contest in which failure was not an option.  Despite the possible
horrors of thermonuclear war, Eisenhower translated this weapon of mass destruction into
an instrument of national destiny, to be employed by the republic to advance the cause of
liberty, equality, justice, and peace. 
In his effort to build national strength with nuclear weapons, he made the bomb a
permanent fixture of the American military arsenal, the national political scene, and the
cultural landscape.  But Eisenhower did not view this entrenchment as a negative
development.  The weapon could not be uninvented, but he believed that, if the United
States used the weapon as an instrument to advance sincere national goals, then the
nuclear weapon, like all weapons, could be a force for good.  Eisenhower embedded deep
in the national conscience the premise upon which future nuclear policy would be made: 
only the United States of America had the scientific knowledge, the liberal political
tradition, the social stability, and the moral values necessary to use nuclear weapons in
the best interests of humanity.  As the Cold War progressed, and Eisenhower continued to
find ways to put the atom to work in service of the republic, he institutionalized the
nuclear bomb in American government and society.  He allowed the nuclear weapon to
become an indispensable part of the American political system and he encouraged the
search for as many possible uses for the bomb as could be found.  He eventually found
ways for the bomb to serve the nation’s economic, military, industrial, and moral
interests.  Eisenhower imagined he could provide money to the poor, power to the weak,
sustenance to the starved, and hope to the discouraged with the proper use of the nuclear
weapon. 
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Eisenhower looked for and found a comfortable and permanent place in the
American conscience for this weapon of mass destruction and every single American
chief executive since 1961 followed his lead.  Even John F. Kennedy, Eisenhower’s
successor who campaigned to “get America moving again,” found little cause or
opportunity to alter significantly the direction in nuclear policy established by
Eisenhower.  Although the Kennedy administration popularized the notion of using a
flexible nuclear response to international crises, this concept was hardly new.  Kennedy
contrasted flexible response with the rigidity of Eisenhower’s New Look and argued that
Eisenhower endangered the nation both with unacceptable weakness and unnecessary
risk.  But in the years between the administrations of Eisenhower and Nixon, the two
Democratic presidents, Kennedy and Johnson, took advantage of and retained what
Eisenhower had built.  Because of Eisenhower, those presidents could choose between
tactical atomic war or general thermonuclear war if necessary, encourage the use of
atomic energy for electrical power, rely upon an undeniable nuclear deterrent to manage
crises, steer the world away from nuclear proliferation, and continue to lead the free
world toward peace.  By abolishing the taboo on the full use of atomic and thermonuclear
weapons in both civilian and military applications, Eisenhower hoped that the United
States would not have to choose either defeat or bankruptcy, fear or war, security or
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